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Abstract
The dissertation is comprised of three essays, which study unintended effects of charter school
programs. Chapter 1 evaluates the influence of charter schools on housing values. The dynamics
between school quality and housing markets contribute to the isolation of disadvantaged students
in low performing school districts. Charter schools reduce the link between residential location
and school services, and hence potentially affect both property values and residential sorting. This
chapter examines if charter schools influence the differences in housing prices between school
districts and neighborhoods. I begin by developing a theoretical model identifying how charter
schools influence school quality and how these changes potentially affect housing prices. Utilizing
housing sale data for Upstate New York between 2000 and 2010, I estimate models comparing
changes in housing price differences between school districts and neighborhoods. I find that
charter schools do not influence the gap in housing prices between districts but affect the
differences in housing values between high and low income neighborhoods in districts with charter
schools.

Chapter 2 analyzes the location of charter schools in New York, Florida, North Carolina,
Michigan, and Ohio. I begin by describing the finance, accountability, and authorizer policies in
each state. Then, I derive location and enrollment incentives created by these policies. Estimated
negative binomial models reveal consistency between location patterns and finance provisions. In
states where charter school payments vary with district location, charter schools are more likely to
locate in districts with high expenditures holding cost and performance constant. However, in
states where charter school payments do not vary with district location, charter school location is
not influenced by district expenditures. Compensations for enrolling disadvantaged students create
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location and enrollment incentives if they are sufficient enough to cover the costs of educating
these students.

Chapter 3 examines how charter schools influence school district efficiency. Charter school
opponents and proponents have been arguing for a long time about the effect of charter schools on
district efficiency with very opposing views on the subject. Utilizing data for all New York State
school districts from 1998 to 2009, I find that charter schools increase school district efficiency
holding cost factors and district performance constant. The magnitude of the effect differs
depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect ranges between a 1.1
and 3.4 percent decrease in per pupil expenditures for enrollments between 50 and 5000 charter
school students respectively. The effect is driven by efficiency gains in the provision of education
for students in traditional public schools. The results are confirmed by several falsification tests.
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1. Introduction
Charter schools have been one of the most significant developments in U.S. education over the
last twenty years (Bifulco and Bulkley 2014). Since the first charter school program was
introduced in Minnesota in 1991, 42 states and the District of Columbia have adopted charter
school legislation. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), the
percentage of all public schools that were public charter schools increased from 1.7 to 5.8
percent between 1999/2000 to 2011/2012. In over 100 mostly urban school districts charter
schools serve more than 10 percent or the public school population. At the same time, charter
school enrollment increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million students nationwide.

Charter schools receive public funding but operate independently of their local school district. A
contract with a public agency exempts the school from selected state and local rules. In return for
funding and autonomy, the school must meet student performance standards specified in the law
and its charter. The contract usually lasts for a set number of years and must be renewed to
continue receiving public funding. To enroll into a charter school students have to apply for
admission. Charter school students can cross attendance zone and in most states district borders
making charter schools clearly a form of school choice. They do not charge tuition and
oversubscribed charter schools are normally required to select students by lottery (Nelson et al.
2000; Bifulco and Bulkley 2008).

2

Research on charter schools has been mainly interested in the effects of charter schools on
academic achievement (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Hoxby and Murarka 2007; Booker et al. 2007;
CREDO 2009; Imberman 201; Angrist 2012 et al.; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011) and segregation
and isolation of particular student groups (Bifulco and Ladd 2007; Bifulco, Ladd, and Ross 2009;
Zimmer et al. 2009; Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin 2005; Garcia 2008). Much less attention has
been paid to the unintended effects of charter schools on public finance issues. Therefore, in the
dissertation I address how charter schools influence housing prices, how charter schools financial
provisions influence the location of charter schools, and how charter schools influence school
district efficiency.

Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of charter schools on housing values. More specifically, I evaluate
whether or not the entry of charter schools lowers the difference in housing prices between
adjacent high and low performing jurisdictions. I develop a theoretical framework to analyze the
impact of charter schools on housing values. My theory describes ways in which charter schools
might influence school quality and thereby the difference in housing prices between either school
districts or neighborhoods. The first case describes a positive effect of charter schools on school
quality. The charter school is perceived as a valuable schooling option or introduces competition
among schools. However, the increase in school quality is not large enough to create an incentive
for households to move between jurisdictions. The difference in housing prices can either go up
or down depending on the relative changes in school quality between jurisdictions. The second
case illustrates an increase in school quality that is large enough to create resorting between
jurisdictions. In this case, housing price differences between jurisdictions will decrease. The
third case describes how charter schools might decrease school quality. Cream skimming of
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educationally advantaged students or a decrease in district resources can degrade school quality.
Housing values in jurisdictions with lower school quality will drop leading to an increase in the
housing price gap between high and low performing school districts.

To analyze changes in housing price differences, I utilize housing sales for New York State
between 2000 and 2010. My final sample consist of the city school districts Syracuse, Niagara
Falls, Ithaca and their adjacent districts as well as a group of comparison districts. To analyze the
change in housing price differences across districts, I estimate models comparing housing prices
between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts. Further, I compare changes in
housing prices between neighborhoods with similar income in the district with charter schools
and its adjacent districts. Also, I run regressions using a control group of districts similar to
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca.

I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between school
districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences between
neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter schools raise the price of housing by almost 6 percent in
neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar neighborhoods in
the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent in neighborhoods
with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school
district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and richer
neighborhoods in Syracuse is decreasing. The results suggests resorting between Syracuse’s
richer and poorer neighborhoods. Probably households living in Syracuse’s richer
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools,
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move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices in the richer neighborhoods fall. As
demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices in the poorer neighborhoods grow.

After charter school entry, housing prices in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods decrease
relative to neighborhoods with similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts.
Likewise, after charter school entry, Ithaca’s poorer neighborhoods experience declining housing
prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In both districts housing
prices in richer neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in
Niagara Falls and Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer
neighborhoods increases after charter school opening.

The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between
neighborhoods is more complex and context specific than described in theoretical models on
inter-district choice and voucher programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on
housing values depend on how charter schools affect expected school quality in jurisdictions.
Also, the empirical findings suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies
substantially between neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price
changes it is necessary to analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.

Chapter 3 analyzes the influence of finance provisions on charter school location patterns by
comparing different states. Supply decisions by charter school operators play an important role in
determining which students have access to charter schools, which schools will be subject to
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charter school competition, what effects charter schools will have on school and residential
segregation, and ultimately on the distribution of the costs and benefits created by charter
schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2014).

The chapter provides an empirical test of whether charter school finance provisions influence
charter school location and enrollment using a comparison between Michigan, Ohio, North
Carolina, Florida, and New York. Applying theory and knowledge on finance provisions, I state
hypothesis regarding the relationship between funding policies and charter concentration in five
states. The first hypothesis states that in states linking charter school payments to district
expenditures, charter schools will be more likely to locate in districts with greater expenditures
holding performance and cost factors constant. This hypothesis was corroborated by the
empirical analysis. The greater the variance in district expenditures the stronger was the
relationship between charter school concentration and district expenditures.

The second hypotheses stated that in states paying the same per pupil amount no matter where
the charter school locates, charter schools will move into school districts with relatively low per
pupil payments. While the coefficients of the negative binomial models suggest the hypothesized
relationship, the results were close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus, the hypothesis
cannot be corroborated.

The third hypothesis predicted greater numbers of charter schools in districts with high
concentrations of disadvantaged students and greater enrollment of these students in states
paying additional money if the charter school enrolls disadvantaged students. The analyses were
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able to corroborate this hypothesis for poor students. The results for special education and LEP
students show that charter schools do not locate in areas with high concentrations of these
students and enroll them less often compared to traditional schools in the same district. A
potential explanations is that compensations are insufficient to outweigh the costs of educating
these students. Another explanation is that charter schools have an incentive to enroll relatively
high performing students to ensure compliance with the charter school contract and to secure
sufficient demand for the allotted seats in the school.

The evidence provided in this chapter that charter schools respond to financial incentives in their
location and enrollment patterns suggests that policy makers can influence the supply of charter
schools by raising or lowering per pupil payments. For instance, a way to potentially encourage
charter schools to serve larger shares of disadvantaged students is to increase the per pupil
payments for those categories of students.

Second, the decision to either tie charter school payments to district spending or to pay a flat per
pupil amount independent of location, has an important impact on charter school supply. Policies
tying per pupil payments to district spending levels are likely to attract charter schools in high
spending and inefficient districts. The opening of charter schools can increase competition
between schools and hence lead to gains in the efficiency of providing education. As this study
shows, these gains may be achieved at the expense of strong student stratification. More costly
students stay in traditional schools while less costly students go to charter schools. This is more
likely if finance policies do not include any or only small compensations for high cost students.

7

In states where finance policies show no variation in charter school payments with location,
revenues have less influence on charter school supply. In these states charter school location may
be more demand driven. This will be particularly true if finance policies include sufficient
compensations for students not being served well by the existing traditional school system.

Chapter 4 uses the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical estimation
strategy. Theoretically, I work out how charter schools influence the costs and efficiency of
providing education. Empirically, I focus on the effects of charter schools on school district
efficiency. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher salaries
and student characteristics as well as changes in performance. Thus, inputs and performance
constant the coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by changes in district
efficiency associated with charter school enrollment.

Utilizing data for all New York State school districts outside New York City from 1998/99 to
2009/10, I find that charter school enrollment increases district efficiency. The magnitude of the
effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect ranges
between a 1.1 and 3.4 percent decrease in expenditures for an enrollments between 50 and 5000
charter school students. Efficiency gains are driven by the increased efficiency in providing
education for students in traditional public schools. A charter school enrollment between 50 and
5000 students reduces per pupil expenditures required to produce an increment in student
performance by 1.5 and 4.3 percent respectively.
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The estimation strategy comes with two caveats. First, the interpretation of the coefficient
attached to charter school enrollment as an efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability,
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district to which they transferred to.
The cost of bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares
of either low or high ability students transfer into the district. Second, given multiple outputs and
input sharing in the production of education, the reduction of inefficiencies in the production of
test scores may have two different sources. The reduction could reflect decreases in spending for
outputs other than test scores. The reduction also could reflect the use of more efficient
technologies to educate students. I will deal with both of these problems more in future drafts of
the chapter.

In conclusion, the aim of this dissertation was to assess the unintended impact of charter school
programs on housing prices, location decisions by charter operators, and school district
efficiency in providing education. My conclusion is that charter school have unintended
consequences in all three researched aspects. Thus, policy makers have to carefully scrutinized
these unintended effects and incorporate them in their decisions on charter school policies.

9

2. The Impact of Charter Schools on Housing
Values
2.1 Introduction

Starting with Oates (1969), an extensive body of literature has examined the link between school
quality and residential location documenting that school quality is capitalized into housing values
(Ross and Yinger 1999; Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). No matter if the studies focus on
educational inputs such as spending per pupil or school outputs such as test scores, researchers
have consistently found that households are willing to pay more for an incremental increase in
education (Black 1999; Kane et al. 2006; Brasington and Haurin 2006). Further, studies found
that heterogeneous preferences for school quality lead to residential sorting. Households with
greater preferences for school quality and higher income sort into different neighborhoods than
families with lower preferences for school quality and lower income (Bayer, Ferreira, and
McMillan 2007; Yinger 2009). Ultimately, the dynamics between school quality and housing
markets have strongly contributed to the isolation of disadvantaged students in low performing
school districts (Barrow 2002). This is particularly true for urban areas where the poor are
isolated in low performing city school districts and high degrees of segregation are prevalent
between city and suburban school districts (Eberts and Gronberg 2005; Urquiola 2005; Bayoh,
Irwin, and Haab 2006).

School choice programs reduce the link between residential location and school services, and
hence potentially affect both property values and residential sorting. Theoretical papers predict
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large effects of voucher programs on housing markets, reducing income and housing value
disparities across school districts (Nechyba 2000, 2003; Ferreyra 2007; Epple and Romano
2003). Brunner, Cho, and Reback (2012) find that, in states that adopted inter-district choice
programs, school districts with desirable nearby, out of district schooling options experience a
relatively large increase in housing values, residential income, and population density. Hence,
the authors corroborate the theoretical hypotheses substantiating that school choice programs are
a potential instrument for overcoming the isolation of disadvantaged students and student
segregation.

This essay focuses on charter schools, a rapidly growing form of school choice, and their impact
on housing price disparities between neighborhoods with different income. Charter schools are
nonsectarian, publicly funded schools, operating under a contract with a public agency. The
contract, or charter, exempts the school from selected state or local rules and regulations. In
return for funding and autonomy, the school must meet student performance standards specified
in the law and its charter. The contract usually lasts for a set number of years and must be
renewed to continue receiving public funding. Typically, students are not enrolled unless parents
apply for admission. Charter schools are open to anyone who applies and they do not charge
tuition. Oversubscribed charter schools are normally required to select students by lottery
(Nelson et al. 2000; Bifulco and Bulkley 2008).

This chapter adds to the small literature on the impact of charter schools on housing values.
More specifically, I evaluate whether or not the appearance of charter schools lowers the
difference in housing prices between adjacent high and low performing jurisdictions. Prior
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research by Imberman, Rourke and Naretta (2014) analyzes the impact of charter schools on
housing values in Los Angeles County. The authors use the number of charters and the share of
public enrollment in charters within various distances from a parcel as measurements of charter
school penetration. Including census block fixed effects to account for endogenous charter
locations and changes in the geographic distribution of sales, Imberman and colleagues do not
find an impact of charter schools on housing values. Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn (2014) use
housing sales in New York City to estimate the effect of choice school on housing values. The
authors use the border approach popularized by Black (1999) and find that the opening of a
choice school reduces the capitalization of test scores from zoned schools into housing values by
approximately one third. They also find that the opening of the choice school is positively
capitalized into housing values, suggesting that choice schools in New York City are viewed as
neighborhood amenities.

The chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, I develop a theoretical
framework to analyze the impact of charter schools on housing values. My theory describes three
ideal cases of how charter schools influence school quality and thereafter the difference in
housing prices between jurisdictions (either school districts or neighborhoods). The first case
describes a positive effect of charter schools on school quality. The charter school is perceived as
valuable schooling option or introduces competition among schools. However, the increase in
school quality is not large enough to create an incentive for households to move between
jurisdictions. The difference in housing prices can either go up or down depending on the relative
changes in school quality between jurisdictions. The second case illustrates an increase in school
quality that is large enough to create resorting between jurisdictions. In this case, housing price
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differences between jurisdictions will decrease. The third case describes how charter school
decrease school quality. Cream skimming of educationally advantaged students or a decrease in
district resources can degrade school quality. Housing values in jurisdictions with lower school
quality will drop leading to an increase in the housing price gap between high and low
performing school districts.

Second, this chapter is the first study on the impact of charter schools on housing values outside
the two largest cities in the United States, New York and Los Angeles. To analyze changes in
housing price differences, I utilize housing sales for New York State between 2000 and 2010.
My final sample consist of the city school districts of Syracuse, Niagara Falls, Ithaca and of their
adjacent districts as well as a group of comparison districts. Thus, this study sheds light into the
impact of charter schools on housing prices for a set of school districts located in metropolitan
areas with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.

To analyze the change in housing price differences across districts, I estimate models comparing
housing prices between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts. Further, I
compare changes in housing prices between neighborhoods with similar income in the district
with charter school and its adjacent districts. Also, I run regressions using a control group of
districts similar to Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca.

I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between school
districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences between
neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter schools raise the price of housing by almost 6 percent in
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neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar neighborhoods in
the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent in neighborhoods
with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school
district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and richer
neighborhoods in Syracuse decreases. The results probably indicate resorting between
Syracuse’s richer and poorer neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools,
move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices in the richer neighborhoods fall. As
demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices in the poorer neighborhoods grow.

After charter school entry, housing prices in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods decrease
relative to neighborhoods with similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts.
Likewise, after charter school entry, Ithaca’s poorer neighborhoods experience declining housing
prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In both districts housing
prices in richer neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in
Niagara Falls and Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer
neighborhoods increases after charter school opening.

The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between
jurisdictions is more complex and context specific than described in theoretical models on interdistrict choice and voucher programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on housing
values depend on how charter schools affect expected school quality in jurisdictions. Also, the
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empirical findings suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies
substantially between neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price
changes it is necessary to analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the charter school
program in New York State. Section 3 states the theoretical framework and Section 4 applies the
theoretical framework to New York State. Sections 5 and 6 explain estimation strategies and
comparison groups respectively. Section 7 makes conclusions on the estimation strategies and
comparison groups. Section 8 describes the data used for the analysis and provides Summary
statistics. Section 9 presents the results and Section 10 states the conclusions.

2.2 Charter School Program in New York State and Sample of School
Districts

The New York Charter School Law was established in 1998. According to the law, charter
school students are allowed to attend charter schools outside their school district and attendance
zone boundaries. However, if charter schools are oversubscribed, they have to select students by
lottery. In this lottery process, preference is given to students residing in the school district,
where the charter school is locating (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2854 (2b)). Thus,
oversubscribed schools may almost exclusively serve students from the district where they are
located.
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Charter schools receive per pupil payments from the districts in which their students reside, and
these payments are the charter school’s primary source of funding. The amount a district pays
per student is linked to the approved operating expenses of the district where the student resides.
The charter application, approval, and evaluation process is closely regulated by the charter
school authorizers1. The accountability standards set by authorizers can be considered relatively
high compared to other states. Charter schools authorized by the Board of Regents have to
perform higher than traditional schools in their district. School authorized by the New York State
University are expected to have 75 percent of their students to score “proficient” or higher on
state assessments. In a multistate comparison of charter school accountability laws and practices,
the Center for Education Reform (CER) rated New York as a state that holds charter schools
strictly accountable, pointing out that New York is one of the few states that have closed charter
schools for performance reasons (CER 2007). The National Alliance of Public Charter Schools
identifies New York as being amongst the few states using performance-based charter contracts,
comprehensive school monitoring, and a systematic data collection processes (NAPCS 2012).
Further, the charter school law of New York State requires districts to provide transportation to
students enrolled in charter schools (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2853 (4b)).

In 2010, 177 charter schools were operating in New York State. The majority of charter schools
are located in NYC. I focus on charter schools outside NYC as I do not have housing sale data
available for NYC. Table 1 shows the 14 school districts outside NYC that have charter schools.
The first column indicates the year the first charter school was established. The second column
shows the number of charter schools in each school district and the third column the share of

1

Almost all charter schools are authorized by the State University of New York and the Board of Regents. Only two
charter schools are authorized by a local school district.
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students enrolled in charter schools. The highest counts of charter schools are in Albany,
Buffalo, and Rochester. The share varies widely between 1 percent in Yonkers and 74 percent in
Wainscott2. Further, there are several districts where the share is between 11 and 24 percent
including Albany, Buffalo, Lackawanna, Roosevelt, and Kenmore-Tonawanda.

The following columns present the performance of charter schools, regular public schools in the
district, and the performance of adjacent districts. Performance is measured using state wide tests
for grades 4 and 8 in English Language, as well as grades 4 and 8 in mathematics. After
calculating the state average, I standardize the result with regard to the state mean. The resulting
performance measurement is zero at the state mean and equals one (and negative one) at one
standard deviation above (below) the mean. Charter schools outperform the average public
school in the district where they are located except in the Niagara Falls school district. Most of
the charter schools locate in school districts that perform below the state average. The exceptions
are Ithaca and Kenmore Tonawanda where traditional public schools perform above the state
average. The surrounding suburban districts perform in most cases better than the city school
districts except in Ithaca, Kenmore-Tonawanda, and Troy, where the performance in the charter
school district is greater than in its neighboring districts.

To be included in the analysis, districts have to fulfill two criteria. First, there has to be a
sufficient number of housing sales observed before and after charter school entry. In Albany, the
first charter school opened in 1999. As I do not have housing sales prior 2000, I excluded Albany
from the sample. In Buffalo, Rochester, Roosevelt, and Wainscott charter schools started

2

The Wainscott School District has only two schools including the charter school. The traditional public school has
only elementary grades and had an enrollment of 21 students.
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operating in 2000. With only 8 months of housing sales before charter school entry, I am unable
to estimate the effect of charter schools on housing values in these school districts, and hence
excluded them from my analysis. For some districts, particularly those located on Long Island, I
have sales information only for parts of the district. These districts have to be excluded as well.

Second, some school districts had a charter school moving into one of their adjacent school
district at an earlier point in time. These charter schools may already affected housing values.
Therefore, I excluded the school districts Kenmore-Tonawanda, Lackawanna, Troy, and
Yonkers. Applying these two criteria leaves Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca for the analysis.

2.3 General Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework is based on the standard model of school quality capitalization as
expressed in Ross and Yinger (1999), and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011). The standard
model assumes that households maximize their utility over school quality, housing, and a
composite good. Households make bids on housing based on school quality and local property
tax rates. Households sort into different districts and attendance zones according to their income
and preferences. The model assumes that households are mobile, and hence a key equilibrium
condition is that all households in an income taste class achieve the same utility level.
Households locate in a metropolitan area with many local governments financed by a property
tax. All people who live in the same district are assumed to receive the same level of public
services, and the only way to gain access to the public services in a district is to live there.
Further, all households are considered homeowners.
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A household’s budget constraint requires income to equal spending.

𝑌 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡𝑉 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡

𝑃𝐻
= 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐻 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻(1 + 𝑡 ∗ )
𝑟

(1)

where Y is the household’s income; Z is a composite good; H is units of housing services, which
are sold at price P; t is the effective property tax rate3; V is the market value of a house and equal
to PH/r, where r is the appropriate discount rate; and t* = t/r.

The household’s problem is to determine how much to pay for H given the quality of local public
services, S, and the effective tax rate, t. This problem can be specified by determining the
maximum price a household will pay for housing associated with a given S, holding their utility
constant. More technically, the household problem is defined by solving Equation (1) for P and
maximizing the result with respect to H and Z subject to a utility constraint. Thus, a household
maximizes

𝑃=

𝑌−𝑍
𝐻(1 + 𝑡 ∗ )

(2)

subject to

𝑈(𝑍, 𝐻, 𝑆) = 𝑈 0 (𝑌)

3

(3)

The effective property tax rate equals the nominal tax rate times the assessed value divided by the market value.
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where U0 is the utility achieved by households with income Y.

Using the envelope theorem, the following equation can be derived

𝜕𝑃
𝑈𝑆 /𝑈𝑍
𝑀𝐵𝑆
=
=
𝜕𝑆 𝐻(1 + 𝑡) 𝐻(1 + 𝑡 ∗ )

(4)

In this equation, 𝜕P/𝜕S is the slope of the households bid function with respect to the quality of
local schools. The slope indicates a household’s willingness to pay for an additional unit of
school quality. According to the standard model, households sort into jurisdictions based upon
the slope of their bid functions. Further, US/UZ is the marginal rate of substitution between S and
the composite good and is also called the marginal benefit from S in dollar terms or MBS.

Households sort according to their bid-functions for educational quality at two jurisdictional
levels: school districts and attendance zones. To illustrate how school quality and residential
location are linked for both types of jurisdictions consider the case depicted in Figure 1. There
are two jurisdictions and two income-taste classes. Jurisdiction 1 has a low school quality and
Jurisdiction 2 has a high school quality4. Further, there are two income taste classes A and B.
Income taste class A has a high marginal willingness to pay for education. Income taste class B
has a low marginal willingness to pay for education. Households in income taste class A have a
steep bid function for school quality, and they win the bidding competition for housing in

“School quality is a complex and multidimensional concept” (Cullen and Jacob 2007: 6). Measures of school
quality can be financial resources, the quality of the match between students and teachers, test scores, etc. In this
study, I will use standardized test scores from the NYS report cards as they make comparisons between school
districts possible. Further, report cards are well known to parents and potentially guide schooling decisions.
4
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Jurisdiction 2. Households in income taste class B have a flatter bid function for school quality,
and they win the bid in Jurisdiction 1. Over time, households will perfectly sort into both school
jurisdictions resulting in income and housing prices disparities.

Assume now that a charter school opens in Jurisdiction 1 (similar to Syracuse and Niagara Falls).
The appearance of a charter school in Jurisdiction 1 can influence perceived school quality in
four different ways. First, parents might value the option of sending their child to a low-cost
educational alternative. When the existence of that possibility gives rise to a higher level of
expected school quality than without it, the option has a value. This value is irrespective of
whether the option is exercised or not. Option values are frequently encountered in financial
markets, for example when the right to sell or buy in the future at a given price is bargained. The
concept is also frequently associated with the valuation of environmental goods (Cameron and
Englin 1997; Adamowitz et al. 1998) and transportation options (TCRP 2002), which may or
may not be enjoyed in the future. If parents see charter schools as an option value because of
their high performance, a particular school theme, or the racial composition of the school, school
quality in Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will increase. This effect is likely to be larger in Jurisdiction 1 as
the existing school quality is low and potential alternatives will add more value.

Second, charter schools introduce competition to regular public schools. Charter school
proponents argue that regular public schools operate in a monopolistic market and are
overburdened by the institutions of democratic governance that leave them vulnerable to
conflicting demands of multiple interest groups. Thus, they have weak incentives to improve
school quality as perceived by parents or to use resources more efficiently (Brennan and
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Buchanan 1980; Chubb and Moe 1990). Charter schools introduce competition to the public
school system creating market incentives that induce regular public schools to become more
efficient and increase their performance (Friedman 1955, 1962). Competitive mechanisms are
likely to increase school quality in Jurisdiction 1. In Jurisdiction 2, school quality changes only if
the charter school performs at the same or a higher level than the traditional schools in
Jurisdiction 2. In that case, the charter schools is able to compete with traditional schools
potentially influencing their quality. Generally, the effect of competition is likely to be larger in
Jurisdiction 1 as school quality is relatively low and competitive mechanisms will create greater
pressure to improve school quality.

Third, charter schools can give rise to “cream skimming”. Cream skimming refers to the worry
that charter schools will primarily serve the most advantaged students, leaving the disadvantaged
to languish in underperforming schools. Cream skimming might arise for two main reasons.
There is variation in availability of information about charter schools, and if information is costly
to obtain, economically and educationally advantaged families are better able to exercise choice
(Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Further, advantaged students are less costly to educate and
charter schools might choose a location in the district where students with relatively high socioeconomic status live or take other steps to recruit relatively high performing students (Henig and
McDonald 2002). Cream skimming is likely to result in high quality charter schools potentially
leading to an increased option value. At the same time, traditional public schools will decrease in
school quality.
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Fourth, charter schools can potentially decrease district resources. Charter schools might have a
negative impact on school districts resources in two ways. First, operating two systems of public
schools under separate governance arrangements can create excess costs. Excess costs can be a
result of increased personnel, facility, transportation, special education, health services, and
maintenance costs. Second, charter school financing policies can distribute resources away from
districts if state aid payments to districts decrease and local charter school contributions increase
(Bifulco and Reback 2012). Decreasing district resources are likely to have a negative impact on
the quality of traditional public schools. Charter school quality is unlikely to be influenced by
decreasing district resources.

These mechanisms may appear simultaneously, and may offset or complement each other. For
instance, it is possible that charter schools introduce “cream skimming” and at the same time
competition to the regular district school. Whether overall school quality increases or decreases
depends on the relative strength of these effects. The mechanisms can empirically lead to three
different cases that I explain in the following sections. In the first case, school quality increases
but the change is insufficient to generate resorting. In the second case, the increase in school
quality leads to resorting. In the third case, school quality decreases.

Case 1: Increase in School Quality Insufficient to Generate Resorting
In the first case, illustrated in Figure 2, growth in perceived school quality is not large enough to
generate resorting. For Type B households the savings in housing generated by a move into
District 1 would not be outweighed by the loss in amenities. Case 1 is more likely, if there is a
large difference in school quality and other amenities between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 prior to the
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charter school opening. Both income taste classes stay in their jurisdiction and compete with
families of the same type for housing. However, as school quality has increased households are
willing to pay a higher price for a unit of housing holding their utility constant. Population
density and average income in both districts stay the same. Depending on the change in school
quality for both jurisdictions housing prices will remain the same or go up. Thus, if the school
quality in Jurisdiction 2 is greater than in Jurisdiction 1 prior to the appearance of the charter
school and no resorting takes place, then
∆N1 = 0,

∆N2 = 0,

∆P1 ≥ 0,

∆P2 ≥ 0,

∆ Y 1 = 0, and ∆ Y 2 = 0.

The change in relative housing prices between Jurisdictions 1 and 2 is difficult to predict.
However, even if the incremental increase in school quality is smaller in Jurisdiction 2 than in
Jurisdiction 1, the effect on housing prices could be larger in Jurisdiction 2 as households have a
greater willingness to pay for marginal increases in school quality.

Case 2: Increase in School Quality Leading to Resorting
In the second case, growth in perceived school quality is large enough to generate resorting. This
case is illustrated in Figure 3. Increases in Jurisdiction 1’s school quality will create an incentive
for Type B households living in Jurisdiction 2, to move into Jurisdiction 1 to take advantage of
lower housing prices while sending their child to the charter school. Note that Type B
households will only move into Jurisdiction 1 if the loss in amenities, they face by leaving
Jurisdiction 2, is outweighed by savings in housing. Generally, resorting is more likely if
Jurisdictions 1 and 2 are relatively close in the quality of education and other amenities before
the appearance of the charter school. The resorting of households leads to an increase in
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population density in Jurisdiction 1 and a decline in population density in Jurisdiction 2. As a
result housing prices in Jurisdiction 1 will go up and housing prices in Jurisdiction 2 will go
down. Since the households choosing to move into Jurisdiction 1 have a greater income than the
households already living in Jurisdiction 1, the average income in Jurisdiction 1 will increase. As
all households in Jurisdiction 2 belong to the same income taste class there will be no change in
average income. Thus, if school quality is greater in Jurisdiction 2 than in Jurisdiction 1 prior to
the appearance of the charter school and resorting takes place, then it follows that:
∆N1 > 0,

∆N2 < 0,

∆P1 > 0,

∆P2 < 0,

∆ Y 1 > 0, and ∆ Y 2 = 0.

where N1 and N2 are population densities, and Y 1 and Y 2 are the average incomes in Jurisdiction
1 and 2. The difference in housing prices between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will be reduced as housing
prices in Jurisdiction 1 increase and Jurisdiction 2 decrease. Also, the gap in income disparities is
reduced as average income increases in Jurisdiction 1.

Case 3: Decrease in School Quality
In the third case, the charter school decreases overall school quality in Jurisdiction 1. This case is
depicted in Figure 4. As school quality has decreased, Type B households will pay less for a unit
of housing holding their utility constant. Type A households will not be attracted by the low
performing schools in Jurisdiction 1. Thus, housing prices in Jurisdiction 2 will not change.
Under this scenario, the same income taste classes continue living in Jurisdiction 1 and
Jurisdiction 2. Also, population density and average income in both Jurisdictions stay the same.
Depending on the decrease in school quality for Jurisdiction 1 housing prices will go down.
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Thus, if the school quality in Jurisdiction 2 stays the same and school quality in Jurisdiction 1
decreases, then

∆N1 = 0,

∆N2 = 0,

∆P1 ≤ 0,

∆P2 = 0,

∆ Y 1 = 0, and ∆ Y 2 = 0.

The difference in housing prices between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will increase as housing prices in
Jurisdiction 1 decrease and Jurisdiction 2 stay the same. Population density and average income
stay the same in both Jurisdictions.

Differential Effect of Charter Schools on Housing Values with Distance
The effects described in the above cases are likely to differ by households’ distance to the charter
school. Epple and Romano (2003) describe how with increasing distance from the charter school
transportation costs increase. Increasing transportation costs will decrease households’ option
values of sending a child to a charter school. Thus, it is likely that the effect of charter schools on
housing values is also declining with distance.

2.4 Application of Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework can be applied to school districts and neighborhoods. I start with an
application to housing prices changes between districts and then explain implications for housing
price changes between neighborhoods. For each jurisdiction, I state how changes in housing
price gaps are likely to occur.
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The New York State charter school program and the location of the three school districts in the
sample have two important implications for applying the above described theory. First,
oversubscribed schools in New York have to give enrollment preference to students living in the
school district the charter school is located. Thus, for oversubscribed schools, the option value of
the charter school is very small for families living outside the district. Second, charter schools in
Niagara Falls and particularly Syracuse have lower levels of performance relative to the
traditional public schools in their adjacent districts (see Table 1). In these areas, it is unlikely that
parents will send their children to a charter school which has lower levels of performance than
the traditional public school the family can access.

These assumptions are supported by the charter school enrollment figures in 20105. In Syracuse
and Niagara Falls, 95 percent of the students enrolled in charter schools reside in the district
where the charter school is located. In Ithaca, the share of students enrolled from outside the
district is greater. Still about 60 percent of the students in the Ithaca charter school are from
Ithaca. Consequently, the gap in housing prices between districts with charter schools and their
adjacent districts is most likely driven by changes in housing prices in districts with charter
school particularly in Syracuse and Niagara Falls.

In sum, for the Syracuse and Niagara Falls metro areas, I expect changes in housing price
differences between districts to be driven by housing price changes in districts with charter
school. The gap in housing prices between districts will converge if housing prices in the district
with charter school increase. The housing price gap will diverge if housing prices in the district

5

Enrollment is taken from the New York State report cards.
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with charter school decrease. In Ithaca, the change in housing price differences is likely to be
driven by housing price changes in Ithaca and its adjacent school districts. If housing prices
decrease or decrease more in Ithaca than in its adjacent districts, housing prices will converge. If
housing prices increase or increase more in Ithaca than in its adjacent school districts, housing
prices will diverge.

Changes in housing price differences between neighborhoods are expected to follow a different
pattern. First, it is important to note that changes in housing price differences between
neighborhoods can occur in two ways. On one hand, the difference in housing prices between
neighborhoods located in the same districts can change. On the other hand, the difference in
housing prices between neighborhoods in different districts can change. Second, resorting
between neighborhoods is more likely, as gaps in amenities are smaller compared to gaps in
amenities between districts. Third, neighborhoods within a school district are often very
heterogeneous. Usually, the socio-economic status of residents and the quality of schooling
available differ between neighborhoods. Thus, charter school may impact housing prices in
varying neighborhoods differently.

If households move between neighborhoods or bid up housing prices in some neighborhoods but
not in others, the housing price difference between districts is probably influenced as well.
However, the changing housing prices may not show up in an across district analysis for the
following reasons. First, the effect of charter schools may strongly differ between neighborhoods
even if the effect goes in the same direction. In an across district analysis, a heterogeneous
charter school effect would lead to imprecisely measured results leaving the researcher in
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uncertainty if there is an effect of charter schools on housing values. Second, the effects of
charter school may be positive in some neighborhoods while being negative in other
neighborhoods. In an across district analysis these effect would cancel each other out leading the
researcher believe that there is no effect of charter schools on housing values.

Altogether, I expect the gap in housing prices between neighborhoods to converge if households
resort between neighborhoods. In this case, housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly
low school quality increase and housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly high school
quality decrease. Further, housing prices between neighborhoods will converge if housing price
changes in the neighborhood with formerly low school quality are greater than in the
neighborhood with formerly high school quality. I anticipate housing prices to diverge if school
quality decreases in the neighborhood with low school quality leading to lower housing values
while housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly high school quality stay the same. Also,
charter schools may lead to an increase in housing prices in formerly low and high performing
neighborhoods but more so in the neighborhood with high school quality. This case is likely as
households in the neighborhood with high school quality have a steeper bid function and housing
prices are likely to react more to an incremental increase in school quality.

2.5 Empirical Methods: Estimation Strategy

The section on empirical methods consist of three parts. The first part explains the estimation
strategies used in the chapter. The second part describes in more detail the comparison groups
utilized in the empirical methods. The third part compares advantages and disadvantages of the
empirical strategies used.
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Estimation Strategy 1
The baseline specification is based on a difference in difference framework. I estimate the shift
in neighborhood housing price trends comparing housing values before and after the charter
school entry in the district where the charter school enters to the shift in housing values in its
adjacent districts. I use census tract fixed effects to control for time invariant neighborhood
characteristics. I also include quarter by year fixed effects to control for seasonality and specific
year characteristics. The baseline estimating equation is written as follows:

log 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 ) + 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 + 𝛿𝑛 + 𝜃𝑛 𝑇𝑦 + 𝜇𝑞𝑦

(5)

+ 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦

where P is the price of a house i, in neighborhood n, in district d, during a quarter of the year q,
and year y. Postqy indicates the time after charter school entry6. Insided indicates the district with
the charter school. The vector X stands for housing characteristics including the overall condition
of the house, the availability of a fireplace, the construction grade, the availability of central air
conditioning, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, the living area, the living area
squared, the age of the house, and the age of the house squared. The term δn stands for
neighborhood fixed effects at the census tract level. The term θnTy indicates the slope of the
neighborhood specific trend and µqy indicates month by year fixed effects. The last term εindqy is a
randomly distributed error term.

6

I set the start of the post period equal to the opening of the first charter school in the area.
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The coefficient of interest in the above equation is β2. The coefficient compares housing price
trends in districts with charter schools to housing price trends in their adjacent districts before
and after charter school entry. The coefficient measures the average treatment effect of charter
schools on housing values in the district in which they are located under the provision that the
adjacent districts act as an appropriate counterfactual for the change in housing prices in absence
of the charter school. I expect the coefficient to be positive, if charter schools raise housing
prices in the district they locate. I expect a negative sign, if charter schools decrease housing
prices in the district they locate.

There are three potentially useful modifications of the baseline model. In the first modification, I
will reduce the sample to housing sales taking place half a mile away from the district border. By
reducing the sample to housing sales close to the district border, I can effectively control for
amenities relevant to residents on either side of the border.

In the second modification, I control for distance between charter school and parcel. As stated in
the theoretical section, with distance grow transportation costs. Increased transportation costs are
likely to decrease the option value of the charter school. Thus, the effect of charter schools on
housing values probably decreases with distance.

To control for distance in the baseline specification, I measure the distance between each house
sold and the charter school. I add a distance term to Equation 5. Further, I interact distance with
Post and Inside. The coefficient I am after is attached to the triple interaction between distance
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and Post X Inside. The coefficient tells me how the effect of the charter school is changing if the
distance to the charter school increases by one mile.

Third, theoretical models on the relationship of school quality and housing values have stressed
the importance of household income on the willingness to pay for education (Nguyen-Hoang and
Yinger 2011; Epple and Romano 2003; Epple, Romer, and Sieg 2001). These models emphasize
that high-income households are willing to pay more for increases in their child’s educational
achievement and hence are willing to pay more for increases in the quality of their child’s
school. Therefore, a charter school may be highly valued by families living in a high income
neighborhood. On the other hand, households living in high income neighborhoods are likely to
have already access to relatively high performing public or private schools. Thus, charter schools
may not add additional value for them. Households living in low income neighborhoods are
likely to have only access to low performing schools, and a potential alternative will be highly
valued. However, poor households are unlikely to be able to pay relatively large amounts of
money for increases in the quality of their child’s school.

As the effect of charter schools on housing values is likely to differ between neighborhoods with
varying income, I estimate the baseline specification separately for neighborhoods with different
income. In the first of these models, I reduce the sample to housing sales in neighborhoods with
an income below the median in the district with charter school. In the second model, I reduce the
sample to housing sales in neighborhoods above the median in the district with charter school. In
both models, I include only neighborhoods in the charter school district that have a similar
income compared the neighborhoods in the adjacent districts and vice versa. With limiting the
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sample to similar neighborhoods in the district with charter school and its adjacent districts, I
avoid bias resulting from comparisons that are not supported on either side of the border.

Estimation Strategy 2
The next empirical specification is based on a triple difference framework. I estimate the shift in
neighborhood housing price trends comparing housing values before and after charter school
entry, between the metropolitan areas in the sample and their matched metropolitan areas, and
between the focal districts in these areas with their adjacent districts. Similar to the previous
equation, I include a several fixed effects to control for time-invariant neighborhood
characteristics, neighborhood housing price trends, seasonality, and year effects. The empirical
model can be expressed as follows:

log 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 ) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑 )

(6)

+ 𝛽4 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑 ) + 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 + 𝛿𝑛 + 𝜃𝑛 𝑇𝑦 + 𝜇𝑞𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦

In this model, Insided indicates the district with charter and its direct comparison district in a
matched metropolitan area. Treatd is a dummy variable being one in the district with charter
school and its adjacent districts. The dummy equals zero for all districts in the control group.

The coefficient of interest is β4. The coefficient compares metropolitan areas with each other,
compares the district with charter school and its direct comparison district with their adjacent
school districts, and compares the time before and after charter school entry. The coefficient will
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be positive if charter schools impact properties more positively (or less negatively) in districts
with charter schools compared to its adjacent districts and a set of similar school districts in
another metropolitan area. Therefore, a positive coefficient can indicate two effects. If the charter
school moved into a district with lower housing values than its adjacent district, the housing
price gap will decrease. If the charter moved into a district with greater housing prices than its
adjacent districts, the housing price gap will increase. The coefficient will be negative if the
impact of charter school entry is more negative (or less positive) in the district with the charter
school compared to its adjacent districts and a set of school districts in another metropolitan area.
Thus, a negative coefficient can imply two effects. If the charter school moved into a district
with lower housing values than its adjacent districts, the housing price gap will increase. If the
charter school moved into a district with greater housing prices than its adjacent districts, the
housing price gap will decrease.

It is important to note that the empirical strategy stated above does not rely on similarity in
district characteristics. If districts with charter schools and without charter schools are not
becoming more or less dissimilar prior charter school opening, the estimated effect should
identify the causal impact of charter schools on housing values. More specifically, identification
of the causal effect requires that housing prices follow parallel trends conditional on the
observable covariates in the absence of any intervention. If that is the case, any difference in
housing prices in the period after charter school entry can be attributed to charter schools.
Importantly, this assumption cannot be explicitly tested as we do not observe the true
counterfactual. In the next section, I will analyze the parallel trend assumption using graphical
evidence.
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2.6 Empirical Methods: Comparison Groups

The goal of the empirical strategy is to estimate changes in housing price differences between
districts with and without charter schools. For causal inference, however, it is not sufficient to
compare housing prices in school districts before and after charter school opening. An
appropriate comparison group is required to estimate what would have happened to housing
prices in the absence of the charter school. To help estimate the counterfactual, I select different
control groups. How I select control groups is explained in more detail below.

Comparison Group 1: Adjacent School Districts
The first control group consists of all housing sales in the adjacent school districts. I define
adjacent districts as all districts that border the district with the charter school. This is illustrated
in Figure 5, which shows Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The Syracuse City School District is
located in the center and the two charter schools are highlighted. Adjacent school districts are all
districts touching the border of the Syracuse City School District. The focus of my analyses is
changes in housing price gaps between school districts after charter school entry. Thus, the
adjacent school districts are a natural comparison group. Further, as the adjacent school districts
are in the same metropolitan area, they are likely to be affected by the same housing market
shocks as the district with charter school.

As stated earlier, for my empirical strategy it is important that housing price trends between
districts with charter school and their adjacent districts are not becoming more or less dissimilar
prior charter school opening. As this so called parallel trends assumption cannot be explicitly
tested, I graphically analyze housing price trends prior charter school opening.
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To analyze if districts with charter schools have similar trend compared to their adjacent
districts, I regress the log of housing prices on a full set of quarter by year fixed effects for the
time period prior to charter school entry. Then, I plot the monthly average residual for the charter
school district and the adjacent school districts. The time fixed effects in the regression control
for potential shocks over time. The residuals show how monthly housing sales in districts with
charter schools and in their adjacent districts differ from the respective trends. In Figures 6 to 8, I
plot the monthly residuals with a local linear fit7 to make the trend line more visible.

Figure 6 shows housing price trends for Syracuse. Panel 1 compares trends between all housing
sales in Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The trends are parallel. At the end of the observed
time period the trends start to slightly diverge probably because of an anticipation effect of the
charter school on housing values. Panel 2 reduces the sample to sales half a mile away from the
district border. As expected, the trends are closer to each other. Further, the trends are relatively
parallel and do not show a potential anticipation effect for the time period prior charter school
entry.

Figure 7 shows housing price trends for Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts. Using all
housing sales, the trends are parallel (see Panel 1). Limiting the sample to housing sales close to
the district border, trends are still parallel but the distance between them is less (see Panel 2).

I use Stata’s lpoly command to produce the local line fit line. The command performs a kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression of the residual and time in months. Displayed is a graph of the smoothed values with
confidence bands
7
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Figure 8 shows housing price trends for Ithaca and its adjacent school districts. Using all housing
sales, the trends are less parallel compared to Syracuse and Niagara Falls (see Panel 1). It is
difficult to say why these differences in trends occur. A potential explanation is that the more
rural districts surrounding Ithaca have somewhat different housing markets compared to Ithaca.
Also, the housing markets in the adjacent school districts could be less homogenous than in the
other two districts. Reducing the sample to sales at the district border, trends seem to be even
less parallel. The space between both graphs varies considerably.

Comparison Group 2: Similar Metropolitan Areas
The second comparisons group consist of districts located in metropolitan areas other than
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca. Searching for metropolitan areas that match the districts in
the sample and their adjacent districts, I face the following dilemma. I have plenty of information
on school district characteristics but only a small number of metropolitan areas in New York
State. To overcome this dilemma, I use a judgmental approach with the following formal
procedure. All three districts in the study sample with charter schools are city school districts,
thus I start with a list of all city school districts in New York State. Next, I limited the sample to
districts that, like Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca, are located in western or central New
York. Finally, I select the districts and their adjacent districts that are the closest match to
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, Ithaca, and their adjacent districts on variables drawn from school
district tabulations of the 2000 U.S. Census. Specifically, I find the closest match, on mean
performance, enrollment, share of black students, and share of students in poverty. The four
variables are good determinants of factors influencing housing prices making them a good
approximation for differences in housing price trends between districts. The results of this
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matching process are presented in Table 2. A graphical comparison between housing price trends
is shown in Panels 3 and 4 in Figures 6 to 8.

Compared to other school districts in western and central New York, Syracuse stands out as a
school district having a relatively high enrollment, low performance, high rates of poverty, and a
large share of black students. Syracuse is surrounded by school districts having a much lower
enrollment, higher levels of student performance, a lower share of students in poverty, and a
lower share of black students as depicted in Table 2. These figures suggest that there is a high
degree of socio-economic segregation between Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The unique
characteristics of the area will strongly influence the difference in housing prices between
Syracuse and its adjacent districts making it difficult to find comparison districts. However, I can
exploit the variation in the timing of charter school entrance between districts and can compare
Syracuse with Niagara Falls. Niagara Falls is the closest match for Syracuse among districts that
did not contain charter schools earlier than Syracuse (see Table 2). Its enrollment and share of
black students is somewhat smaller than Syracuse, but in all other categories Niagara Falls and
its adjacent districts show great similarities with Syracuse and its neighboring districts. The first
charter school moved into Syracuse in 2002, while Niagara Falls had its first charter school in
2006. Thus, I can use Niagara Falls as the control district for Syracuse during the pre-2006
period. Therefore, the pre-period for Syracuse are the 2 years before charter school entry. The
post period are the years following the charter school entrance up to the point when Niagara Falls
had its charter school8.

8

As families might anticipate the opening of the charter school in Niagara Falls, I exclude the 6 months before
charter school opening in Niagara Falls from the analysis.
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Figure 9 shows the pre trends for Syracuse and Niagara Falls. The first panel shows housing
price trends for Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts. The trends are parallel. Panel 2
compares the difference in housing price trends between Syracuse and its adjacent school
districts with the difference in housing price trends between Niagara Falls and its adjacent school
districts. The residuals in Panel 2 are calculated in the following way. In a first step, I subtract
the residuals in Syracuse from the residuals in its adjacent districts. I do the same for Niagara
Falls. Then I plot the difference separately for both metro areas. The trend lines are again based
on a local linear fit. The trends are parallel in the beginning of the time period but converge at
the end. The result suggests that Syracuse’s adjacent school districts are a better comparisons
group.

In the next step, I have to find comparison districts for Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls school
district is characterized by schools that perform about one standard deviation below the state
average, have an enrollment that is smaller than in the big upstate cities but substantially larger
than in rural school districts, and a relatively high share of students in poverty (see Table 2).
Niagara Fall’s adjacent districts perform better and have a smaller enrollment. Their shares of
black and poor students are less than the state average. School districts that serve as a good
comparison are Binghamton and Dunkirk. They are somewhat smaller than Niagara Falls but
have performance below the state mean and enrollment of black and poor students above the
state mean. Their adjacent districts are suburban and comparable to Niagara’s adjacent districts.

Figure 10 shows the pre trends for Niagara Falls and Binghamton and Dunkirk. As previously
shown, trends between Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts are parallel (see Figure 7).
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Trends in Binghamton, Dunkirk, and their adjacent districts are the same in the beginning of the
observed time period. Then, the trend in Dunkirk and Binghamton drops a bit. Again, I plot the
differences in residuals between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts and Binghamton and
Dunkirk and their adjacent districts. The trends are parallel for most of the observed time period.
However, similar to the Syracuse case, trends converge at the end of the observed time period.
Thus, the adjacent school districts seem to be a better comparisons group for Niagara Falls.

Ithaca is located in a small metropolitan area and is strongly influenced by its higher education
industry. Ithaca enrolls fewer students than the other districts in the sample and has much higher
student performance compared to its adjacent school districts. The share of black and poor
students is much lower compared to other districts with a charter school. The surrounding
districts are rural, have lower student achievement than Ithaca, smaller enrollment, a similar
share of black students, but fewer students in poverty (see Table 2). Saratoga Springs and
Oneonta are districts that share these characteristics. They have institutions of higher education
in the district and they are surrounded by rural districts. Their performance is above the state
mean and their enrollment is relatively small. The share of black students in Saratoga Springs is
less than in Ithaca and the share of poor students is higher in Oneonta. Saratoga Springs and
Oneonta have adjacent school districts with lower performance and smaller enrollment. These
characteristics make Saratoga Springs and Oneonta good comparison districts for Ithaca.

Figure 11 shows pre trends for Ithaca as well as for Saratoga Springs and Oneonta. As already
mentioned, trends between Ithaca and its adjacent school districts are less parallel compared to
Syracuse, Niagara Falls and their adjacent school districts. Oneonta and Saratoga show similar
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trends except five years prior charter school entry. Again, I plot the difference in residuals
between Ithaca and its adjacent districts and Ithaca’s direct comparison districts and their
adjacent districts. Trends converge and diverge at different points in time periods and do not
seem to be parallel for most of the observed time. Ithaca’s adjacent school districts seem to be a
better comparisons group than Saratoga Springs and Oneonta.

2.7 Empirical Methods: Concluding Remarks

While both specifications estimate the change in housing price gaps between school districts, the
underlying assumptions and identification strategies are different. Equation 5 assumes that
housing price trends between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts are parallel
prior charter school opening. Equation 6 assumes that the trend of housing price difference
between districts in the metropolitan area with charter school are similar to trends in housing
price differences between districts in a matched control area. As the graphical analysis of pre
trends showed, the parallel trends assumption is meet best by districts adjacent to the district with
charter school. Thus, Equation 5 is the preferred specification.

Equation 5 estimates the effect of charter schools on the housing price gap between districts by
using a difference in difference estimator. Using this strategy, I can effectively control for
common shocks to housing prices in the metropolitan area. Equation 6 uses a triple difference
strategy. Using this strategy, I can effectively control for housing price shocks in the
metropolitan area and for common shock between city school districts and their adjacent
districts. While the triple difference has the advantage of a more robust analysis, the housing
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price trends prior charter school opening were less parallel. Thus, generally, I will give more
weight to the results of Equation 5.

2.8 Data

The data for these analyses are drawn from several sources. Property sales information and
housing characteristics were obtained from the New York Office of Real Property Services
(ORPS). The database includes information on property location, class, sales date, and sales
price. Information from the sales database was merged with detailed parcel-level data from the
New York State Real Property System (RPS) database. The Real Property System collects
information from local assessors on a number of parcel characteristics such as construction grade
of the house (which refers to the quality of the material and workmanship used to construct the
house and is graded from A to E), size (for living space measured in square feet, number of
bathrooms, number of bedrooms, etc.), and special features (for example full basement, central
air conditioninging, fireplace, etc.). In most cases, housing characteristics were only available for
the first time a house was sold. Thus, the data does not provide information on parcel traits that
varies over time. Combining both datasets, I constructed a pooled cross-sectional dataset that
spans from January 2, 2000 to August 6, 20109. It is important to note that neither of the
combined datasets includes information on housing sales in NYC, and hence I have to exclude
NYC from my analysis. Information on charter school entry and location was drawn from the
New York Charter School Institute web page hosted by the State University of New York10.

The New York Office of Real Property Services puts a flag on all housing sales that are not arm’s length. I do not
include these sales in my data set as they are unlikely to reflect the market price of a parcel.
10
Housing sales and charter schools were geo coded and placed into the census tracts and districts using ArcGis.
9
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Tables 3 to 6 show Summary statistics for housing sales in Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca.
In each table Columns 1 and 2 compare the housing characteristics in the district with charter
schools to housing characteristics in the adjacent school districts. In Columns 3 and 4, I compare
the housing characteristics for the same district but for houses located ½ mile away from the
district border. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 contrast housing characteristics for the direct
comparison of the charter school district and its adjacent school districts.

Table 3 compares housing characteristics for Syracuse. Columns 1 and 2 show that houses in
Syracuse cost $37,598 less than in the adjacent districts (about 27 percent). Further, houses in
Syracuse are of somewhat inferior quality, are less likely to have air conditioning, and are on
average 32 years older compared to houses in the adjacent school districts. Therefore, housing
characteristics in Syracuse and its adjacent school district mirror to some extent the socioeconomic segregation between the school districts. Comparing houses characteristics for sales ½
mile away from the district border, the gap in housing prices is somewhat greater averaging
$38,504 (a difference of about 26 percent). The housing quality in Syracuse is still inferior to its
neighbors. Also, the share of houses with central air conditioning is higher in the adjacent school
districts and the age gap is less compared to the previous sample.

Contrasting houses in Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts, houses in Niagara Falls
have lower sales prices and are of lower quality than in the adjacent school districts. The
difference in housing prices is on average $83,734 (about percent 51 percent). Houses in Niagara
Falls are more likely to have central air conditioning and they are older.
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Comparing Syracuse and its adjacent school districts with Niagara Falls and its adjacent school
districts, it is apparent that the housing price gap between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts
is somewhat greater. Further, the gap in housing size is greater while the gap in housing age is
smaller between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts. All other housing characteristics look
similar.

Table 4 presents summary statistics for Niagara Falls. As already described earlier, houses in
Niagara Falls are of less value and of somewhat less quality compared to houses in the adjacent
school district. Using the reduced sample around the district border for Niagara Falls, the gap in
housing prices is much smaller averaging $20,782 (about 18 percent). Houses in Niagara Falls
are of somewhat better quality, more likely to have air central air conditioning, and to be older.

Dunkirk and Binghamton have less valuable and lower quality houses than their adjacent
districts. The difference in housing prices is $41,484 (about 32 percent). Further, houses in the
Dunkirk and Binghamton are less likely to have central air conditioning. Comparing the
differences in housing stock between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts with Dunkirk and
Binghamton and their adjacent school districts the following points are evident. The housing
price difference between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is greater. Also, the differences
in housing size and age are greater in Niagara Falls. All other housing characteristics look
relatively similar.

Table 5 presents summary statistics for Ithaca. Columns 1 and 2 compare housing characteristics
in Ithaca and its surrounding districts. It is notable that housing prices and the quality of housing
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in Ithaca are greater than in its adjacent school districts. The difference in housing prices is
$62,003 (about 43 percent). Also, houses in Ithaca are more likely to have central air
conditioning. The reduced sample shows for Ithaca a decline in the housing price difference. The
difference in housing prices is reduced to $29,492 (about 13 percent). Overall, the gap in housing
quality, share of houses with air conditioning, and age is reduced.

In Oneonta and Saratoga, housing prices and housing quality are greater than in their adjacent
school districts. The difference is $54,223 (about 21 percent). Further, houses are more likely to
have central air conditioning. Comparing the differences in housing characteristics between
Ithaca and its adjacent districts with differences between Oneonta and Saratoga and its adjacent
districts, it is evident that there is a greater difference in the housing prices and quality between
Ithaca and its adjacent districts. All other housing characteristics look relatively similar.

2.9 Results

The results are presented separately for Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca in Tables 6 to 8
respectively. Models 1 and 2 estimate Equation 5 using the adjacent school districts as control
group. In Model 2, the sample is reduced to housing sales ½ mile away from the district border.
The main focus in the first two models is the coefficient on the interaction between post and
inside. The effect captures the change in housing prices differences between school districts with
charter schools and their adjacent districts after charter school entry.

Model 3 estimates Equation 6 using the matched metropolitan areas. The main effect is captured
by the triple interaction between post, inside, and treatment. The coefficient compares the change
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in housing price differences between the districts with charter school and its comparison district
and between the control districts and their adjacent school districts after charter school entry.

Models 4 to 6 estimate Equation 5 but differentiate by distance and neighborhood income. Model
4 interacts the coefficient of interest with distance in miles. In Model 5, the sample consist only
of sales in neighborhoods having a neighborhood income below the median in the district with
charter school. Model 6 presents the same model for housing sales taking place in neighborhoods
with an income above the median. In Models 5 and 6, I include only neighborhoods in the
charter school district that have a similar income compared the neighborhoods in the adjacent
districts and vice versa. With limiting the sample to similar neighborhoods on each side of the
border, I avoid bias resulting from comparisons that are not supported on either side of the
border.

Results Syracuse
Table 6 presents the results for Syracuse. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients on the interaction
between post and inside are negative and imply an increase in the housing price gap between
Syracuse and its adjacent school districts. However, the estimated coefficient are imprecisely
estimated and not statistically significant. Model 3 shows no effect of the charter school
indicating that the difference in housing prices between Syracuse and its adjacent district relative
to the difference in housing prices between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is not
changing after charter school entry. Model 4 shows a main effect being close to zero and
statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the triple interaction including distance suggests that
with increasing distance, the effect of the charter school is reduced. Being a mile further away
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reduces the impact of the charter school in housing prices by 1.4 percent. As the coefficient is
imprecisely estimated, this cannot said with certainty.

Model 5 shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post
and inside. Housing prices in Syracuse’s poor neighborhoods increase by about 6 percent after
charter school entry compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6
shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and
inside. Housing prices in Syracuse’s richer neighborhoods decreased by 5 percent after charter
school entry compared to similar neighborhoods located in the adjacent school districts.

The results for Models 5 and 6 probably indicate resorting between Syracuse’s richer and poorer
neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer neighborhoods, who get their child
enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools, move out of their neighborhood into
somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand decreases in the richer neighborhoods,
housing prices fall. As demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices grow. Thus,
the result for neighborhoods in Syracuse is similar to Case 2 in the theoretical section.

Results Niagara Falls
Table 7 shows the results for Niagara Falls. In Model 1, the coefficient on the interaction
between post and inside is close to zero implying no change in the housing price gap between
Niagara Falls and its neighboring districts. Reducing the sample to housing sales close to the
district border the coefficient becomes positive indicating a decrease the housing price gap. The
coefficients in both models are not statistically significant. In Model 3, the coefficient on the

47

triple interaction is close to zero. The coefficient indicates that the difference in housing prices
between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is not changing differently compared to districts
in the matched metro area. In Model 4, the main effect is close to zero and not statistically
significant. The coefficient on the triple interaction is positive indicating a greater impact on
housing values for parcels that are further away from the charter school. However, the coefficient
is imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant.

Model 5 shows a statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction between post and
inside. Housing prices in Niagara Falls poor neighborhood decreased by 2.9 percent compared to
similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6 shows a positive but not
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and inside. The results indicate
an increasing gap between housing prices in Niagara Falls neighborhoods. Housing prices in
poorer neighborhoods decrease while they remain unchanged in richer neighborhoods. The result
is potentially explained by declining school quality in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods. As
the charter school is low performing compared to other schools in the district, a reduction in
school quality is unlikely based on cream skimming. It is more likely that resources or services
declined in schools located in low income neighborhoods. As school quality decreases,
households have to be compensated by lower housing prices. The situation in Niagara Falls is
best explained by theoretical case number three.

Results Ithaca
Table 8 presents the results for Ithaca. In Model 1, the coefficient on the interaction between post
and inside is negative and indicates a decline in the housing prices gap between Ithaca and its
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neighboring districts. Reducing the sample to housing sales at the district border, the coefficient
becomes positive. Both coefficients are imprecisely estimated and they are not statistically
significant. In Model 3, the coefficient on the triple interaction is close to zero. The coefficient
indicates that the difference in housing prices between Ithaca and its adjacent districts is not
changing differently compared to districts in the matched metro area. Differentiating the effect
by distance, the main effect in Model 4 is close to zero. The coefficient on the triple interaction is
close to zero suggesting no relationship between distances and housing price changes. Both
coefficients are not statistically significant.

Model 5 shows a negative and statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction
between post and inside. Housing prices in Ithaca’s poor neighborhood decrease by 1.9 percent
compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6 shows a positive but
not statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and inside. The results
indicate an increasing gap between housing prices in Ithaca’s neighborhoods. Housing prices in
poorer neighborhoods decrease while they stay the same in richer neighborhoods. Similar to
Niagara Falls, the result is potentially explained by declining school quality in the poorer
neighborhoods in Ithaca. As performance measurement in the charter school’s 2012 and 2013
report cards reveal, the Ithaca charter school is lower performing compared to its traditional
counterparts. Thus, a reduction in school quality is unlikely to be based on cream skimming.

It is more likely that resources or services declined in schools located in low income
neighborhoods. As school quality decreases, households have to be compensated by lower
housing prices. The situation in Niagara Falls is best explained by theoretical case number three.
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More likely is that resources or services declined in schools located in low income
neighborhoods. As school quality decreases, households have to be compensated by lower
housing prices. Similar to Niagara Falls, the situation in Ithaca is best explained by theoretical
case number three.

In conclusion, there are no statistically significant results on the coefficients of interest for
Models 1 to 4. Most of the results are imprecisely measured and do not allow any further
conclusions about and whether the gap in housing prices changes. The models 5 and 6 show
statistically significant coefficients indicating changes in housing prices for neighborhoods
within Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca. The heterogeneity of the charter school effect
amongst neighborhoods with different income is most likely the reason why models focusing on
overall effects at the district level show either imprecise or no results. In Syracuse, households
living in neighborhoods with higher median income move into neighborhoods with lower median
income located in Syracuse. The difference in housing prices between neighborhoods in
Syracuse is decreasing. In Niagara Falls and Ithaca low income neighborhoods experience
declining housing prices. As housing prices in higher income neighborhoods do not change, the
gap in housing prices between neighborhoods is increasing.

2.10 Conclusions

Theoretical models of bidding and sorting suggest that charter schools can have a significant
effect on housing markets and residential sorting. In this chapter, I provide an direct empirical
test of whether those predicted effects occur. My theory describes three cases how charter
schools influence school quality and housing prices. The first case describes a positive effect of
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charter schools on school quality. However, the increase in school quality is not large enough to
generate resorting. The difference in housing prices between high and low performing
jurisdictions can either go up or down depending on the relative changes in school quality
between jurisdictions. The second case illustrates an increase in school quality that is large
enough to create resorting. In this case, housing price differences between high and low
performing jurisdictions decrease. The third case describes how charter school decrease school
quality leading to a decline in housing prices in the lower performing jurisdiction. In this case,
the gap in housing prices between districts increases.

Empirically, I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between
school districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences
between neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter school raise the price of housing by almost 6
percent in neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar
neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent
in neighborhoods with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the
adjacent school district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and
richer neighborhoods in Syracuse is decreasing. The results probably indicate resorting between
Syracuse’s richer and poorer neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools,
move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices fall. As demand increases in poorer
neighborhoods, housing prices grow.
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Syracuse is exemplary for the effect of high performing charter schools on housing values in
districts with much lower performing traditional public schools. The charter schools are an
amenity that is valued by some families who willing to move out of their neighborhood into a
poorer neighborhood.

In Niagara Falls poorer neighborhoods, housing prices decrease relative to neighborhoods with
similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts. Likewise, Ithaca’s poorer
neighborhoods experience declining housing prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the
adjacent school districts after charter school entry. In both districts housing prices in richer
neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in Niagara Falls and
Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer neighborhoods increased after
charter school opening.

Niagara Falls and Ithaca are exemplary for the effect of charter schools on housing values that
performing lower than the traditional public schools in the district. The charter schools takes
students and money away from traditional schools. Their low performance is likely to be
acknowledge by residents and seen as a disamenity.

The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between
jurisdictions is more complex and context specific compared to inter-district choice and voucher
programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on housing values depend on how
charter schools impact expected school quality in jurisdictions. Also, the empirical findings
suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies tremendously between
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neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price changes it is necessary to
analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.

Additional research has to be conducted to explore the relationship between charter schools and
housing prices further. Particularly, my analysis is limited by the availability of housing sales
before 2000 and only focuses on areas with small charter school enrollment. Using different
samples may lead to somewhat different results. Further, I did not have attendance zones for
school districts to explore within district changes on housing prices further. Future research
could address these deficiencies to create a better understanding how charter school influence
housing prices.
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Figure 1: Perfect Sorting without Charter Schools
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Figure 3: School Quality Increase With Resorting
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Figure 4: School Quality Decrease
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Figure 5: Syracuse City School School District and Its Adjacent School Districts
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Figure 6: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Syracuse
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Figure 7: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Niagara Falls
1)
Niagara Falls vs Surrounding School Districts

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

Months
Niagara Falls
Surrounding Districts

2)

.5
0
-.5
-1

Sale Price Residual

1

Niagara Falls vs Surrounding School Districts - 1 Mile

-80

-60

-40
Months
Niagara Falls
Surrounding Districts

-20

0

58

-.5

0

.5

Sale Price Residual

1

Figure 8: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Ithaca
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Figure 9: Sale Price Residuals by Date for Syracuse and Metro Comparison
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Figure 10: Sale Price Residuals by Date for Niagara Falls and Metro Comparison
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Figure 11: Sale Price Residuals by Date for Ithaca and Metro Comparison
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Table 1: Performance of Charter Schools and Districts in 2010
District

First Charter
Established

Number
of Charter
Schools

Share of
District
Enrollment

Sufficient
Pre Period

Housing
Sales
Available

Charter
School in
Adjacent
District

Average
Performance
Charter
Schools

Average
Performance
District
Schools

Average
Performance
Surrounding
Districts

Included
in Final
Sample

Albany
1999
12
24%
No
Yes
No
-0.18
-0.97
0.63
No
Buffalo
2000
15
19%
No
Yes
No
-0.44
-1.58
0.18
No
Rochester
2000
6
4%
No
Yes
No
N/A
-0.90
0.74
No
Roosevelt
2000
1
8%
No
Yes
No
N/A
0.15
-0.53
No
Wainscott
2000
1
74%
No
Yes
No
-0.25
-1.17
-1.14
No
Riverhead
2001
1
2%
Yes
No
No
-0.59
-0.22
0.34
No
KenmoreTonawanda
2001
1
2%
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.91
-0.07
0.60
No
Troy
2001
2
11%
Yes
Yes
Yes
-0.84
-1.71
0.48
No
Lackawanna
2002
1
19%
Yes
Yes
Yes
-0.60
-0.84
0.30
No
Syracuse
2002
2
5%
Yes
Yes
No
-0.89
-2.20
0.22
Yes
Yonkers
2005
1
1%
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
0.42
0.14
No
Niagara Falls
2006
1
5%
Yes
Yes
No
-0.49
-1.29
-0.17
Yes
Hempstead
2009
2
7%
Yes
No
No
-0.19
N/A
0.56
No
Ithaca
2009
1
2%
Yes
Yes
No
1.13
-1.04
0.83
Yes
Source: Number of charter schools and year of establishment are taken from the SUNY Charter School Institute web page (http://www.newyorkcharters.org).
Enrollment figures are taken from the Common Core of Data 2010 Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey. Performance measures are taken from
the 2010 New York State report cards
Performance is computed by averaging the standard scores for grade 4 ELA, grade 4 math, grade 8 ELA and grade 8 math for each school in New York State.
Then, the measurement is converted into standard scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
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Table 2: Charter Districts and Matched Control Districts

Mean
Performance

District
Enrollment
Black
Population
in %

Population
in Poverty
in %

Mean
Performance

Adjacent Districts Averages
Enrollment
Black
Population
Population in Poverty
in %
in %

Measurement
state mean
state standard deviation

0.00
1.00

3082.23
4198.70

4.09
9.29

8.38
5.22

0.14
0.46

3487.26
3261.23

4.21
5.75

8.47
3.65

District
ITHACA

1.02

7620.00

7.33

7.61

-0.03

1501.25

2.17

7.88

Control: Saratoga Springs
Control: Oneonta

0.58
0.65

7915.00
2705.00

1.48
7.33

5.68
14.99

0.06
-0.22

2107.50
691.67

1.02
0.31

7.30
11.72

NIAGARA FALLS

-0.96

11075.00

28.65

19.64

0.24

4162.86

1.13

4.40

Control: Binghamton
Control: Dunkirk

-0.23
-1.36

8135.00
2610.00

14.47
5.07

18.34
24.70

0.41
0.14

3020.00
1657.50

2.57
1.11

7.86
9.72

SYRACUSE

-2.17

28575.00

40.45

22.54

0.25

4193.33

2.49

5.97

Control: Niagara Falls

-0.96

11075.00

28.65

19.64

0.24

4162.86

1.13

4.40

All variables are used for the school year 1999
Performance computed by converting mean score of each district in the state into a standard scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one
using statewide test specific means and standard deviations, and then averaging the standard scores for grade 4 ELA, grade 4 math, grade 8 ELA and
grade 8 math.
Any additional measure from the district tabulations of the 2000 U.S. Census
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Table 3: Summary Statistics Syracuse
Syracuse
All housing
All housing
sales Syracuse sales adjacent
districts

Syracuse
Niagara Falls
1 Mile
1 Mile
All housing
All housing
around the around the
sales Niagara sales adjacent
border
border
Falls
districts
Syracuse
adjacent
school
districts
5,053
13,470
2,943.00
1,481.00
2,314.00
5,464.00
Number of sales
Sales price in $
100,362
137,959
105530.6
144035
80,677.15
164,411.50
(52,368)
(73,248)
(44,553)
(78,981)
(39,099)
(78,217)
Share condition fair or poor
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.14)
(0.18)
(0.14)
(0.19)
Share condition good or excellent
0.04
0.10
0.03
0.08
0.05
0.09
(0.29)
(0.18)
(0.27)
(0.23)
(0.28)
(0.20)
Share no fire place
0.50
0.53
0.45
0.43
0.69
0.38
(0.50)
(0.50)
C(0.49)
(0.46)
(0.49)
(0.50)
Share construction grade A or B
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.06
0.16
(0.24)
(0.19)
(0.29)
(0.24)
(0.37)
(0.22)
Share construction grade D or E
0.16
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.00
0.01
(0.34)
(0.33)
(0.02)
(0.08)
(0.36)
(0.32)
Share central air condition
0.15
0.27
0.19
0.34
0.37
0.24
(0.44)
0.39)
(0.47)
(0.48)
(0.43)
(0.36)
Average number of full baths
1.23
1.40
1.23
1.46
1.25
1.51
(0.58)
(0.51)
(0.62)
(0.48)
(0.60)
(0.51)
Average number of bedrooms
3.10
3.11
3.03
3.06
3.08
3.20
(0.70)
(0.65)
(0.72)
(0.76)
(0.72)
(0.73)
Average number square feet living area
1533.96
1580.09
1,501.17
1,633.74
1,367.62
1,766.08
(582.57)
(471.83)
(660.78)
(440.47)
(619.31)
(531.02)
Average age
66.84
34.74
64.59
48.50
61.61
36.06
(20.91)
(15.38)
(20.37)
(16.02)
(20.97)
(15.66)
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics Niagara Falls
Niagara Falls
All housing All housing
sales Niagara sales adjacent
Falls
districts

Niagara Falls
Dunkirk and Binghamton
1 Mile
1 Mile
All housing
All housing
around the around the
sales Dunkirk sales adjacent
border
border
and
districts
Niagara Falls adjacent
Binghamton
school
districts
2,314
5,464
790.00
212.00
966.00
15,966.00
Number of sales
Sales price in $
80,677
164,412
97441.94
118223.5
89,351.64
130,835.90
(39,099)
(78,217)
(41,239)
(100,389)
(52,203)
(80,980)
Share condition fair or poor
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.12
0.07
(0.18)
(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.17)
(0.33)
(0.26)
Share condition good or excellent
0.05
0.09
0.10
0.01
0.07
0.07
(0.23)
(0.28)
(0.30)
(0.10)
(0.26)
(0.26)
Share no fire place
0.69
0.38
0.63
0.58
0.70
0.54
(0.46)
(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.49)
(0.46)
(0.50)
Share construction grade A or B
0.06
0.16
0.11
0.24
0.06
0.10
(0.24)
(0.37)
(0.31)
(0.43)
(0.23)
(0.30)
Share construction grade D or E
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.06
(0.02)
(0.08)
(0)
(0)
(0.28)
(0.23)
Share central air condition
0.37
0.24
0.43
0.12
0.07
0.21
(0.48)
(0.43)
(0.50)
(0.33)
(0.25)
(0.41)
Average number of full baths
1.25
1.51
1.26
1.33
1.24
1.40
(0.48)
(0.60)
(0.49)
(0.54)
(0.48)
(0.58)
Average number of bedrooms
3.08
3.20
3.04
2.92
3.11
3.11
(0.76)
(0.72)
(0.62)
(0.72)
(0.87)
0.7629268
Average number square feet living area
1367.62
1766.08
1,350.82
1,451.51
1,509.62
1,607.15
(440.47)
(619.36)
(411.61)
(609.22)
(476.92)
(594.69)
Average age
61.61
36.06
53.87
46.05
67.29
47.70
(16.02)
(20.97)
(17.36)
(19.61)
(16.72)
(22.37)
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics Ithaca
Ithaca
All housing
All housing
sales Ithaca sales adjacent
districts

Ithaca
1 Mile around 1 Mile around
the border
the border
Syracuse
adjacent
school
districts

Oneanta and Saratoga
All housing
All housing
sales Oneanta sales adjacent
and Saratoga
districts

3,777
3,112
539.00
228.00
6,435.00
20,833.00
207,012
145,009
227882.8
198390.4
257,702.90
203,479.60
(122,708)
(108,677)
(122,426)
(112,922)
(173,751)
(135,591)
Share condition fair or poor
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.04
(0.16)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.25)
Share condition good or excellent
0.43
0.28
0.43
0.49
0.12
0.18
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.32)
(0.38)
(0.45)
Share no fire place
0.48
0.71
0.40
0.51
0.48
0.56
(0.50)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.46)
Share construction grade A or B
0.15
0.08
0.13
0.20
0.18
0.11
(0.36)
(0.34)
(0.40)
(0.39)
(0.31)
(0.28)
Share construction grade D or E
0.11
0.17
0.10
0.20
0.05
0.08
(0.32)
(0.30)
(0.40)
(0.22)
(0.26)
(0.38)
Share central air condition
0.16
0.05
0.19
0.13
0.43
0.26
(0.36)
(0.39)
(0.34)
(0.50)
(0.44)
(0.22)
Average number of full baths
1.67
1.51
1.88
1.74
1.63
1.56
(0.71)
(0.67)
(0.68)
(0.67)
(0.64)
(0.63)
Average number of bedrooms
3.16
3.10
3.42
3.29
3.19
3.10
(0.86)
(0.80)
(0.78)
0.8216371
0.8013503
(0.78)
Average number square feet living area
1681.48
1654.07
1,897.15
1,807.02
1,800.00
1,662.80
(659.52)
(650.88)
(640.79)
(693.98)
(627.25)
(607.48)
Average age
48.05
44.47
36.51
36.16
35.45
37.88
(26.07)
(20.35)
(24.90)
(27.77)
(27.46)
(26.73)
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Number of sales
Sales price in $
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Table 6: Analysis for Syracuse
Syracuse and
Adjacent Districts

Post

Syracuse and
Syracuse and
Syracuse and
Syracuse and
Syracuse and
Adjacent
Control Districts Adjacent Districts - Adjacent Districts Adjacent Districts Districts - 1/2 - inl. Adjacent
with Distance
- Income below
Income above
Mile
Districts
Interaction
Median
Median

(1)
0.0544**
(0.0222)

(2)
0.0892*
(0.0457)

(3)
0.0114
(0.0204)

-0.0243
(0.0171)

-0.0351
(0.0231)

-0.0336
(0.0256)
0.0466***
(0.0146)

Distance
Post X Inside
Post X Treatment
Post X Distance

(5)
-0.0757
(0.0550)

(6)
0.0748***
(0.0228)

0.0597**
(0.0274)

-0.0503**
(0.0231)

-0.00109
(0.00355)
0.0530
(0.0712)
-0.0139
(0.00871)

Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Treatment

0.00829
(0.0307)

Neighborhood Fixed Effects
Neighborhood Trend
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects
Number of observations

(4)
0.0637*
(0.0337)
-0.0113
(0.0111)
0.00998
(0.0364)

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

18,517

4,423

23,379

18,517

3,451

4,429

R2
0.605
0.571
0.606
0.606
0.440
0.629
Notes : Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens.
Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Analysis for Niagara Falls

Post

Niagara Falls and
Adjacent
Districts

Niagara Falls
and Adjacent
Districts - 1/2
Mile

(1)
0.126**
(0.0460)

(2)
0.133**
(0.0555)

0.00987
(0.0211)

0.0325
(0.0391)

Niagara Falls
and Control
Districts - inl.
Adjacent
Districts
(3)
0.151***
(0.0469)

Niagara Falls and Niagara Falls and Niagara Falls and
Adjacent Districts Adjacent Districts Adjacent Districts - with Distance
- Income below
Income above
Interaction
Median
Median
(5)
0.033***
(0.0054)

(6)
0.118**
(0.0469)

0.0784
(0.0568)
-0.0401*
(0.0232)

-0.0291***
(0.0016)

0.0139
(0.0105)

Distance
Post X Inside
Post X Treatment
Post X Distance

(4)
0.121*
(0.0665)
0.00359
(0.00966)
-0.0109
(0.0776)

0.000684
(0.00518)
-0.190**
(0.0749)
0.0282
(0.0194)

Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Treatment

-0.0511
(0.0614)

Neighborhood Fixed Effects
Neighborhood Trend
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

Number of observations

7,772

1,001

15,953

5,507

1,294

1,792

R2
0.618
0.688
0.565
0.642
0.548
0.644
Notes: Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens.
Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Analysis for Ithaca
Ithaca and
Adjacent
Districts

Ithaca and
Adjacent
Districts - 1/2
Mile

(1)
0.0344
(0.0664)

(2)
0.0328
(0.122)

-0.0504
(0.0417)

0.0421
(0.0854)

Neighborhood Fixed Effects
Neighborhood Trend
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

Number of observations

6,876

767

20,782

4,763

1,351

4,686

Post
Distance
Post X Inside
Post X Treatment
Post X Distance
Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Distance
Post X Inside X Treatment

Ithaca and
Ithaca and
Ithaca and Adjacent Ithaca and Adjacent
Control
Adjacent Districts Districts - Income Districts - Income
Districts - inl. - with Distance
below Median
above Median
Adjacent
Interaction
Districts
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.0311
0.747**
0.0211***
0.0164
(0.0345)
(0.334)
(0.0041)
(0.0802)
-0.0153**
(0.00628)
-0.0245
-0.01297
-0.0191***
0.0199
(0.0229)
(0.0292)
(0.0033)
(0.0408)
0.0476*
(0.0286)
-0.00534**
(0.00231)
-0.00601
(0.0124)
0.00560
(0.0138)
0.0468
(0.0453)

2

R
0.627
0.715
0.627
0.587
0.709
0.594
Notes: Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens.
Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3. The Influence of Finance Policies on Charter
School Locations in New York, Florida, North
Carolina, Michigan, and Ohio
3. 1 Introduction
The nature and effects of state charter school programs depend partly on the location decisions
made by potential charter school operators. These supply decisions influence the composition of
charter schools, their effects on the enrollments and finances of traditional public schools, and
the type of competition charter schools will create. Despite their importance, supply decisions
have been largely neglected in the study of charter schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

Among the understudied questions of charter school location is how finance provisions influence
charter school locational decisions. Although state policies regarding charter school finance
policies vary widely, charter schools in all states share the following characteristics. First,
enrollment is not guaranteed. Second, charter school funding is determined by the number of
students. Third, charter schools have to fulfill performance goals. Therefore, all charter school
operators must be concerned with: (1) reaching achievement standards, (2) attracting enough
students to fill their allotted number of seats, and (3) keeping costs sufficiently low to maintain
financial viability. These three factors are likely to influence the locational decision of charter
school operators. States can affect these factors by their funding policies (Bifulco 2014).
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This chapter examines the influence of finance provisions on charter school location patterns by
comparing different states. Using data for Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New
York, the results show that locational and particularly enrollment patterns are consistent with the
incentives created by financial policies. In states tying charter school payments to school districts
expenditures, charter schools are more likely to locate in districts having greater expenditures. In
states paying flat per pupil amounts independent of charter location, charter schools are more
likely to move into low spending school districts. The analysis also shows that additional
payments for enrolling disadvantaged students encourages charter schools to locate in high
poverty areas and to enroll more disadvantaged students, but only if payments are large enough
to outweigh the cost of educating those students.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the analysis sample and Sections 3, 4,
and 5 describes the finance, accountability, and authorizer policies for each state in the study
sample. Section 6 discusses the location and enrollment incentives created by the different
policies in each state. Using policies and theoretical considerations, Section 7 states the studies
hypotheses. Section 8 describes the empirical methods used to test the hypotheses. Section 9
presents the results, and finally Section 10 makes conclusions.

3.2 Sample

Table 9 shows the decision making process determining the study’s sample. Column two and
three show the number of charter schools and the share of charter school students in states with
charter school programs. I first select states having large charter school programs regarding the
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number of schools and charter school enrollment (see also Bifulco 2014 for similar criteria).
Next, I keep states where payments are determined by charter school laws rather than through
negotiation between authorizer and charter school operator. In a final step, I select only states
where the data for my empirical models is available. More particularly, I need performance
information prior the start of the charter school program. Thus, the final sample consists of
Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New York.

3.3 Charter School Finance, Accountability, and Authorizing Policies

I expect charter schools to make location decisions that increase the likelihood of reaching
performance goals, attracting enough students, and staying financially viable. How likely it is for
a charter school operator to reach these three goals is influenced by each states’ finance,
accountability, and authorizing policies. By making it easier to reach the three goals in some
locations than in others, charter school policies create location and enrollment incentives. To
understand how these incentives emerge, I describe the finance, accountability, and authorizing
policies for each state separately in the next sections.

3.3.1 Charter School Finance Systems in New York, Florida, North Carolina,
Michigan, and Ohio

Allotments to charter schools consist of two parts: base payments and additional payments for
students with certain characteristics (henceforth compensations). Base payments are determined
by the legislature in each state in the study sample. For each charter school, the total amount is
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calculated by multiplying the base payment by the number of full time students in the school. In
New York, Florida, and North Carolina base payments vary with the location of the charter
school. In Michigan11 and Ohio payments are the same no matter where the school is located.
Compensations are additional payments for high cost students. Charter schools can receive
compensations for students with disabilities, living in poverty, and having limited English
proficiency (LEP). The additional payments are calculated either by weighting these groups of
students differently in the calculation of base payments or by directly adding a specific per pupil
amount of money to the base payment. In all the states in the study sample, charter schools
receive additional payments for students with disabilities. Only in Michigan and Ohio do charter
schools receive compensation for enrolling poor students. In all states in the study sample but
New York, charter schools receive additional payments for enrolling LEP students.

Table 10 lists base payments and compensations for each state in the sample. All figures are
displayed for 2007, as this is the most recent year in the sample detailed information for all states
can be determined. I describe first, how base payments are determined in each state.

Base Payments
In New York, charter schools receive payments for each enrolled student from the district where
the student resides. Per pupil payments are determined by the approved operating expenses of the
district from two years earlier divided by a weighted pupil count (also from two years earlier)
multiplied by an adjustment factor12. Approved operating expenses are total district expenditures
excluding expenditures for capital outlay and debt service for school buildings; transportation;

11
12

In Michigan there is a small variation of $300.
The adjustment factors is supposed to correct for inflation.
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lunch programs; tuition payments; and some other miscellaneous expenditures. The adjustment is
based on the statewide change in approved operating expenses from three years prior to one year
prior (Bifulco and Buerger 2012). In 2007, the approved operating expenditures per pupil that
charter school could have received varied between $6,081 and $17,915 with a mean of $9,987
and a standard deviation of $2,497.

In Florida, the per pupil payments to charter schools are calculated by dividing the operating
funds of the district in which the charter school is located by the number of weighted full-time
equivalent students in the school district. The result is multiplied by weighted full-time students
in the charter school. Operating funds include gross state and local funds, discretionary lottery
funds, and funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy (Florida
Statutes Title XLVIII Chapter 1002.33 (17)). In 2007, the per pupil payments for weighted
students counts ranged from $6,776 to $10,745 with a mean of $7,913 and a standard deviation
of $802.

In North Carolina, the state pays charter schools the average per pupil revenues of the district in
which the charter school is located excluding funding for students with special needs or limited
English proficiency (G.S. § 115C-238.29H a 1). If charter schools enroll students with special
needs or LEP, they receive additional funds from the state. These revenues are explained in the
next section. Further, charter schools obtain per pupil payments from the school district in which
a student resides. The amount of these payments have to equal the per pupil local expenditure
(G.S. 115C-238.29H). Calculations for these amounts are done by the school district. The
Department of Public Instruction neither oversees nor intervenes with the calculation and
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payment of local appropriations (Charter School Financial Guide 2010). In 2007, the payments
charter schools could have received varied between $3,943 and $8,864 depending on the district
the charter school locates and excluding payments for students with disabilities or limited
English proficiency. The distribution had a mean of $5,047 and a standard variation of $770.

In Michigan, the charter school finance system is strongly influenced by Proposal A, a
constitutional amendment approved by Michigan voters in 1994. Proposal A decoupled the local
property tax from the financing of local education agencies and established the state’s sales tax
as primary source of education funding. Under Proposal A, the Legislature annually calculates a
per-pupil funding allowance for each school district. The amount of the allowance is related to
district spending prior to Proposal A. Districts having spent more prior the proposal receive a
greater allowance. All districts receive at least the minimum allowance from the state. Charter
schools receive either the minimum allowance or a charter school allowance (Summers 2013). In
2007, the minimum allowance was $7,085 and the charter school allowance was $7,385. Charter
schools located in districts receiving an allowance less than $7,385 obtained the minimum
allowance. Charter schools located in districts receiving an allowance greater than $7,385
obtained the charter school allowance. Therefore, the maximum difference between districts in
charter school payment was $300 (Olson and LaFaive 2007).

In Ohio, all charter schools receive the per pupil base cost amount from the state regardless of
location. The per pupil base cost formula is determined statewide by the General Assembly
according to the cost of the three input factors: base classroom teacher compensation, other
personnel support, and non-personnel support. The General Assembly decides on the base
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classroom teacher compensation by defining a teacher to student ratio and a base classroom
teacher compensation for the whole state that is necessary for the state‐defined basic education.
Per pupil payments for personnel and non-personnel support are calculated using an adjustment
factor determined by the legislature and revenues in the previous year. In 2007, the per pupil
base cost formula was $5,403 (Legislative Service Commission 2008).

Base Payment Adjustments
Base payments to charter schools are often adjusted for district or student characteristics.
Adjustments are done by either weighting students differently or by adding specific dollar
amounts for certain types of students. I present the weights for each state in Table 10. To
compare additional payments resulting from these weights, I multiply state’s average unweighted
base payment by the specific student weight. If specific dollar amounts are added, I show the
payments in 2007.

In two states charter school revenues are adjusted for district characteristics. In Florida, charter
schools receive additional funding if they locate in districts with small enrollments. Payments are
based on a sparsity index. The index is computed by dividing the full time equivalent enrollment
of the district by the number of permanent senior high school centers (not to exceed three). In
2007, potential payments to charter schools ranged between $2 and $533 per pupil. Further,
Florida law also requires that payments to charter schools are adjusted for the cost of living in
the district. Adjustments are done using an annually computed District Cost Differential (DCD),
The DCD is calculated by adding each district’s Florida Price Level Index for the most recent
three years and dividing the sum by three. The result is multiplied by 0.800, divided by 100, and

77

0.200 is added to the product. In 2007, the weights ranged between 0.9221 and 1.0271. Using the
average unadjusted payments to charter schools of $7,913, the adjustment would results in
deductions or payments between -$616 and $214.

In Ohio, charter schools receive additional funding if they locate in school districts that are
below the 80th percentile in the state’s income and property wealth distribution. The amount of
the so called parity aid is determined by the state’s legislature. In 2007, parity aid ranged
between $9 and $594 per pupil depending on district’s position in the wealth distribution of the
state.

States also adjust their payments to charter schools according to student characteristics. In
addition to location-specific incentives, these adjustments create incentives to enroll (or exclude)
specific students. All states use weights that increasing payments to charter schools for enrolling
students with disabilities. In Michigan and North Carolina, these weights do not distinguish
between different forms of disabilities with flat weights of 0.286 and 0.125 respectively. In Ohio,
Florida, and New York weights vary with the severity of the disability. Weights range in Ohio
between 0.28 and 4.73, in Florida between 0.035 and 5.201, and in New York between 0.9 and
1.65. Therefore, weights for students with severe disabilities are greatest in Ohio and Florida
while they are smallest in North Carolina and Michigan. The weight for students with less severe
disabilities is greatest in New York and smallest in Florida. Comparing actual payments, Ohio
and Florida have the highest payments for students with severe disabilities while Florida has by
far the smallest payment for students with less severe disabilities. New York has a relatively high
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per pupil payment for students with severe disabilities while North Carolina and Florida have
relatively low payments.

Adjustments for enrolling students living in poverty are made in Michigan and Ohio. In
Michigan, charter schools receive additional payments for students qualifying for free breakfast,
milk or lunch under federal law. In 2007, the federal eligibility threshold for a one person
household was a monthly gross income of $850 per month. The weight for poor students was
0.115 leading to an additional payment of $832. In Ohio, charter schools receive additional
payments for students whose parents participate in the Ohio Works First program. The program
provides time-limited cash assistance to families with a gross monthly income of less than $773.
Only charter schools located in districts having more poor students than the average school
district in the state receive additional payments for enrolling poor students. In 2007, the per pupil
payment varied depending on the degree of poverty in the district. The in the poorest school
district was $1,208.

In all states but New York, base payments are adjusted for enrolling LEP students. The weight in
Florida is 0.275 leading to an additional payment of $2,176. In North Carolina, charter schools
receive a compensation of $683 for enrolling an LEP student. In Michigan, LEP students receive
the same weight as poor students if they are not already counted as a poor student. If they are
already counted as a poor student they do not receive an additional weight. Also, the legislature
appropriates annually money for LEP students. In 2007, appropriations were $2,800,000 and
41,842 LEP students were counted in the state. Hence, the state paid an additional $67 for every
LEP student enrolled in a charter school. In Ohio, the weight varies with the number of LEP
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students living in the district where the charter school is located. If there are more LEP students
than in the average school district, charter schools receive additional payments for LEP students.
The weights vary between 0.125 and 0.25 leading to additional payments between $675 and
$1,350 respectively. Therefore, weights and payments for LEP students are greatest in Florida
followed by Ohio and Michigan. Payments are smallest in North Carolina.

Florida is the only state adjusting payments to charter schools according to grade enrollment.
The weight for enrolling students in classes K to 3 is 0.035 and for enrolling students in classes 9
to 12 is 0.088. Additional payments are $277 and $360 respectively.

3.3.2 Accountability

Charter schools programs are based on the idea of performance-based accountability (Bulkley
2001). The strength of a performance-based accountability system depends on both the rigor of
the performance goals and how these goals are enforced (Bulkley 1999, Hill et al. 2001). Charter
schools have to fulfill the same NCLB goals as do other schools in their state (US Department of
Education 2001). If standards are relatively high compared to other states, it will be more
challenging for charter schools to reach the performance goals. NCES has compared each state's
standard for proficient performance in reading and mathematics in grades 4 and 8 by placing the
state standards onto a common scale defined by NAEP scores. Table 11 compares the percentage
of students that are proficient according to the state and the NAEP standard for each state in the
study sample for 2007. Differences between NAEP and state standards tend to be smaller in New
York and Florida, indicating relatively demanding standards. North Carolina has less demanding
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reading standards than New York and Florida, but similar standards in mathematics. Michigan
and Ohio tend to have less demanding standards than New York and Florida in both math and
reading.

The instruments charter school authorizers use to enforce performance standards start with the
application process and end with the renewal of the charter school contract. Performance based
contracts between authorizer and operator, and the systematic data collection and monitoring of
the school are important factors as well (Bulkley 2001). The National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools (NAPCS) has developed a model charter school law including the accountability
mechanisms a “flawless” charter school law should have. Further, NAPCS has transparently
compared the availability of these mechanisms with charter school laws nationwide. I use the
NAPCS model charter school law to compare the availability of accountability mechanisms
between the five states in my sample.

Table 12 depicts the four NAPCS accountability criteria. The first criterion analyzes
accountability mechanisms during the application process. The criterion highlights the inclusion
of comprehensive academic, operational, governance, and performance requirements in the
application. The second criterion examines whether or not charter school laws require
performance based contracts created as separate post-application documents between authorizers
and public charter schools, and whether or not these contracts detail academic performance
expectations, operational performance expectations, and school and authorizer rights and duties.
The third criterion captures the processes that allow authorizers to monitor and collect data on
the compliance with the performance contract. Finally, the last criterion analyzes the renewal
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process with a focus on school closure and dissolution procedures. NAPCS assigns points from 0
to 4 for each of these criteria with 0 indicating that accountability instruments are not in place
and 4 representing that all instruments of the model law are part of the charter school law.

Table 12 shows the scores assigned to the five states and the state average according to the
NAPCS ranking. Florida and New York are rated as having more extensive accountability
provisions, while Michigan, Ohio, and particularly, North Carolina are rated as having weaker
accountability provisions. Therefore, New York and Florida have both more rigorous
performance standards and more extensive charter school accountability provisions than
Michigan, Ohio, and North Carolina.

3.3.3 Authorizers

Authorizers decide on charter applications, and hence potentially influence the location of
charter schools. I scrutinize each state’s charter school law for preferences towards applicants
intending to serve certain types of students or to locate in a specific area. Also, I investigated
authorizers’ mission statements for priorities towards certain locations or student groups.

In New York, charter schools can be authorized by the local school districts, the State Board of
Regents (Regents), or the trustees of the State University of New York (SUNY). New York
charter School Law states that authorizers are “encouraged to give preference to applications that
demonstrate the capability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified
by the applicants as at risk of academic failure” (Charter School Law S 2852 (2)). Consequently,
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the mission statements of Regents and SUNY state a preference towards applicants intending to
serve students that are at a greater risk of not meeting the State’s academic standards.

In North Carolina, the charter school law allows local school boards, the University of North
Carolina, and the state board of education to serve as authorizers. Charter schools approved by
local school boards and the University of North Carolina must also be approved by the State
Board of Education. As the State Board of Education has the final decision on a charter school
application, the board acts ha the last decision on authorizing a charter school. North Carolina
Charter School Law states that in reviewing charter school applications the “State Board is
encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the capability to provide
comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the applicants as at risk of
academic failure” (§ 115C-238.29 D (a)).

In Florida, local school boards, state universities (for lab schools13 only) and community college
district boards of trustees (for charter technical career centers only) can serve as authorizers. In
practice, however, 99 percent of the charter schools are authorized by local school boards and 1
percent by higher education institutions (NACSA 2012). Neither the Florida Charter School Law
nor the Florida Charter School Application Evaluation Instrument, used by authorizers to assess
charter school applications, state preferences towards applicants serving a particular student
population or locating in specific neighborhoods. The Florida Association of Charter School

13

Laboratory or developmental research schools are affiliated with the college of education within the state
university of closest geographic proximity. Lab schools serve as a vehicle for the conduct of research,
demonstration, and evaluation regarding management, teaching, and learning (Florida Statutes Title XLVIII,
Chapter 1002).
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Authorizers (FACSA) does not state a preference in providing education to certain student
groups either.

In Michigan, boards for local districts, intermediate school districts14, community colleges, and
public universities can authorize charter schools, with jurisdictional restrictions for all but tribal
community colleges and public universities. The most active authorizers are local school boards
and higher education organizations. While local school boards authorize smaller numbers of
charter schools15, higher education organizations often oversee large numbers of charter
schools16. The charter school law gives priority to authorizing schools replacing charter schools
that have been closed for low performance and that intend to operate the same grade levels as the
closed school (Sec 380.503 (2)). Amongst the authorizers overseeing large numbers of charter
schools, only the Bay Mills Community College has in its mission to ensure a quality education
for urban, minority, and poor children.

In Ohio, the law allows a wide variety of entities to serve as authorizers if they are approved by
the state board of education. Active authorizers are the state’s education department, local school
districts, higher education institutions, and not-for-profit organizations. Higher education
institutions and not-for-profit organizations oversee larger numbers of charter schools than local
school boards. Neither the charter school law nor the mission statements of the largest charter
school authorizer mention a preference towards a location or student group.

14

Intermediate school districts are organized at the county or multi-county level and provide services for school
districts including services for special education students and vocational education. Additionally they collect data for
the state department of education.
15
The Detroit School District is the largest local authorizer with overseeing 18 schools in 2010.
16
In 2010, the Bay Mills Community College oversaw 43 charter schools, Grand Valley State University 42, and
Central Michigan University 59 charter schools.
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3.4 Location Incentives and Disincentives

Reasons for establishing a charter school can vary tremendously between charter school
operators. However, given the terms under which charter school are financed and authorized,
charter school operators have to meet three key objectives. First, they have to reach student
achievement standards specified in their charter agreements. Second, operators have to attract
enough students to fill their allotted seats. Finally, charter schools have to keep costs low enough
to maintain financial viability (Bifulco and Buerger 2012). Following Bifulco and Buerger
(2012), I expect that charter operators will make supply decisions that increase the likelihood of
meeting these objectives. Given this assumption, Bifulco and Buerger (2012) identify several
locational incentives that charter school financing and accountability provisions create for
charter school operators. In this section, I recap those incentives, and identify few additional
incentives created by aspects of charter financing policies not discussed by Bifulco and Buerger
(2012).

Location Incentives Based on Variation in Charter School Base Payment
In states where charter school payments depend on district expenditures, districts with a high
expenditure-to-cost ratio are an attractive location for charter school operators. A large number
of low cost students and high expenditures will make it relatively easy for the charter operator to
fulfill the achievement goals in the charter school contract. However, a high spending to cost
ratio is also likely to allow the district to operate traditional public school that are appealing to
students and parents. Thus, attracting enough students to stay financially viable might be
difficult. Districts with high spending-to-cost ratios, which use their resources inefficiently, are
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more likely to be an attractive location for charter schools. Therefore, in states where charter
school base payments vary with school location, I expect larger concentrations of charter schools
in inefficient districts with high spending-to-cost ratios (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

In states where charter school payments do not vary with the location of charter schools, I would
expect a different picture. In these states, including Michigan and Ohio, charter school payments
can be more or less than expenditures in the surrounding district. Charter schools are more likely
to move into districts with relatively low per pupil expenditures. In these districts, charter
schools have more funding than traditional public schools enabling them to provide attractive
programs to students and parents. Thus, in states that have no variation in charter school
payments, I expect to see a larger concentration of charter schools in districts with low per pupil
payments, holding districts costs and performance levels constant.

Bifulco and Buerger (2012) analyze charter school location patterns in New York a state having
a high variation in per pupil district payments linked to differences in district expenditures.
Controlling for the cost of providing education and mean student performance, they find that
districts with higher per pupil operating expenditures have greater concentrations of charter
schools. Holding district spending and cost of education constant, districts with lower mean
student performance have more charter schools, which suggests that charter schools are more
likely to move into relatively inefficient school districts.
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Location Incentives Based on Cost Factors
A substantial literature in education finance maintains that education costs depend on district and
student characteristics (Downes and Pogue 1994; Reschovsky and Imazeki 1998; Duncombe and
Yinger 2000, 2005). District characteristics influencing education costs include teacher wages
and facility costs. Holding other factors constant, charter schools have an incentive to locate in
districts with low teacher wages and rents to decrease their operational costs (Bifulco and
Buerger 2012).

Student characteristics influencing costs are mainly students’ learning and language abilities.
Supplemental payments for different grade levels, poor, LEP, and disabled student can offset
disincentives created by high costs. By serving high shares of students in groups that generate
additional payments, charter schools can generate higher per pupil revenues than surrounding
schools. Whether or not charter schools have financial incentive to serve high cost students
depends on the relationship between costs and supplemental payments. Holding everything else
equal, in states where supplemental payments equal or exceed costs, charter schools will enroll
relatively large amounts of high cost students. In states were costs are greater than additional
revenues, charter schools will not have incentive to enroll high cost students. Ultimately, how
costly high need students are, will depend on the performance standards in the charter school
contract and if an effective set of policy instruments is in place to enforce these standards. Costs
will be greater in states having higher performance goals and more effective instruments and
lower in states with lower performance standards and less effective instruments costs (Bifulco
and Buerger 2012).
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Lacireno-Paquet et al. (2002) present evidence from Washington, D.C. that suggests that this
type of financial incentive can influence charter school enrollments. Specifically, they find that
charter schools are less likely than regular public schools to serve students whose language or
special education needs make them more costly to educate. Interestingly, only charter schools
that they classified as market-oriented, rather than mission-oriented, showed this tendency,
suggesting that this type of financial incentive influences the supply decisions of some types of
charter school providers more than others.

Location Incentives Based on Performance of Students and Schools
Attracting high achieving students increases the likelihood of reaching required achievement
standards. The more demanding the student achievement standards, the stronger the incentive to
attract high achieving students. Also, schools that offer high achieving peers are attractive to
parents both because such peers might have positive spill-over effects and because parents might
use the achievement level of students as a proxy indicator of instructional quality. Of course,
high achieving students often have other attractive schooling options either because they live in
areas with high quality public schools or have access to private or magnet schools. Thus, a
charter school which chooses a location attractive to high achieving students may face more
competition and have a harder time filling seats, which might weaken the strength of this
incentive (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

Parents whose children attend low performing schools are more likely to be dissatisfied with
their current schooling options and to find a charter school attractive. Thus, locating in low
performing school districts makes it more likely that a charter school can fill its allotted seats.
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However, many of the students attracted to the charter school might be high need or low
achieving students. Enrolling these students will make it more difficult to reach the student
achievement standards without sufficient additional payments. If charter schools have a cost
effective model to educate high need students, low performing school districts will be an
attractive charter school location (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

Also, charter schools locating in low performing districts can try to attract students from more
advantaged backgrounds. For instance students whose parents are college educated may be more
likely to use school choice programs compared to students of parents with less education. There
is consistent empirical evidence that parental preferences are very heterogeneous and that lowincome parents place lower values on academic characteristics when choosing schools
(Schneider and Buckley 2002; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Jacob and Lefgren 2007).
Further, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that if information is costly to obtain,
economically and educationally advantaged families are better able to exercise choice. Using a
nationally representative data set, Butler et al. (2013) find students of parents having a somewhat
greater socio-economic status than their peers having a higher likelihood enrolling into a charter
schools. Thus, charter school operators in low performing school districts may be able to attract
higher performing students out of low performing schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

Evidence that these considerations may influence charter school locations is provided by a study
in Washington, D.C. Henig and MacDonald (2002) found that charter schools were more likely
to locate in census tracts with high proportions of African-American and Hispanic residents than
in predominantly white census tracts. However, among census tracts with concentrations of
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nonwhite residents, charter schools tended to locate in those with middle income and high home
ownership rates. This location pattern suggests a strategy of targeting the more advantaged
students within groups of traditionally disadvantaged students. Corroborating these findings,
Bifulco and Buerger (2012) find that New York charter schools are more likely to locate in
districts with concentrations of college educated adults as well as high levels of diversity in
educational attainment.

Location in Diverse Districts
The preceding discussion suggests that a strategy targeting advantaged students who would
otherwise attend schools with concentrations of disadvantaged students might be attractive to
charter school operators. Such a strategy, if successful, would make reaching achievement
standards, attracting a sufficient number of students, and keeping per pupil costs low each more
likely. Thus, many charter school operators might look to locate near schools with diverse
populations of students that include significant concentrations of both educationally
disadvantaged groups and more advantaged, higher achieving student groups (Bifulco and
Buerger 2014).

Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2005) make a more general argument of this kind. They argue that a
diverse population is likely to have a dispersed distribution of parental preferences for different
types of educational programs. As a result, schools or districts that serve diverse populations will
have a difficult time satisfying the preferences of all of their parents, creating a demand for
charter schools that can differentiate their offerings from the local school or district. They also
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present evidence, consistent with their argument, that charter schools in Michigan are more
likely to locate where populations are diverse in terms of race and adult education levels.

Another important factor is how in a diverse school district students sort into schools. It is
possible that the schools reflect the diversity of the district residents. However, it is also very
likely that students already sort into schools. If students are to sort into schools according to the
preferences, I do not expect a high demand for students in these districts. However, families
compete for entry into a neighborhood and may do not get to match their preferences towards
education with the neighborhood they end up living. Thus, I expect charter schools to move into
school districts with greater variation in residents and at the same time great disparities in
schools’ performance and student characteristics.

Location Incentives Based on Authorizer Preferences
As described earlier, authorizers in New York, North Carolina, and Michigan have preferences to
approve applications for charter schools locating in areas with high shares of students at risk of
academic failure. Charter operators applying for opening a charter school at a location preferred
by the authorizer will have greater chances of getting their charter application approved. Charter
schools will only locate in these areas if they have a cost effective model to educate high need
students, or if they can enroll high performing students from these areas.

Although charter school authorizers are widely accepted as a crucial institution for the success of
charter school programs, policymakers and researchers have largely overlooked them (Finnigan
2004). Using information from interviews and focus groups Finnigan et al. (2004) provide some
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evidence that state authorizers are much more likely than local authorizers to consider in their
sponsoring decisions the improvement of the public school systems, creating competition, and
fulfillment of the state law. Thus, it is possible that charter school authorizers, particularly at the
state level, actively encourage operators to move into certain areas. However, at this point it is
unclear how strong this effect is.

3.5 Hypotheses

Taking into account base payments as well as accountability and authorizing policies in each
state, I offer the following hypotheses.

H1. Holding performance and cost factors constant, I expect a positive relationship
between district expenditures and the number of charter schools in states where charter
school payments vary with district spending.

The incentive to move into a high spending school district will be greater if there is a greater
variance in district expenditures.

H2. In states where charter school payments do not vary with district expenditures,
holding performance and cost factors constant, I expect a negative relationship between
expenditures and the number of charter schools in a district.
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In states where charter school payments are unrelated to district spending, charter schools will
have a competitive advantage in districts where per pupil spending in traditional public schools is
low.

Taken into account the weights and additional payments for disadvantaged students, I can offer
the following hypotheses.

H3. In states compensating charter schools for the enrollment of disadvantaged students,
I expect a positive relationship between charter concentration (charter enrollment) and
the share of disadvantaged students in a district (school).

The relationship between the number of charter schools and the share of disadvantaged students
in a school district is altered by the amount of additional payments, authorizer preferences, and
the strength of the accountability system in the state. Additional payments have to be perceived
as sufficient by charter school operators to create an incentive. Authorizer preferences can
enforce incentives created by additional payments. High accountability standards with rigid
enforcement increase the costs for charter schools to educate disadvantaged students and mitigate
incentives created by additional payments.

3.6 Empirical Methods

To test the above stated hypotheses, I conduct two sets of analysis. The first analysis examines
the distribution of charter schools across districts and the second analysis examines the
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enrollment in charter schools. Focusing on the districts where charter schools are located allows
me to examine the effect of financial considerations that vary at the district level such as per
pupil payments. Looking at enrollment allows me to investigate the alignment of actual student
shares with compensation schemes for high cost students.

Location Across Districts
The goal of this study is to determine how finance and accountability policies in different states
influence locational decisions of charter schools. The empirical estimation follows the approach
used by Downes and Greenstein (1996), Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2005), and Bifulco and Buerger
(2012) to examine school location and estimate the following regression model in each of the
five states:

Chi = f(Ei, Pi, Ci, Di, Ni, εi)

(1)

where Chi is the number of charter schools in district i, Ei is per pupil spending in the district, Pi
is a measure of student performance in the district, Ci are indicators of educational costs in the
district including teacher wages and student need indicators, Di are measures of the diversity of
the population in the district, Ni is a control for the number of school age children, Rit are rental
costs, and εi is a random error term.

Two main issues arise in estimating and interpreting the proposed regression. First, the count of
charter schools only occurs in non-negative integer values and several districts will not
experience a charter school moving in at all. In this case, researchers typically estimate either a
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Poisson or a negative binomial model. I used two tests to determine the correct model for the
count of charter schools in each state. First, I calculated the over-dispersion parameter alpha
using a log likelihood test. Alpha is the variance of the multiplicative random effect. If the value
of alpha is close to zero, the distribution has a variance that is close to the mean. In this case, a
Poisson model is preferred over a negative binomial model. If alpha is significantly different
from zero, a negative binomial model is preferred. The value of alpha is significantly different
form zero in all states suggesting that a negative binomial is a better fit for my models 17.

Second, I follow Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and conducted the following analysis. In a first
step, I estimated the fitted frequencies for different numbers of charter schools using a Poisson
and negative binomial model. Then, I compared the actual to the fitted frequencies of the two
models. Frequencies for the actual and fitted counts are quite similar in New York, Michigan,
and Ohio in both models. In North Carolina and Florida, the Poisson regression substantially
underpredicts the proportion of zero charter schools and overestimates the proportion of having
one or two charter schools. This pattern in the lack of fit is associated with the neglect of
overdispersion in the data. In count data, overdispersion arises when for the variance for a count
exceeds its mean. This is particularly true in North Carolina and Florida18. The negative binomial
model predicts the count of charter schools much better, and hence I use this model for my
estimation.

17

The alpha values are all statistically significant at the .01 level. The values are: New York 297.45; Florida 504.4;
North Carolina 266.39; Michigan 569.08; and Ohio 928.09.
18
The mean and variances are: New York 0.07 and 0.06; North Carolina 0.8 and 190.2; Florida 6.7 and 222.36;
Michigan 0.33 and 7.89; and Ohio 0.48 and 11.62.
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A second issue concerns potentially endogenous relationships. Each of the independent variables
I propose to examine is potentially influenced by the presence of charter schools. To address this
issue, I regress the number of charter schools in 2009-10 on measures of the independent
variables before charter school entry. For instance, all measurements based on census tabulations
will be from 1990. None of the five states had a charter school program in 1990. Further,
performance measurements will be from standardized tests at least one year before the charter
school program was established. Using district characteristics before charter school opened
should minimize potential simultaneity problems.

The data to estimate Equation 1 comes from several sources. The charter school counts come
from charter school lists administered by each state and available at the state’s education
department web page. The operating expenditures in a district were calculated using the
Common Core of Data School District Finance Survey (CCD). The per pupil expenditure in each
district is calculated by dividing the current operating expenditure19 for elementary and
secondary education instructional programs by the number of students enrolled in the district.
Current operating expenditures reflect in states with varying charter school payments revenues
for charter schools. In states with flat payments they reflect how much the traditional schools
spend charter schools are competing with. Performance measurements are computed by
converting mean scores of each district in the state into standardized scores with a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one using statewide test specific means and standard deviations, and

19

The current operating expenditures are defined as the sum of the current expenditures for instruction, the current
expenditures for support services, and the current expenditures for other services (including food services and
enterprise operations). I exclude capital expenditures as they fluctuate strongly according to building projects in the
districts. Further, I exclude debt as these costs do not reflect operating expenditures of a given year.
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then averaging the standard scores for grade 4 English, grade 4 mathematics, grade 8 English and
grade 8 mathematics.

Measurements of student characteristics, mean years of education, the diversity measurements
for education and race, rent for residential property and enrollment figures were computed using
data from district tabulations of the 1990 U.S. Census. The measures of educational and racial
diversity are versions of a Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index for parental education is
constructed using 4 different years of education categories20. The Herfindahl index for race is
constructed using 5 racial categories21. Values for the Herfindahl indices range from 0 to 100
with greater numbers indicating more diversity.

Finally, the measure of teacher wages in each of the state’s metropolitan areas is the Labor
Market Comparable Wage index produced by the National Center for Education Statistics. This
measure is determined by wages paid for comparable occupations in the local labor market and
thus reflects the underlying costs of teachers rather than district decisions about teacher salaries.

Enrollment in Charter Schools
Choosing a location is only one of several supply decisions that charter school operators make.
They also make decisions about what programs to offer, and how to advertise and recruit
students. Together with the educational preferences of parents and students, these supply
decisions may influence who attends charter schools. Once charter school operators have chosen
a location where there is healthy demand, charter schools may have an incentive to choose

20
21

The categories are less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, and college degree.
The categories are white, black, Indian, Asian, and Hispanic.
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programs and recruitment strategies that attract higher achieving students or students who require
fewer resources to reach student achievement standards. I do not observe the decisions charter
schools make about programming, recruiting and advertising in this study. However, I can
compare the enrollments of charter schools to the surrounding traditional public schools to see if
their programs and recruitment strategies attract certain types of students. Further, I can evaluate
if charter school enrollment patterns are consistent with the incentives set by each state’s finance
policies (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).

Using report card information from 2010 in each of the five states, I compare the compositions
of charter schools to the schools in the district where they are located. Charter school students
are able to cross district school borders, however, in most states enrollment preferences are given
to the students residing in the district where the charter school is located22. I use a regression
framework for comparing enrollment in charter and traditional schools in the same district. The
dependent variables measure the share of students with disabilities, being poor, and having
limited English proficiency. The independent variable is a charter school dummy. In such a
regression, the intercept simply states the share of at risk students in traditional schools. The
coefficient on the charter school dummy shows how charter schools deviate from traditional
schools in their enrollment and if the disparity is statistically significant. To make comparisons
only within districts, I add district fixed effects to the regression. To control for potential

The charter school law in New York states that in case of oversubscription “enrollment preference shall be
provided to pupils […] residing in the school district in which the charter school is located” (Charter School Law S
2854. 2 (b)). In Florida, charter schools can give preference to students residing “within a reasonable distance of the
charter school” (Title XLVIII 1002.33 10 (d)) and can give preference to students that live in the municipality the
charter school is located (Title XLVIII 1002.33 10 (b)). “A resident of a municipality that operates a charter schoolin-a-municipality pursuant to paragraph (15) (c). In Ohio, charter schools can restrict enrollment to students in the
district they are located in (2013 Ohio Charter Law Guidebook). In case of oversubscription, Ohio charter schools
have to give preference to students residing in the district the school is located (2013 Ohio Charter Law Guidebook).
22
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heteroskedasticity, I weight each regression by school enrollment. More formally, I estimate the
following equation:

𝑋𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑠𝑖

where Xsi stands for characteristics of students enrolled in school s, in district i. The
characteristics include the share of students in poverty, LEP students, and students with. Charter
is an indicator that turns on for charter schools. The term δi stands for districts fixed effects.

3.7 Empirical Results

First I discuss the results for the analysis of charter location across districts and then the
enrollment analysis.

Location Across Districts
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the district level analysis. In New
York, Michigan, and Ohio charter schools move into relatively low performing school districts
with relatively high concentrations of poor students. In contrast, in North Carolina and Florida,
charter schools move into relatively high performing school districts and have a relatively low
concentration of poor students. In all states except New York charter schools move into districts
with relatively high teacher wages and rents, which is probably explained by the fact that charter
schools are locating in urban areas that tend to have higher wages and rent prices. Districts where
charter schools locate have greater educational diversity but do not differ greatly from other
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districts in the level of adult education. In terms of racial diversity, charter schools move into
more racially diverse districts in New York, Ohio, and Michigan. Charter schools locate in less
diverse districts in Florida and North Carolina. In all states charter schools move into districts
with greater enrollment and with greater operating expenditures per pupil.

The patterns of charter school location detailed in Table 13 does not allow me to say much about
the incentives created by finance policies. Finance, accountability, and authorizer policies create
countervailing incentives and it would be useful to know which of the variables listed in Table
13 are independently associated with the number of charter school, after controlling for other
variables. Further, Table 13 ignores the considerable amount of variation in the number of
charter schools across districts with charter schools. To help assess whether the theoretically
described incentives influence which districts have the highest concentration of charter schools, I
show the results of the regression analysis in Table 14.

New York, Florida, and North Carolina are states where charter school payments vary with
operating expenditures in the district. New York has the greatest variation followed by Florida
and North Carolina. For these states, I predicted positive coefficients and greater magnitudes in
states with greater variation in expenditures. The predications are confirmed by the coefficients
in Table 14. For all three states, the coefficients are positive. The effect of operating expenditures
on the concentration of charter schools in the district is greatest in New York followed by
Florida, and North Carolina. In New York, a one percent increase in the per pupil expenditures is
associated with a 6 percent increase in charter schools. Thus, if a district would increase per
pupil spending by 16 percent, the number of charter schools in the district would double. In
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Florida, a one percent change in operating expenditures leads a 2.4 percent increase in charter
schools. If a district would increase operation expenditures per pupil by 41 percent the number of
charter schools would double. In North Carolina a one percent increase in operating expenditures
is associated with a 1.7 percent increase in charter schools. To double the amount of charter
schools a district would have to spend 58 percent more per pupil.

In Michigan and Ohio payments to charter schools do not vary with district expenditures. I
predicted a negative coefficient on the variable measuring the operating expenditures. The
coefficients in Table 14 show negative coefficients for Michigan and Ohio. In Michigan, a one
percent increase in operating expenditures leads to a decrease in charter schools by 0.3 percent.
In Ohio, a one percent increasing in operating expenditures leads to a decrease in charter school
concentration of 0.1 percent. Both coefficients show relatively small effects that are not
statistically significant. The initial hypothesis cannot be corroborated; however, the relationship
between operating expenditures and charter school concentration is negative as predicted.

For variables measuring student characteristics such as the share of students with disabilities,
being poor, and having limited English proficiency, I predicted greater concentrations of charter
schools in states paying compensations for these students. The coefficients on the variable
measuring the share of students with disabilities are close to zero and statistically insignificant in
all states but New York. In New York, the coefficient on the share of students with disabilities is
statistically significant and negative. A one standard deviation increase in the number of disabled
students decreases the number of charter schools by 50 percent. The weights for students with
disabilities are neither high nor low compared to the other states in the sample. However, charter

101

schools in New York State seem to avoid places with high concentrations of students with
disabilities. Thus, the finding is not consistent with the predictions in the theoretical section of
the chapter.

The coefficients on the variables measuring the share of poor students in the districts are close to
zero and statistically insignificant in all states but Ohio. In Ohio, a one standard deviation change
in the share of poor students increases the number of charter schools in the district by 85 percent.
Out of all states, Ohio has the highest additional payments for poor students. Thus, the result
confirms the hypotheses stated in the theoretical section of the chapter.

The coefficients on the variable measuring the share of students with limited English proficiency
are close to zero and statistically insignificant in Florida and Ohio. The coefficients are
imprecisely measured in New York and North Carolina. In Michigan, the coefficient is positive
and statistically significant indicating that charter schools are more often located in districts with
higher shares of LEP students. The coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in
the share of LEP students leads to a 24 percent increase in charter schools. Michigan is not a
state with high compensations for LEP students. Thus, the initial hypothesis is not corroborated.

The analysis of the relationship between student characteristics and charter school concentration
did not show a consistent pattern. The results corroborated the theoretical predictions regarding
the relationship between the share of poor students and the concentration of charter schools. The
results did not corroborate the theoretical predications for the relationship between the share of
students with disabilities and limited English proficiency and the concentration of charter schools
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in the school district. There are two potential explanations for the inconsistency between
empirical results and theoretical predictions. First, if there are large variations in the student
population within districts, the across district analysis cannot pick up differences between
districts. This could be particularly true for Florida and North Carolina where districts are very
large and match county borders. Second, the incentives created by compensations may be offset
by the higher cost of educating these students. In this case, compensations are not high enough to
create a location incentive. The enrollment analysis will help to understand which of these two
explanations is likely to be true.

Further, I predicated a negative relationship between costs factors including teacher wages and
building rents and the number of charter schools in the district. However, only in New York does
an increase in the teacher wage index leads to a decrease in charter schools. In all other states,
the coefficients on the teacher wage variable are close to zero and not statistically significant. A
potential explanation why the results in these four states deviate from the theoretical predictions
could be that charter schools pay salaries below the conventional wages for similar occupation in
the area. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the gap in salaries between
traditional and charter schools teacher was $8,900 in 2012 (NCES 2013). Thus, charter schools
might be able to avoid high costs by paying their teachers lower salaries.

I proxy for commercial rent with the rent for residential properties as researchers have shown the
strong correlation between both real estate sectors and their similarities in rent patterns (Gyourko
2009; Rosen 1979; Roback 1982). The coefficients in all states are close to zero and not
statistically significant. The result indicates that rent differences between school districts do not
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have an impact on how charter school operators choose their location. One potential explanation
is that other factors such as per pupil payments are more important factors when charter school
operators look for potential locations.

The predictions on the relationship between district performance and the concentration of charter
schools in the district were ambiguous. On one hand, charter schools could be drawn to move
into high performing districts making it easier to fulfill performance goals. On the other hand,
charter schools could be inclined to move into low performing district where the demand for
alternative educational programs is high. I find a statistically significant result only for New
York, where charter schools locate more often in school district with low performance. In the
other states, there is no statistically significant relationship between performance and charter
concentration. The result is possibly explained by the countervailing incentives performance
creates for charter school operators.

I predicted that charter schools are more likely to move into districts with both concentrations of
college educated parents but also considerable diversity in educational levels among parents. The
coefficients on the variable measuring the mean years of education are not statistically
significant in any of the states. In New York and North Carolina the coefficients on the variable
measuring the educational diversity in the district are statistically significant. The coefficient in
New York implies that a one standard deviation increase in diversity is associated with a 116
percent increase in the number of charter schools. In North Carolina the coefficient is much
smaller suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in diversity is associated with a 21
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percent increase in charter schools. Therefore, I can only partially corroborate the initially stated
hypotheses.

Controlling for educational diversity, the amount of racial diversity in a district does not have
statistically relationship with the concentration of charter schools for all states except Ohio. The
coefficient in Ohio implies that a one standard deviation increase in racial diversity is associated
with a 60 percent increase in charter schools.

In all states charter schools are more likely to move into school districts with high enrollment
numbers. Similar to the operating expenditures, the coefficient on the enrollment variables can
be interpreted as an elasticity. The effects in all states are relatively small suggesting that to
double the number of charter schools the enrollment would have to increase by 100 percent.

In Table 15, I pool all states and rerun Equation 1 including dummy variables for each state and
interacting these dummies with the log of operating expenditures. The coefficients on the
interactions are statistically significant for New York, Florida and North Carolina. The
magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller for New York and larger for North Carolina
compared to the results in Table 14. The reason for these differences are the relative numbers of
charter schools in each state. New York has a relative small number of charter school compared
to Florida and North Carolina. Thus, the concentration of charter schools is also greater in these
states. The coefficients on the interactions for Michigan and Ohio are not statistically significant.
Overall, the results of the pooled regression confirms the results of Table 14.
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In conclusion, the across district comparisons shows the following results. The first hypothesis
predicted a positive relationship between expenditures and the concentration of charter schools in
states with varying charter payments. The analysis corroborated the hypothesis showing a
positive and statistically significant relationship between expenditures and the number of charter
schools in a school district. The relationship was stronger in states having a greater variation in
charter payments. The second hypothesis states a negative relationship between district
expenditures and charter concentration for states with no variation in charter payments. The
hypothesis was partially confirmed as the coefficients showed the expected sign but were not
statistically significant. The third hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the share
of disadvantaged students and the concentration of charter schools for states paying
compensations. The analysis did not show a consistent pattern for all groups of disadvantaged
students. For poor students the regressions showed a positive and statistically significant result in
Ohio. Ohio is the state that pays the largest compensation for poor students of all states in the
sample. Thus, the hypothesis was confirmed. For students with disabilities and with limited
English proficiency the regression did not show the predicted effects. The inconsistency between
theoretical predictions and empirical results may be explained by within district variation in
these variables or compensations insufficient to create location incentives.

Enrollment in Charter Schools
Table 16 presents for each state the share of students with disabilities, living in poverty, and
having limited English proficiency. I calculated the measurements using school level report cards
for each state. The first notable result is that students in Florida are more likely to be poor, and
limited in their English proficiency. Students in Ohio are much less likely to be poor and have
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limited English skills. In general, the variance between states is greatest in the number of
students receiving free lunch and relatively small for students with limited English proficiency.

Table 16 does not allow a direct comparison between charter and traditional schools in the same
district. In the next step, therefore, I regress each measure of disadvantaged students on a charter
school dummy and district fixed effects. I am weighting each regression by school enrollment to
avoid potential heteroscedasticity. Also, I cluster at the district level to control for potential
shocks in the enrollment of disadvantaged students. To increase the comparability across states, I
standardized each measure of disadvantaged students with regard to the state’s mean. Table 17
presents the coefficients on the charter school dummy with their corresponding standard error.

I predicted that in states paying compensations to charter schools for enrolling disadvantaged
students, enrollments of disadvantages students will be higher than in states not paying
compensations. This is exactly what the coefficients on the charter dummy show for the
regressions using the share of poor students in a school as dependent variable. In Michigan and
Ohio the coefficients are positive and statistically significant suggesting that charter schools
enroll more poor students than the traditional public schools in the same district. Payments for
poor students are much higher in Ohio compared to Michigan. Consistently, the coefficient is
greater in Ohio than in Michigan. The coefficient for Ohio implies that charter schools enroll 0.4
of a standard deviation more poor students than the traditional public schools located in the same
district. In Michigan, charter schools enroll 0.27 of a standard deviation more poor students than
traditional schools in their district. In Florida and North Carolina the coefficients are negative
and statistically significant. The coefficients show that charter schools enroll 0.5 and 1.43
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standard deviations fewer poor students than the traditional schools in their district. In New
York, the coefficient is positive but imprecisely estimated. New York does not pay any
additional funding for enrolling poor students.

The regressions using the share of students with disabilities or the share of students with limited
English proficiency as dependent variables, show negative and statistically significant
coefficients on the charter school dummy. The results suggest that charter schools enroll smaller
numbers of these students than traditional schools in the same school district. For students with
disabilities, the difference between charter and traditional schools is greatest in Ohio. Charter
schools enroll 0.34 standard deviations fewer special education students compared to traditional
public schools. For LEP students, the difference is greatest in Florida, where charter schools
enroll over one standard deviation fewer LEP students than traditional public schools.

There are two potential explanations for the discrepancy between theoretical predications and
empirical results. First, compensations for these students are not large enough to create an
enrollment incentive. In fact, Duncombe and Yinger (2005) estimate that the additional costs of
educating an LEP or special education student are much higher than for a poor student.
Estimating cost functions for New York State school districts, they find that students coming
from poor families are 111 percent and LEP students are 215 percent more costly to educate
compared to regular students. Further, they estimate the costs of educating special education
students to be 264 percent more costly compared to regular students.
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Second, charter school operators may try to avoid disadvantaged students to ensure the school is
high performing. Even though charter schools cannot selectively admit students, they can choose
their mission and establish unique curricula making it less likely for disadvantaged students to
apply (Renzulli and Evans 2005). If the school admits larger shares of less disadvantaged
students it is easier to fulfill performance goals in the charter contract and hence avoid the risk of
being closed or not renewed. Also, high performing charter schools are more likely to attract
students, making it easier to fill the allotted seats in the school.

In conclusion, the enrollment analysis shows the following results. The third hypothesis
predicted greater enrollments of disadvantaged students in states paying compensations. The
hypothesis was confirmed for the enrollment of poor students. The hypothesis was not confirmed
for the enrollment of special education and LEP students. The results are most likely explained
by two factors. First, compensations for disadvantaged students are likely to not outweigh the
cost of educating them. Second, charter schools prefer high performing students to ensure a
proper licensing and demand for the school.

3.8 Conclusion

Supply decisions by charter school operators play an important role in determining which
students have access to charter schools, which schools will be subject to charter school
competition, what effects charter schools will have on school and residential segregation, and
ultimately on the distribution of the costs and benefits created by charter schools.
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This chapter provides the first empirical test of whether charter school finance provisions
influence charter school location and enrollment using a comparison between different states.
Applying theory and knowledge on finance provisions, I state hypothesis regarding the
relationship between funding policies and charter concentration in five states. The first
hypothesis states that in states linking charter school payments to district expenditures, charter
schools will be more likely to locate in districts with greater expenditures holding performance
and cost factors constant. This hypothesis was corroborated by the empirical analysis. The
greater the variance in district expenditures the stronger was the relationship between charter
school concentration and district expenditures.

The second hypotheses stated that in states paying the same per pupil amount no matter where
the charter school locates, charter school will move into school district with relatively low per
pupil payments. While the coefficients of the negative binomial models where indicating the
hypothesized relationship, the results were close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus,
the hypothesis cannot be corroborated.

The third hypothesis predicted greater numbers of charter schools in districts with high
concentrations of disadvantaged students and greater enrollment of these students in states
paying compensations. The across district and enrollment analysis were able to corroborate these
hypotheses for poor students. The results for special education and LEP students show that
charter schools do not locate in areas with high concentrations of these students and enroll them
less often compared to traditional schools in the same district. A potential explanations is that
compensations are insufficient to outweigh the costs of educating these students. Another
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explanation is that charter schools have an incentive to enroll relatively high performing students
to ensure compliance with the charter school contract and to secure sufficient demand for the
allotted seats in the school.

The evidence provided in this chapter that charter schools respond to financial incentives in their
location and enrollment patterns has important policy implications. First, it suggests that policy
makers can influence the supply of charter schools by raising or lowering per pupil payments.
For instance, a way to potentially encourage charter schools to serve larger shares of
disadvantaged students is to increase the per pupil payments for those categories of students.

Second, the decision to either tie charter school payments to district spending or to pay a flat per
pupil amount independent of location, has an important impact on supply decision by charter
operators. Policies tying per pupil payments to district spending levels are likely to attract charter
schools in high spending and inefficient districts. The opening of charter schools can increase
competition between schools and hence lead to gains in the efficiency of providing education. As
this study shows, these gains may be achieved at the expense of strong student stratification.
More costly students stay in traditional schools while less costly students go to charter schools.
This is more likely if finance policies do not include any or only small compensations for high
cost students.

Policies paying flat amounts most likely will see less influence of district expenditures on charter
location. In these states charter school location may be more demand driven. This will be
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particularly true if finance policies include sufficient compensations for students not being
served well by the existing traditional school system.

Third, charter school accountability seems to play an important role in charter location and
enrollment. States with low accountability standards and relatively high compensations are likely
to see concentrations of charter schools in areas with disadvantaged students and greater
enrollments of these students in charter schools. Good examples are Michigan and Ohio where
states pay compensations for poor students and accountability systems are not as demanding as
in other states. Therefore, high accountability standards probably have to be accompanied by
greater compensations for disadvantaged students. Otherwise, charter schools are likely to be
discouraged from locating in areas with high shares of these students or to enroll them.

Finally, the authorizer preferences stated in charter schools laws do not seem to have a great
influence on charter school locations in the five states analyzed. In states having preferences
towards charter applications intending to serve certain types of students or to locate in specific
area, the analysis did not show a larger concentration of charter schools in areas with high
concentrations of students emphasized in the law. There are two reasons why this could be the
case. First, authorizers might not follow the priorities set in the law and may emphasize other
criteria in authorizing and renewing charter schools. Second, as earlier discussed, charter school
operators may be avoiding areas with high concentrations of disadvantaged students for cost
reasons. The analysis in this chapter suggests that location priorities are likely to have to be
backed up by greater compensations for enrolling disadvantaged students.
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Table 9: Decisions Process for Sample
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

23

Number of charter
schools1
No program
25
504
38
813
158
18
18
412
63
31
36
39
53
9
35
No program
77
No program
42
62
294
181
1
48
No program
No program
35
15
70
72
140
96
No program
323
18
102
134
12
39
No program
20
536
72
No program
3
No program

Share of charter
schools students23
No program
3.95%
10.57%
1.80%
5.14%
8.03%
0.92%
7.35%
5.23%
2.25%
4.37%
5.26%
1.71%
1.77%
0.12%
1.00%
No program
4.56%
No program
1.41%
2.86%
6.84%
4.23%
0.08%
2.01%
No program
No program
2.67%
0.41%
1.66%
3.94%
1.62%
2.64%
No program
5.16%
0.96%
3.31%
4.49%
2.25%
1.80%
No program
0.45%
3.06%
5.83%
No program
0.01%
No program

Predetermined
Payments24
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
negotiations
predetermined payments
predetermined payments
-

Data Availability25
no
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
-

Calculations based on the 2010 Common Core of Data assembled by the National Center of Education Statistics.
Own research based on state charter school laws and budget information.
25 Inquiries were made to the state education departments regarding data necessary for the analysis.
24
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West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

No program
206
3

No program
4.14%
0.31%

negotiations
-

-
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Table 10: Charter School Finance Systems in Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New York
New York

Florida

North Carolina

Michigan

Ohio

Base Payments
Payments (in 2007)

$6,081 to $17,915 with a
mean of $9,987 and a
standard deviation of $2,497

$6,776 to $10,745 with a
mean of $7,913 and a
standard deviation of $802

$3,943 to $8,864 with a mean
of $5,047 and a standard
variation of $770

$7,085 or $7,385 with a mean
of $7,159 and standard
deviation of $129

$5,403

no adjustments

no adjustments

no adjustments

no adjustments

Payments: $9 - $594
depending on district wealth
and determined by the
legislature

Small districts/Sparcity

no adjustments

Payments: $2 to $533
depending on district
enrollment; determined by the
legislature

no adjustments

no adjustments

no adjustments

Cost of living

no adjustments

Weights: between 0.9221 to
1.0271

no adjustments

no adjustments

no adjustments

Weight: 0.125

Weight: 0.286

Weight: 0.28 – 4.73 based on
the severity of the disability

Payment: $631

Payment: $2,069

Payments: $1,513 – $20,153

no adjustments

Weight: 0.115

Adjustments for district
characteristics
Adjustment for low wealth
districts

Deductions/Payments: -$616
to $214
Adjustments for student
characteristics
Disabilities

Weight: 1.65 for students
with severe disabilities and
0.9 for students with less
severe disabilities

Weights for less severe
disabilities: grades K to 3 =
0.035; grades 9 to 12 = 0.088
Weights for severe
disabilities: 3.734 and 5.201

Poverty

Payments: $14,182 for
students with severe
disabilities and $7,735 for
students with less severe
disabilities26

Payments for less severe
disabilities: $277 and $696

no adjustments

no adjustments

Payments for severe
disabilities: $21,634 and
$33,242

Payment: $832

26

Calculation is based on the maximum amount of expenditures that can be multiplied with the weights. The amount was $8,500 in 2007 (NYS Education Commissioner 2007).
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Payment: $1,208 determined
by the legislature
Limited English Proficiency

no adjustments

Weight: 0.275

Payment: $2,176

Payment: $683 determined
by the legislature

Weight (if student is not
already counted as poor):
0.115

Weights: 0.125 – 0.25
depending on the # of LEP
students in the district

Payment (if student is not
already counted as poor):
$832

Payments: $675 – $1,350

Payment: $67 determined by
the legislature
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Table 11: Strength of Accountability Systems in Five States According to NAPCS Model Charter School Law

Strength Charter School Law

New York
Florida
North Carolina
Michigan
Ohio
NAPCS Average

Charter Application,
Review, and
Decision-making
Processes

Performance-Based
Charter Contracts
Required

Comprehensive Charter
School Monitoring and
Data Collection
Processes

2
2
1
1
1
1.725

3
2
2
2
1
1.525

3
2
1
2
3
2.025

Clear Processes for
Renewal,
Nonrenewal, and
Revocation
Decisions
3
2
1
2
2
2.075

Average
Score

2.75
2.00
1.25
1.75
1.75
1.84

Table 12: Comparison of State and NAEP Proficiency Levels for Five States

New York
Florida
North Carolina
Michigan
Ohio
NCES Average

Reading Grade 4
Proficiency
Difference between
State and NAEP
Standards
-32
-41
-56
-46
-44
-41.90

Comparison State and NAEP Proficiency Levels
Reading Grade 8
Mathematics Grade 4 Mathematics Grade
Proficiency
Proficiency
8 Proficiency
Difference between
Difference between
Difference between
State and NAEP
State and NAEP
State and NAEP
Standards
Standards
Standards
-25
-37
-29
-19
-26
-32
-60
-27
-31
-44
-40
-42
-44
-30
-37
-39.71
-32.79
-30.66

Average
Difference

-30.75
-29.5
-43.5
-43
-38.75
-36.26
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Table 13: Description of Variables for the Analysis of Charter School Location Across Districts in 5 States:
New York

Number of Districts
Number of Charter
Schools

Current Operating
Expenditures

Mean Student
Performance

Teacher Wage
Index

Child Poverty Rate

Mean Years of
Education

Educational
Diversity

Racial Diversity

Florida

North Carolina

Michigan

Ohio

With
Charter

Without
Charter

With
Charter

Without
Charter

With
Charter

Without
Charter

With
Charter

Without
Charter

With
Charter

Without
Charter

14

466

38

23

47

63

96

278

38

544

3.54
(4.43)

0
(0)

10.63
(18.43)

0
(0)

2.06
(2.35)

0
(0)

2.73
(7.93)

0
(0)

6.68
(12.1)

0
(0)

9,589.36
(1,320.51)

9,173.31
(2,288.58)

4,515.56
(404.8)

4,393.64
(387.83)

4,458.13
(546.45)

4,364.13
(356.72)

4,662.48
(952.77)

3,906.67
(827.03)

5,499.65
(780.8)

4,654.92
(1,084.58)

-1.09
(1.28)

0.19
(0.94)

0.17
(0.97)

-0.37
(1.06)

0.2
(0.94)

-0.18
(1.05)

-0.28
(1.15)

0
(0.83)

-1.38
(1.52)

0.09
(0.88)

103.88
(10.39)

106.02
(12.58)

82.84
(6.47)

75.3
(6.91)

87.14
(7.33)

83.55
(6.28)

96.07
(6.65)

91.73
(6.86)

91.98
(5.2)

87.97
(6.31)

14.62
(6.95)

6.64
(4.46)

19.26
(6.25)

26.04
(7.35)

16.88
(7.2)

20.6
(8.47)

15.16
(12.34)

12.75
(8.52)

21.21
(13.56)

13.49
(9.21)

13.18
(0.99)

13.67
(0.87)

12.4
(0.56)

11.76
(0.45)

12.32
(0.69)

11.91
(0.46)

12.77
(0.8)

12.73
(0.72)

12.54
(0.8)

12.53
(0.86)

90
(2.65)

86.66
(3.52)

95.74
(2.39)

92.57
(2.88)

95.23
(4.4)

94.24
(2.86)

90.67
(7.33)

89.44
(5.05)

92.11
(6.95)

87.47
(7.45)

53.22
(20.74)

23.29
(20.02)

41.55
(13.02)

43.04
(15.03)

41.97
(18.62)

42.84
(21.9)

21.67
(20.7)

10.71
(12.02)

35.41
(22.38)

7.58
(10.19)

118

Enrollment

Disability Rate

Rate English not
First Language

Median Rent

15,960.38
(18,711.25)

3,410.47
(3,091.61)

42,937.95
(60,548.71)

4,719.91
(4,367.73)

13,572.38
(15,889.62)

5,657.6
(4,355.33)

8,748.55
(20,813.85)

2,408.69
(19,27.88)

15,663.42
(20,057.64)

2,374.24
(18,56.13)

7.4
(1.97)

8.74
(3.49)

22.02
(5.76)

27.75
(5.73)

20.52
(5.02)

23.89
(4.79)

17.66
(6.36)

17.29
(5.19)

20.06
(6.55)

17.27
(5.63)

0.85
(0.09)

0.9
(0.08)

10.11
(9.72)

7.3
(8.49)

4.33
(1.96)

4.33
(1.58)

5.81
(4.73)

4.06
(3.07)

4.61
(2.77)

4.33
(6.11)

524.46
(184.04)

538.28
(197.64)

445.84
(92.2)

311.13
(70.1)

348.6
(64.15)

310.94
(51.14)

444.96
(76.7)

403.18
(81.36)

395.45
(80.49)

375.02
(83.7)

1. Average Operating Expenditures calculated using the Common Core of Data Fiscal Files from 1999.
2. Computed by converting the mean score for each district in the state into a standardized score with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one using statewide test
specifics means and standard deviations, and then averaging the score for grade levels 4 and 8 in subjects Math and English, Language, and Art. Tests are taken from state
accountability systems prior to the charter school program.
3. Teacher comparable wage index for consolidated metropolitan statistical areas obtained from National Center for Education Statistics downloaded from:
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/adjustments.asp
4. Measure from district tabulations of the 1990 U.S. Census.
5. Herfindal index constructed using four different years of education categories. Values range between 1 and 100 with greater values indicating more diversity.
6. Herfindahl index constructed using five different categories of race. Values range between 1 and 100 with greater values indicating more diversity.
All measures in parentheses are standard deviations
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Table 14: Charter School Location Across School Districts in 5 States using Negative Binomial

Variation of Per Pupil Expenditures
by Charter Location

Large

Small

No

No

New York

Florida

North
Carolina

Michigan

Ohio

Log of Avg Operating Expenditures

6.154***
(1.584)

2.439**
(1.206)

1.722*
(1.021)

-0.314
(0.712)

-0.108
(1.075)

Mean Student Performance

-1.674**
(0.770)

-0.147
(0.120)

0.159
(0.174)

-0.134
(0.176)

-0.236
(0.158)

Teacher Wage Index

-0.137***
(0.0438)

-0.00352
(0.0236)

0.0268
(0.0221)

0.0156
(0.0181)

0.0138
(0.0436)

Child Poverty Rate

0.00154
(0.115)

-0.0188
(0.0505)

-0.0116
(0.0368)

0.0167
(0.0215)

6.262**
(2.916)

Mean Years of Education

0.741
(0.688)

0.0671
(0.431)

0.505
(0.365)

0.00881
(0.230)

0.0407
(0.400)

Educational Diversity

0.436**
(0.173)

0.0482
(0.0688)

0.0470*
(0.0282)

0.00524
(0.0104)

0.0433
(0.0546)

Racial Diversity

0.00228
(0.0244)

0.0117
(0.0152)

0.00790
(0.00893)

0.00451
(0.00672)

0.0270***
(0.00727)

Log of Enrollment

0.963**
(0.460)

1.007***
(0.179)

0.707***
(0.156)

0.998***
(0.0909)

1.199***
(0.283)

Disability Rate

-0.252**
(0.109)

0.000354
(0.0523)

-0.00932
(0.0516)

0.00726
(0.0396)

0.0356
(0.0882)

4.184
(5.383)

-0.00283
(0.0144)

-0.100
(0.0895)

0.0499***
(0.0121)

0.000404
(0.0421)

Median Rent

-0.000602
(0.00352)

0.000473
(0.00272)

-0.00157
(0.00306)

0.00168
(0.00196)

0.00508
(0.00458)

Constant

-104.4***

34.43***

33.19***

-9.656

-20.67

Count Charter Schools

Rate English not First Language
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Log-likelihood Value
R-squared
Observations

(25.75)

(12.02)

(8.154)

(6.221)

(12.57)

-47.488
0.853
480

-112.959
0.973
61

-104.146
0.902
110

-267.721
0.981
374

-134.186
0.788
582

R-squared is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and the
predicted value of the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Pooled Negative Binomial for 5 States
Count of Charter
Schools
Operating Expenditures X Dummy New York
Operating Expenditures X Dummy Florida
Operating Expenditures X Dummy North Carolina
Operating Expenditures X Dummy Michigan
Operating Expenditures X Dummy Ohio
Dummy New York
Dummy Florida
Dummy North Carolina
Dummy Michigan
Mean Student Performance
Teacher Wage Index
Child Poverty Rate
Mean Years of Education
Educational Diversity
Racial Diversity
Log of Enrollment
Disability Rate
Rate English not First Language
Median Rent
Constant

2.812***
(0.915)
2.944***
(0.838)
3.125***
(0.842)
0.904
(0.749)
0.245
(0.583)
-1.273
(11.54)
1.907
(10.16)
25.10***
(7.868)
19.39**
(8.939)
-0.308***
(0.0981)
-0.00170
(0.0120)
0.178***
(0.0446)
0.0884
(0.164)
-0.0195*
(0.0100)
-0.00571
(0.00446)
1.217***
(0.0765)
0.0142
(0.0173)
0.00880
(0.0165)
-0.000452
(0.00109)
-39.32***
(6.914)
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Log-likelihood Value
R-squared
Observations

-799.163
0.805
1,603

R-squared is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and the
predicted value of the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: Summary Statistics for All Schools in a State

% With Disabilities
% Students Free Lunch
% Limited English Proficiency

New
York

Florida

North
Carolina

Michigan

Ohio

15.12
(12.38)
43.05
(29.75)
7.26
(11.8)

N/A
N/A
63.41
(24.11)
29.33
(37.18)

15.43
(15.64)
51.41
(19.51)
6.53
(8.73)

18.59
(20.84)
50.99
(24.68)
8.06
(12.66)

15.68
(10.63)
48.86
(27.11)
1.92
(6.97)

All figures are computed from 2010 report cards for individual schools. The table is
showing means and in parentheses standard deviations for all schools in the state.

Table 17: Enrollment Differences between Charter School and Traditional Schools

% With Disabilities
% Students Free Lunch
% Limited English
Proficiency

New York

Florida

North
Carolina

Michigan

Ohio

0.135***
(0.0112)
0.220
(0.145)

N/A
N/A
-0.508***
(0.0527)

-0.141***
(0.0409)
-1.426***
(0.174)

-0.271***
(0.0243)
0.271***
(0.0576)

-0.337***
(0.115)
0.404***
(0.108)

-0.502***
(0.118)

-1.072***
(0.186)

-0.744***
(0.0810)

-0.130*
(0.0747)

-0.367***
(0.127)

All coefficients are from regressing the normalized share of students on a charter school dummy and district
fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by school enrollment and clustered at the district level.

123

124

4. The Effect of Charter Schools on District
Efficiency: The Case of New York State
4.1 Introduction

Charter schools are a rapidly growing form of schools choice in the United States. According to
the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), the percentage of all public schools that were
public charter schools increased from 1.7 to 5.8 percent between 1999/2000 to 2011/2012. At the
same time, charter school enrollment increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million students. Since
the beginning of charter school programs, concerns have been raised that charter schools would
reduce resources from traditional schools (Moodey’s 2013; Molnar 1996; Arsen, Plank, and
Sykes 1999). Given the financial constraints many school districts face after the “Great
Recession” (Hull 2010) and the growing number of charter schools, the question of how charter
schools influence school district efficiency, costs, and expenditures is more salient than ever.

Despite the growing interest there is almost no research on the topic. Arsen and Ni (2012) utilize
fixed effect models to analyze the impact of charter school enrollments on school district
budgets. They find that higher levels of charter school enrollments are associated with declining
fund balances, and more rapidly declining revenues than expenditures in districts losing students
to charter schools. Bifulco and Reback (2014) evaluate the influence of charter schools on
district revenues and expenditures for the city school districts of Albany and Buffalo in New
York State. Using information from school district budgets, they authors find that charter schools
had negative fiscal impact on the two school districts. Gronberg, Jansen, and Taylor (2012) use a
stochastic cost frontier approach to analyze the cost efficiency of charter schools relative to
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traditional public schools, and explore the extent to which those differences are attributable to
differences in hiring and compensation practices, or to differences in the length of time a campus
has been operating. Their main finding suggest that charter schools are able to produce
educational outcomes at lower cost than traditional public schools.

In this chapter, I use the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical
estimation strategy. Theoretically, I work out how charter schools influence the costs and
efficiency of providing education. Empirically, I focus on the effects of charter schools on school
district efficiency. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher
salaries and student characteristics as well as changes in performance. Thus, holding inputs and
performance constant the coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by
changes in district efficiency associated with charter school enrollment.

Utilizing data for all New York State school districts outside New York City from 1998/99 to
2009/10, I find that charter school enrollment increases overall district efficiency. The magnitude
of the effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect
ranges between a 1.1 and 3.4 percent decrease in per pupil expenditures for enrollments between
50 and 5000 charter school students respectively. Efficiency gains are driven by the increased
efficiency in providing education for students in traditional public schools. A charter school
enrollment between 50 and 5000 students reduces per pupil expenditures needed to achieve a
given level of performance by 1.5 and 4.3 percent respectively.
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To confirm the results, I conduct a series of falsification tests and analyze the heterogeneity of
the charter school effect. In a first falsification test, I test for differences in trends between
districts with and without charter school enrollment prior charter school opening. Then, I test for
events at the county level being correlated with both: charter school enrollment and declining per
pupil expenditures. Finally, I use local expenditure for fire services to test for events at the
district level being correlated with charter school enrollment and declining per pupil
expenditures. All falsification tests confirm the initial findings.

I analyze the heterogeneity of the charter school effect using different subsamples of school
districts based on location and need/resources capacity. Further, I differentiate the charter school
effect by grades offered and evaluate the timing of the charter school effect. The charter school
effect is driven by districts having low and high needs for resources and by charter enrollments
in grades K to 6. Further, the charter school effect is most evident 4 to 6 years after the first
charter school enrollment in the districts.

The estimation strategy comes with two caveats. First, the interpretation of the coefficient
attached to charter school enrollment as efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability,
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district they transferred to. The cost of
bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares of either low
or high ability students transfer into the district. Second, given multiple outputs and input sharing
in the production of education, the reduction of inefficiencies in the production of test scores
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may have two different sources. The reduction could reflect decreases in spending for outputs
other than test scores. The reduction also could reflect the use of more efficient technologies to
educate students.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the charter school
program in New York State. Section 3 states the theoretical framework and Section 4 applies the
framework. Sections 5 explains data and measurements used in the empirical models. Section 6
states the empirical strategy. Section 7 presents the results and Sections 8 and 9 provide
falsification and robustness checks. Section 10 makes conclusions.

4.2 New York State Charter School Program

The New York Charter School Law was established in 1998. Charter schools receive per pupil
payments from the districts in which their students reside, and these payments are the charter
school’s primary source of funding. Charter school enrollments in New York are not restricted
by any residency requirements. If charter schools are oversubscribed, they have to select students
by lottery. In this lottery process, preference is given to students residing in the school district,
where the charter school is located (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2854 (2b)). Although
the majority of charter schools students live in the district where the charter school is located,
most charter schools serve at least some students from other districts as well (Bifulco and
Buerger 2013).

The payments for a charter school student come from the district where the student lives and are
based on per pupil spending in that district. The amount a district pays per student is equal to the
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approved operating expenses per pupil in the district27. In 2009, the approved operating
expenditures varied between $6,258 and $29,456 with a mean of $12,001 and a standard
deviation of $3,480. Charter schools receive additional funding for students with disabilities. The
additional payments are 1.65 for students with severe disabilities28 and 0.9 for students with less
severe disabilities. Charter schools do not receive additional funding for students with limited
English proficiency or being poor. Further, the district where a charter school is located is also
required to provide textbooks and software, transportation, health and special education
evaluation services to charter schools.

The amount that a district spends on capital outlays and debt service for school buildings is not
included in the calculation of approved operating expenses that determine charter school
payments in New York. Also, charter schools are not eligible to apply for the largest building aid
program offered by the state. In the years until 2014, the New York City Department of
Education provided space for a large number of charter schools for nominal rental fees, and
absorbs utility and janitorial service costs for those schools (NYC-IBO 2010). A new state law
that passed in April 2014 gives New York City two options to meet the demands of the growing
charter school sector. The city either hands over free space in public or private buildings or gives
money to the school to find their own space (Hernandez and Craig 2014). Districts outside New

27

Per pupil payments are determined by the approved operating expenses of the district from two years earlier
divided by a weighted pupil count (also from two years earlier) multiplied by an adjustment factor. Approved
operating expenses are total district expenditures excluding expenditures for capital outlay and debt service for
school buildings; transportation; lunch programs; tuition payments; and some other miscellaneous expenditures. In
the weighted pupil count, aidable summer session pupils, pupils with special education needs, non-disabled
secondary pupils, and students in particular disability categories receive additional weights. The adjustment is based
on the statewide change in approved operating expenses from three years prior to one year prior.
28
Students with severe disabilities students have limited cognitive abilities combined with behavioral and/or
physical limitations and who require highly specialized education, social, psychological and medical services in
order to maximize their full potential for self-fulfillment and meaningful participation in society (Sections 100.5,
100.6, 100.9 and 200.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education).
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York City, however, have not been as generous in providing space for charter schools. The state
has also used federal funds to provided start-up and facilities grants for charter schools (Bifulco
and Buerger 2013).

The charter application, approval, and evaluation process is closely regulated by the charter
school authorizers. The accountability standards set by authorizers are be considered relatively
high compared to other states. Charter schools authorized by the Board of Regents have to
perform higher than traditional schools in their district. School authorized by the New York State
University are expected to have 75 percent of their students to score “proficient” or higher on
state assessments. In a multistate comparison of charter school accountability laws and practices,
the Center for Education Reform (CER) rated New York as a state that holds charter schools
strictly accountable, pointing out that New York is one of the few states that have closed charter
schools for performance reasons (CER 2007). The National Alliance of Public Charter Schools
identifies New York as being among the few states using performance-based charter contracts,
comprehensive school monitoring, and a systematic data collection processes (NAPCS 2012).
Further, the charter school law of New York State requires districts to provide transportation to
students enrolled in charter schools (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2853 (4b)).

In 2009, the last year in this studies sample, 121 charter schools were enrolling students in New
York State29. The majority of charter schools are located in NYC. I focus on charter schools
outside NYC as I do not have the data to estimate cost functions including NYC. Table 18 shows
the 12 school districts outside NYC having charter schools opening until 2008-09. The first

29

The count is based on the Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) run by the New York State Education
Department.
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column indicates the year the first charter school was established in the district. The first charter
school outside NYC was opened in Albany in 1999-00. The second column shows the total
number of charter schools in each district in 2008-09. The highest counts of charter schools are
in Albany, Buffalo, and Rochester.

The next two columns state the districts’ location. Most districts having charter schools are
located in Upstate, West, and Central New York. However, there are also three districts in the
downstate area around New York City with charter schools. The following columns indicate
whether the district is considered a high need or average need district according to the
Need/Resource Capacity Index conducted by the New York State Education Department30. The
index compares the share of students in poverty to a district’s local contribution per student.
Most districts having charter schools fall into the category high need even though there are two
districts that are considered average need. No charter school is located in a district considered
having a low need/resource capacity.

The next columns present summary statistics on charter school enrollment. It is evident that most
charter school students in New York State (outside NYC) are in grades K to 6. While many
fewer less students enroll in classes 7 to 12. There are two potential explanations why this is the
case. In New York State charter school payments are not adjusted for grades. Thus, if high
school students are more costly to educate, there is an incentive for charter schools to educate
students in lower and less costly classes. Another potential explanation is that charter schools

30

Exact description of the index can be found here:
http://sap.questar.org/publications/guidebooks/state_aid_formulas_guidebook.pdf and
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/accountability/2011-12/NeedResourceCapacityIndex.pdf
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often start with lower grades and open higher grades later creating a “conveyer belt” system from
early childhood education to college (Dobbie and Fryer 2011).

The following columns show the share of charter school students residing in the school district
compared to all students living in the same district. The share ranges from about 1 percent to
more than 19 percent. There are three districts with shares over 15 percent including Albany,
Buffalo, and Lackawanna. The last column states the number of students enrolled in a one of the
district’s charter school but living outside the school district. In some districts like Syracuse and
Niagara Falls the number is relatively small. However, Rochester, Roosevelt, and KenmoreTonawanda enroll large shares of charter school students from outside the district.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I use the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical
estimation strategy. Theoretically, I use the approach to identify how charter schools influence
cost factors and efficiency. Empirically, the approach enables me to include variables controlling
for district cost and efficiency. Further, I can analyze a large number of school districts. I start
with using the cost function approach as a theoretical framework.

Following prior work on cost functions (see Downes and Pogue 1994; Duncombe and Yinger
1998, 2005, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Rechovsky and Imazeki 2001, 2003), I assume that educational
cost C in district i during time t depend on a performance objective S; resource prices W; student
need measures P; and student enrollment N. Thus, more formally:
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Cit= f(Sit, Wit, Pit, Nit)

(1)

The above cost equation indicates minimum spending required to reach a given level of student
performance assuming that the districts use the best available technology to provide education.
Researchers cannot observe costs but often know actual school district spending. Spending may
exceed costs as districts do not use the best available technologies. Districts exceeding costs are
considered as inefficient. Therefore, researchers cannot study determinants of school district’s
cost without controlling for school district’s efficiency.

To extend Equation 1 and control for efficiency let e stand for district efficiency in delivering S.
The value of e is to 1.0 in an efficient district. The value of e is between zero and one in
inefficient districts. A district that does not use best practice (0 < e < 1) must spend more than an
efficient district (e = 1) to achieve the same level of performance S, holding all else equal. Using
e to scale Equation 1 the cost and efficiency equation is:

𝐸𝑖𝑡 =

𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑓(𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑊𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡 )
=
𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑖𝑡

(2)

Duncombe and Yinger (2011a) point out an important conceptual misunderstanding regarding
efficiency in the context of education. The production of public education is strongly
characterized by multiple outputs and input sharing. The same teachers and classrooms,
supported by the same administrative services produce many different outputs. Among these
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outputs are student performance in English and mathematics, graduation rates, as well as student
performance in art, music, athletics and citizenship.

Given multiple outputs and input sharing in the production of education, inefficiencies in the
production of test scores may have two different sources. First, inefficiencies can reflect
spending to promote outputs other than test scores. Second, inefficiencies can reflect the
overpayment in inputs or the ignorance of least cost technology in the production process. For
example, a school district that is efficient in delivering student performance in test scores may
not be efficient in delivering student performance in art or athletics. Indeed, spending for art and
athletics may have little impact on test scores. Therefore, it is a source of inefficiency in the
production of test scores. A good art and athletics program may, of course, contribute to
students’ general conceptual skills with some spillover to mathematics. However, in most cases
spending on these programs will not have an impact comparable to an increase in spending on
instruction in classes where students are tested.

4.4 Application of Theoretical Framework

The entry of charter schools can influence expenditures per pupil by affecting cost factors (W, P,
N), performance objectives (S), or efficiency (e). I start with analyzing the direct effect of charter
schools on cost factors. To analyze the effects for each cost factor separately, I am assuming
performance, efficiency, and the respective other cost factor to be constant. In a next step, I
evaluate the effect of charter schools on performance objectives. Then, I discuss the effects of
charter schools on district efficiency. In a last step, I look into different conceptualizations of per
pupil expenditures.
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It has to be noted that charter school influence cost factors, performance outputs, and efficiency
through two separate mechanisms. First, charter schools can influence inputs, outputs, and
efficiency of traditional public schools. Second, cost factors, output, and efficiency may be
different for charter schools than for traditional schools. Both effects together create the net
effect in which charter schools influence per pupil expenditures in public schools.

Direct Influence of Charter Schools on Cost Factors
Important cost factors in the provision of education are resource prices (W), student needs (P),
and enrollment size (N). Each factor is discussed separately in the following sections. Resource
prices for traditional public and charter schools (W), and particularly teacher salaries, are
strongly influenced by school district characteristics such as the cost of living, local amenities,
labor market conditions, and working conditions for employees (Duncombe and Yinger 2008).
The cost of living in a school district are defined as the resources required to purchase a standard
bundle of goods and services. The greater the cost of living is the more a school districts or a
charter school must pay to attract employees of a given quality. Holding all other factors
constant, charter schools are unlikely to have a direct effect on the cost of living in the school
district.

School district amenities are access to or proximity to natural sites, transportation, cultural
events, and other state or local services (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Holding all other factors
constant, including performance objectives, charter schools are unlikely to have a direct effect on
amenities in the school district.

135

Labor market conditions can also affect the salaries a school district or a charter school is
required to pay. For instance, if an areas unemployment rate for professionals is high relative to
the rest of the state, then teachers and school administrator in that area may have relatively
limited choices of alternative jobs and hence be more apt to accept school district offers with
lower salaries and benefits (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Charter schools are unlikely to
influence overall labor market conditions.

Also, districts and charter schools may trade off spending on factors related to working
conditions against increased teacher compensation. Working conditions reflect both: school
district policies and factors outside districts control (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). School
district policies include school and class size, spending for professional development, school
leadership and culture. Working conditions outside school districts influence are strongly
influenced by students’ characteristics and will be discussed together with student need
measures.

Charter schools are exempt from certain local and state regulations and are likely to have
different working conditions than traditional public schools (Ni 2012; Malloy and Wohlstetter
2003). Charter schools can reduce compensation if they offer better working conditions than
traditional public schools. Charter schools have to increase compensations if their working
conditions are worse compared to traditional public schools. Further, charter schools could
influence the working conditions in traditional schools. Districts may start emulating working
conditions in charter schools, Districts will have to pay greater compensations if working

136

conditions decrease compared to the time prior charter school entry. Districts will have to pay
less compensation if working conditions improve.

Student needs (P) are another important input factor. School districts with high concentrations of
students living in poverty or with limited English proficiency face much greater costs than other
school districts to reach a given performance objective (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Further,
student characteristics can affect mobility decisions of teachers (Hanushek, Kain, Rifkin 2004).
Districts with high concentrations of high cost students need to pay greater compensation than
other districts to have the same quality of teachers. These districts also have higher costs in
recruiting and training teachers.

Charter school students can cross attendance zone boundaries and change the student
composition of schools located in the same district as the charter school (Bifulco and Bulkley
2014). Holding all other factors constant, including efficiency, I do not expect costs to increase if
students only switch schools within a district. However, charter schools students can cross
district boundaries as well and change the student composition of districts receiving and loosing
students. In the receiving district, the cost of educating students increase if the share of high cost
students increases. Contrarily, cost decrease if the share of high cost students decreases. In the
school district loosing students, cost increase if low cost students leave the district and cost
decrease if high cost students leave the district.

Student enrollment (N) influences the cost of providing education through economies of scale.
Economies of scale are the result of declining per unit costs as the number of units increases. In
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education, the focus has been on economies of size, which refer to a decline in per-pupil
expenditures with an increase in district enrollment, controlling for other cost factors (Andrews,
Duncombe, and Yinger 2002). There are mainly four explanations for economies of size in
education. First, some district service such as central administration are relatively fixed. Thus,
the same administrative staff may be able to serve a significant range of enrollment without
decline in service. Second, larger districts may be able to employ more specialized labor which
could improve the quality of instruction at no additional costs. Third, in larger districts teachers
have more possibilities to draw on the experience of other teachers. Fourth, larger districts may
be able to negotiate better prices for bulk purchases of supplies and equipment31 (Duncombe and
Yinger 2008).

Charter schools are likely to influence economies of size at the district and the school level. By
attracting students from outside the district charter schools change the enrollment in the district
they are located and the district students are transferring out.

Influence of Charter Schools on Performance Objectives
Performance objectives (N) are set by a political-administrative process in the school district
(Meier and Stewart 2001; Meier and O’Toole 2003; Chubb and Moe 1990). According to Meier
and O’Toole (2003), the process is likely be influenced by organizational structures of the school
district, organizational stability, and management efforts to exploit the environment and to buffer

31

The existence of economies of scale has been challenged by several authors (see Hanley 2007; Gronberg et al.
2013; Kuziemko 2006). However, cost functions provide consistently evidence for the existence of economies of
scale (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002).
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environmental shocks. The cost of providing education change with modifications of the
performance objectives.

If charter school entry triggers greater performance objectives for traditional public schools,
costs for traditional public schools are likely to increase. Costs for traditional schools are likely
to decrease if charter schools lead to lower performance objectives. Charter school set their
performance objects in a process separate from the school district. Costs for charter schools will
be greater than for traditional schools if performance objectives are greater than for traditional
schools. Costs for charter schools will be lower than for traditional public schools if charter
performance objectives are lower than for traditional schools. Therefore, the net effect of charter
schools on performance objectives and ultimately costs is driven by both: the effect of charter
schools on performance objectives for traditional schools and the performance objectives charter
schools set for themselves.

How Charter Schools Influence Efficiency
In the cost function context, efficiency is concerned with changes in the technology to produce a
given performance objective. Efficiency can be improved in two ways. First, technology can
reduce the inputs necessary to produce a given performance objective. Second, technology can
increase the performance level reached with a given set of inputs. Conversely, efficiency
decreases if more inputs are necessary to reach a given level of performance or a lower level of
performance is realized with a given set of inputs. Charter schools alter the efficiency of
providing education and can either increase or decrease efficiency. I start with describing two
mechanisms leading to increasing efficiency before turning to mechanisms decreasing efficiency.
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The first mechanism leading to an increase in efficiency is created through competition for
students. It has been argued that the traditional public school system does not provide incentives
for local school districts to produce education in an efficient way (Hanushek 1986). The reason
for the lack of incentives is seen in education monopoly of local school districts and the absence
of competition. Charter schools create competition for traditional schools. According to charter
school proponents, competition for students will lead to more efficient use of resources (W)
(Hoxby 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Dee 1998).

Charter schools are exempt from many local and state rules including collective bargaining
agreements. Hence, charter schools may have an opportunity to choose technologies that are
more efficient compared to the technologies traditional public schools in the same district use.
Also, traditional schools may start emulating successful charter schools in their educational
practices or develop new technologies to compete for students. Both effects, the use of more
efficient technologies by charter schools and the change in technology by traditional public
schools may lead to an increase in school district efficiency.

A second mechanism leading to an increase in efficiency operates through student composition
(P). If students sort differently into schools after charter school entry, concentrations of high and
low costs students may change. The change is likely to involve charter as well as traditional
public schools simultaneously. For instance, if charter schools attract large shares of high cost
students, it is likely that the remaining low costs students enroll into traditional public schools
and vice versa. Compositional changes impact efficiency through at least two channels (Booker
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et al. 2008). First, the composition of the student body may affect the instructional technique
decisions of teachers. The best technique for delivering effective instruction to a classroom of
students homogeneous in composition may differ from that technology which works best with a
heterogeneous class.

Second, the composition of the student body may directly affect performance via peer effects.
For example, adding a disruptive student to a classroom might well reduce the ability of other
students to learn. Also, performance is affected by the mean ability of the individual’s peers, peer
group racial, and gender composition (Hoxby 2001). Hence, student responses to the same
change in peers may be quite different. The net effect of any compositional changes
accompanying charter school entry is ambiguous ex ante, as the precise dimension of the
compositional changes and the directional impact of those changes is not clear. However, to the
extent that compositional effects have a positive impact on student performance, the equilibrium
sort under the new institutional structure may lead to improved performance among students
remaining behind at existing public schools.

There are three mechanisms leading to decreasing efficiency (see for these mechanisms Bifulco
and Reback 2014). The first mechanism operates through the provision of services for charter
schools. Districts in many states have to provide services for charter schools such as
transportation, health services, and special education evaluations (Bifulco and Buerger 2014). If
charter schools increase enrollment the unit costs of these services could decrease. However, the
cost of providing these service may be higher if districts have to deliver services to students
spread across a large number of schools. Particularly, for transportation this will be true.
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Additionally, administering charter school payments and coordinating service to charter school
increase the workload in district offices. Thus, it is likely that charter schools increase the costs
for administrative and central services (Bifulco and Reback 2014).

A second mechanism decreasing efficiency takes place at the school level. Charter schools
introduce a second public schools system. Hence, charter school entry is likely to increase the
number of school buildings and associated facility and maintenance costs. Closing a public
school is contentious undertaking as discussions of recent school closure in Chicago and
Philadelphia show32. Often closure is not possible until enrollment is sufficiently small to and
decreases in enrollment are likely to persist for future school years. Also, school districts have to
maintain facilities in case charter schools close or their enrollment drops suddenly. All these
aspects are likely to increase costs of educating students (Bifulco and Reback 2014).

A third mechanism operates through personnel cost. Charters schools are likely to attract only
few students out of each classroom in traditional public school. Consequently, the number of
teachers in traditional public schools cannot be reduced while the district has to pay for
additional teachers in charter schools. Generally, the uncertainty regarding charter school
enrollments a school district faces make it more difficult to maintain targeted class sizes and
student teacher ratios. School districts willing to maintain their targets have to put err on the side

32

For Chicago: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/education/despite-protests-chicago-closing-schools.html?_r=0
For Philadelphia: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/philadelphia-officials-vote-to-close-23schools.html
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of smaller classes increasing costs. Again, all these aspects are likely to increase costs of
educating students (Bifulco and Reback 2014).

4.5 Data and Measurements

To estimate the effect of charter schools on school district expenditures, I utilize a data set
including New York State school districts for the years 1998-99 to 2008-09. I exclude New York
City, as I do not have data necessary to include it in the cost function. Further, I exclude 33 nonK-12 districts as their cost functions differ from districts providing education for all students.
Further, I reduce my sample to school districts that are located within a metropolitan statistical
area (MSA). All charter schools in NYS are located in MSAs, and hence I only compare them to
other districts located in MSAs. After dropping a few districts because of missing variables, the
final sample includes 440 school districts. The sample period is ideal for studying the effect of
charter schools as one year before the opening of the first charter school is included in the data.
Further, I can consistently measure school district performance for the entire time period.

The following sections explains the variables used in the analysis in more detail. Table 19
provides the summary statistics for all the variables presented.

Spending Measures
To measure spending, I used school district expenditure measures from the Annual Financial
Report (ST3) of the NYSED. The ST3 expenditure measure includes general support services,
instruction, transportation, community services, employee benefits, debt services (principal and
interest) and interfund transfers. Using the ST3 measure I construct current and operating
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expenditures (Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger 2014). Current expenditures are derived by
subtracting payments on debt service from total expenditures. Operating expenditures equal
current expenditures minus transportation spending. Transportation cost are not linked directly to
student performance and involve a unique set of cost factors such as the districts area and
population density. Thus, the effect of charter schools on operating expenditures is my primary
concern in this chapter. However, as transportation has to be provided by districts to charter
school students, I include models using current expenditures in the analysis as well.

Using these two expenditure measurements, I can conceptualize spending in three different ways.
The first way uses the above described measures including district payments to charter schools.
Charter school are not considered to be local education agency in New York State. Hence,
charter school receive most of the state and federal payments they are eligible for through the
school districts their students reside. Assuming that charter schools spend the received payments,
the measure is a good approximation for charter school expenditures.

I divide the expenditures for regular and for charter schools by the enrollment of traditional and
charter school students residing in the district. Therefore, the enrollment equals regular public
school students and the students enrolled in charter schools living in the same district. The
resulting quotient is an approximation of the burden placed on tax payers by the entry of charter
schools.

A second way of conceptualization expenditures adds private contributions to charter schools to
the first measurement. The second measurement can be used to analyze how charter school
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influence the burden placed on society as a whole to educate students in public schools. Baker
and Ferris (2011) argue that private contributions are particularly high for charter schools in New
York City. For the FY 2007-08, the authors find private contributions between $0 and $15,000
per pupil in donations. Thus, in extreme cases, private contributions make up to 60 percent of all
charter school revenue. The picture for charter schools outside NYC, which are analyzed in this
study, is somewhat different. In 201133, on average only 4 percent of revenues were coming from
private contributions (SUNY 2014). Therefore, as the amount of private contributions is small
and private contributions for years prior 2010 are not available for all charter schools, I do not
construct the second measurement.

The third measurements is the quotient of school district expenditures, excluding payments to
charter schools, and district enrollment, excluding the enrollment in charter schools. The
measurement can be used to evaluate how charter schools effect spending on students in
traditional public schools. Unfortunately, I am unable to exclude the expenditures imposed on
school districts for services to charter schools such as special education evaluation,
transportation, and health services.

Performance Measures
Student performance is a key variable in cost functions. Performance measures for this study
have to cover a range of student performance indicators and have to be consistently measured
across years. I use performance measures based on New York State report cards. The report
cards are based on standardized tests examining student proficiency and mastery particularly in

33

I analyze the financial audits in FY 2011 as audits for earlier time periods are not available for all charter schools
(http://www.newyorkcharters.org/progress/school-performance-reports/).
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mathematics and English. The examinations are central to New York State’s accountability
system and NYSED publishes the test results as part of each school’s annual report card. Starting
in 1998-99, this system was used consistently until the 2009-10 school year when NYSED
changed the cut scores for proficiency levels. To avoid inconsistency, I limit my sample to the
years 1998-99 to 2008-2009.

I construct a performance index consisting of the equally weighted average percentage of
students reaching proficiency levels in reading and mathematics exams in 4th and 8th grade.
Further, I include the percentage of students receiving a Regents Diploma by passing at least five
Regents exams and the percentage of students not dropping out of high school. I can include or
exclude the performance of charter school students into the measurement. Including charter
school performance makes the measurement representative for all school in the district.
Excluding the performance of charter school students makes the measurement representative for
all traditional public schools in the district.

Enrollment Measures
I compute three different enrollment measures in this chapter. First, I count the students residing
in a school district that are enrolled into a charter school. For these enrollment counts, I include
students who cross the district border to attend a charter school in another district. Second, I
count students residing in a school district that are enrolled in traditional public schools. Third, I
construct a measure including all students residing in a school district enrolled in charter or
traditional public schools (as the sum of the first and second measurement). As in other work on
cost functions, I use the log of student enrollment and allow for a nonlinear relationship between
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per pupil expenditures and enrollment including a squared term [log(enrollment)]2 (Duncomber
and Yinger 2008, 2011b). Both measures are taken from the Basic Educational Data System
(BEDS).

Similar to Rockoff (2010), Duncomber and Yinger (2011b), and Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and
Yinger (2014), I include change in district enrollment in the cost function as well. I define
enrollment change as the percentage change in enrollment over a two year period. I estimate the
impact of enrollment increase and decreases of students in traditional public schools separately.
Changes in enrollment are outside a district’s control and can be interpreted as cost factors. As I
am controlling for district enrollment, the enrollment change variables indicate whether two
districts with the same enrollment and performance have different costs if one of these districts
experiences a change in enrollment and the other one is not.

Cost-Related Measures
Researchers have long recognized that cost of education depend on many factors outside a school
district’s control. These factors include wage environment, student enrollment, and concentration
of disadvantaged students among the student population (see Duncombe and Yinger 2008 for an
overview). Thus, I include the following variables in the cost models:



Teacher Salary: Teacher salary data comes from the “personnel master file” (PMF)
administered by the New York State Education Department (NYSED). The salary
variable is the average salary a district pays to teachers with one to five years of
experience, controlling for the actual experience and education of teachers in that district.
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Percent share students free and reduced price lunch: Information on free and reduced
price lunch are taken from the BEDS.



Percentage share of students with limited English proficiency: Information on students
with limited English proficiency are taken from the BEDS.



Percentage share of students with severe disabilities: Information on students with severe
disabilities are taken from the BEDS. As severely disabled count students that require
teacher consultation services or spend at least 60 percent of their time out of the regular
classroom.

Efficiency-Related Measures
Costs are defined as the minimum spending of district resources required to provide students an
opportunity to reach a given level of student performance. However, the dependent variable in
the cost model is per pupil spending. As discussed earlier, inefficiency in the cost function
context can include both waste and district’s choice to focus on non-tested subjects areas (e.g.
arts and athletics). While it is not possible to measure efficiency directly, it is possible to control
for it indirectly and thereby to minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias.

I follow Duncombe and Yinger (2005, 2011a) and apply two techniques to control for efficiency.
First, I will run specifications including district fixed effects enabling me to control for all
district characteristics including efficiency that do not vary over time. A general limitation of the
approach is that it removes all cross-section variation and undermines the ability to estimate the
impact of S, W, and P on costs. However, in this study I am mainly interested in the effect of
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charter school enrollment on district efficiency. Charter school enrollment varies tremendously
over time and its effects on costs can still be observed.

Second, I include variables in the cost function that have been linked to school district efficiency
in previous research. Note that none of the following variables has to be linked to the impact of
charter schools on efficiency. Following Duncombe and Yinger (2005, 2008, 2011a, 2011b), I
include various income sources, tax price, and other factors affecting voter involvement in
monitoring district officials in my models. Income may affect efficiency in two ways. First,
higher income may weaken voter’s incentive to monitor school officials. Second, a higher
income may encourage voters to push for a broader set of education objects. A tax price
decrease, similar to an increase in income, weakens voter’s incentive to monitor school officials.
Contrarily, an increase in tax prices is likely to boost voter’s incentive to monitor school
officials. Demographic factors such as the share of college educated parents and the share of
children in the total population have been found to be negatively influencing school district
efficiency. Thus, I include these demographic factors in the cost models as well. I use the
following variables to control for district efficiency:



STAR tax share: The School Tax Relief Program (STAR) provides state funded property
tax relief for home owners in New York State. Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014)
show that STAR increases school district inefficiencies, and hence I include the star tax
share in the cost function. I construct this measurement using data from the NYSED
Fiscal Profile Reporting System (FPRS) and the American Community Survey (ACS).
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State aid ratio: To control for the amount of state aid a school district receives, I adjust
state aid payments to the school district by district income, property value, and received
STAR payments. Information is comes from FPRS and ACS.



Local tax share: The local tax share is calculated by dividing the market price of houses
in a district by the property value per pupil. Information on the local tax share comes
from FPRS and ACS.



Income per pupil: Information on per pupil income in the district is coming from FPRS.



Percentage share of college graduates: This variable measures the share of parents with
college education in a school district.



Percentage share of youth: This variable measures the share of 5 to 7 year olds in a
school district.

4.6 Empirical Strategy

The empirical strategy focuses on the effects of charter schools on the efficiency of providing
education. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher salaries
and student characteristics as well as performance. Thus, holding cost factors constant the
coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by changes in district efficiency
associated with charter school enrollment. The caveat in the interpretation of the coefficient
attached to charter school enrollment as efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability,
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district they transferred to. The cost of
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bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares of either low
or high ability students transfer into the district. The coefficient on the charter school enrollment
variable will be downwardly biased if the incoming students have a high ability to reach the
performance goal set by the district. The coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable
will be upwardly biased if the incoming students have a low ability to reach the performance
goal set by the district.

The estimation strategy is similar to a difference-in-differences framework. I compare per pupil
expenditure in districts with and without charter school enrollment before and after charter
school entry. The estimation assumptions are that trends in per pupil expenditure in district with
charter school enrollment were parallel prior charter school opening. To ensure the fulfillment of
this assumption, I conduct falsification tests examining the similarity in trends prior charter
entry. Further, charter school entry should not be correlated with other events influencing school
district per pupil expenditures or efficiency. To ensure the fulfillment of this assumption, I
conduct falsification tests examining changes in per pupil expenditures for districts without
charter school enrollment but located in a county with at least one charter school and per pupil
expenditure for another local service.

For other parts of my empirical strategy, I follow Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014) who
estimate a cost function for a similar time period to evaluate the effects of New York State’s
property tax relief for home owners on district spending. Similar to their work, I treat the STAR
tax share and the adjusted aid ratio as endogenous because STAR induced changes in spending
or performance may be capitalized into housing values. I construct instruments that substitute the
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predicted market price of houses in a district and the property value per pupil into the STAR tax
share and adjusted aid ratio. The predications are based on 1999 values inflated by the CaseShiller home price indices for New York published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Using this approach, I can capture growth in the market prize of houses and property value per
pupil while removing the impact of STAR at the same time.

In their review of literature on cost functions Duncombe and Yinger (2008) point out that teacher
salary and student performance are treated as endogenous as well. Following Eom, NguyenHoang, and Yinger (2014), I instrument for teacher salary with the average manufacturing wage
in the districts county. The instruments for performance are exogenous traits of school districts in
the rest of the district’s county. A districts own choice are likely to be influenced by choice of
nearby districts, and the choice of nearby districts are influenced by their exogenous traits. More
specifically, I use average percentage of high cost students and LEP students in the rest of the
county as instruments34.

Similar to Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014), I examine the appropriateness of the
instruments using two instrument tests namely overidentification and weak instrument tests. The
results of these tests will be discussed in the next section. Further, I use Fuller’s estimator (k=4),
which according to Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2004), proves to be less subject to
potential bias from weak instruments than two-stage-least squares.

34

In future drafts, I will instrument for charter school enrollment using the diversity of parent education and race as
instrument.
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I estimate all cost functions including district fixed effects, linear district time trends, and year
fixed effects. District fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant districts influencing
efficiency or cost. The district trends control for a district’s spending trajectory and the year
fixed effects for specific characteristics of the years included in the sample.

4.7 Results

Table 20 presents results for cost functions using charter school indicators and counts of charter
school in the district as independent variables of interest. For the sake of brevity, I report only
the estimated coefficients on the charter school indicators but note that all specifications reported
in Table 20 and all subsequent tables include the full set of control variables, district fixed
effects, and district specific trends. The first set of results in Table 20 are based on models using
per pupil expenditures including payments to charter schools for a student count including
charter school students as dependent variable. The second set of result uses expenditures
excluding payments to charter schools and a student count without charter school students as
dependent variable. All subsequent tables follow the same format.

The first two columns state results for charter school indicators turning on after a charter school
moves into a school district. The estimated coefficients on the indicator are negative, close to
zero, and not statistically significant. Columns III and IV use a charter school count as
independent variable of interest. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The
result suggest that an additional charter school decreases the per pupil expenditures used to
achieve a given level of achievement in the district by 1.5 percent. Columns V and VI split up
the charter school count in measurements indicating different numbers of charter schools. The
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coefficients on the indicators up to two charter schools are close to zero and statistically not
significant. The coefficient on the indicator for three charter school is negative and statistically
not significant. The coefficients on the remaining indicators are negative and statistically
significant. Having four or more charter schools in the district decrease current and operating
expenditures used to achieve a given level performance level by about 7 percent35 relative to a
district with no charter school.

The second set of columns presents results for regressions using expenditures without charter
school payments as dependent variable. In Column VII and VIII, similar to the previous
estimations, the coefficients on the charter school indicator are negative and not statistically
significant. Columns IX and X show negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
charter school count. The result suggest that an additional charter school in the district decreases
the per pupil expenditures used to achieve a given level of performance by traditional schools by
about 2 percent. Columns XI and XII report the coefficients on the measurements indicating
different numbers of charter schools. The coefficients are all negative. The coefficients attached
to the first two indicators are not statistically significant. The coefficients on the following
indicators are statistically significant. They indicate that three charter schools decrease per pupil
spending used to achieve a given level of performance by about 6 percent and four or more
charter schools decrease spending by about 10 percent.

Table 21 states results using charter school enrollment as independent variable of interest. The
models in Table 21 take charter school enrollments from outside the district into consideration,

35

It is important to note that there are only 4 districts with more than one charter school.
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and hence are preferred to the results presented in Table 20. Again, the first set of results are
based on models using expenditures including charter payments as dependent variable. The
second set of results are based on models using expenditures without charter school payments as
dependent variable. Columns I and II report coefficients on indictors for different charter school
enrollments. The coefficients on the first two indicators are close to zero and statistically not
significant. The following indicators have negative and statistically significant coefficients.
Enrolling between 200 and 300 students in charter schools decreases district expenditures used to
achieve a given level of student performance by about 3.5 percent. Enrolling between 300 and
500 students in charter schools decreases expenditures by about 3 percent. Finally, enrolling
more than 500 students in charter schools reduces spending by about 8 percent.

The next model represents the specification I prefer for estimating the effect of charter schools
on district expenditures. The first term is the log of charter school enrollment in the school
district and the second term is the log of enrollment squared. The specification gives full
functional form flexibility while at the same time even small changes in charter school
enrollment are taken into account. In Columns III and IV, the coefficients on both terms are
statistically significant. To illustrate the magnitude of the charter school effect, I calculate the
effect for different enrollments and graph the result in Figure 12. Charter schools decrease
district expenditures between 1.1 and 3.4 percent depending on the number of students enrolled
in charter schools. The effect grows with increasing charter school enrollment. The graph shows
a step fall of the effect up to the enrollment of 500 students. Afterwards, the effect decreases at a
slower rate.
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The next columns in Table 21 use an expenditure measurement without charter school payments
as dependent variable. In Columns V and VI, similar to the pervious specification, the
coefficients on the indictors for a charter school enrollment up to 300 have coefficients close to
zero and they are not statistically significant. The coefficients on the next indicators are negative
and statistically significant. Enrolling between 200 and 500 charter school students decreases
spending for students in traditional schools by 4.5 percent. Enrolling more than 500 students in
charter school decreases spending for students in traditional public schools by about 9.7 percent.

Columns VII and VIII include the log of charter school enrollment and the squared log of charter
school enrollment as independent variables of interest. The coefficients on both measurements
are statistically significant. The varying magnitude of the charter school effect is depicted in
Figure 13. Charter schools decrease spending for students in traditional schools between 1.5 and
4.3 percent. The effect is more negative with increasing charter school enrollment. Again, the
effect decreases sharply up to an enrollment of 500 students. Afterwards, decreases at a slower
rate.

The results stated in Table 20 and 21 are estimated using instruments for teacher salary, the
STAR and state aid term. I conducted Hansen’s J over-identification tests for the 2SLS models
and the results were consistent with valid instrumental variables: p-values ranging from .37 to
.53 for rejecting the null hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variables. Further, the
instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. I report the first stages of the
two stage estimations in Table 22. All coefficients are statistically significant. Further, the Fstatistics in the first stage regressions range between 34.41 and 139.53, and hence are greater
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than the suggested value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). These statistics and the
use of the Fuller (k=4) estimator suggest that the results are unlikely to be biased due to weak
instruments.

4.8 Falsification Tests

While the results in Tables 20 and 21 provide evidence that charter schools increase school
district efficiency, one may be concerned that charter schools move into districts already
experiencing increasing trends in efficiency. Moreover, one may be concerned that charter
school enrollment is correlated with other events increasing efficiency in providing education. I
investigate these two issues by conducting three falsification tests. The idea behind the
falsification tests is simple, if the effects of charter school enrollment on district spending are
truly causal than they should only hold for the relevant time period, areas that have charter
schools, and local expenditures related to education.

Table 23 summarizes the results of the falsification tests. All tests are based on models with
operating expenditures as dependent variable, a logged charter school enrollment term, and a
squared term of the logged charter school enrollment. The first column states results for a
falsification test including enrollment leads for one and two years prior the first charter school
enrollment in the district. The lead variables are equal to the charter school enrollment one and
two years after charter school opening in the same district. The coefficients on the lead variables
are not statistically significant and much smaller than in the previous models. The effect of the
false charter school enrollment is close to zero. Thus, there is little reason to suspect a large bias
in the initial estimates due to uncontrolled differences in trends prior charter school opening.
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Column II states a falsification test using districts without charter school enrollment. For these
district, I create a false charter school enrollment. The false enrollment equals the enrollment in
the district with the most charter school students in the same county. As control group serve
districts being located in counties having no charter school enrollment prior 2008/09. The
coefficients on the two charter school enrollment terms are not statistically significant and the
effect size is very close to zero. The results suggest that charter school enrollment is not
correlated with other events at the county level influencing spending decisions.

The third column presents a falsification test using the per pupil expenditures for another local
service as dependent variable. I collected the expenditure for the local fire services from the
webpage of the New York State comptroller36. Then, I merge this information to the
corresponding school districts. Using these false per pupil expenditures, I rerun my main
specification. The coefficients are all close to zero and not statistically significant. The results
suggest that charter school enrollment is not correlated with other events at the district level
influencing spending decisions.

The second part of Table 23 uses the same specifications but with per pupil expenditures without
charter school payments. The results are similar accept for the specification using leads for one
and two years prior the first charter school enrollment. The coefficients on the logged enrollment
for both lead years are statistically significant. However, the effect is close to zero meaning that

36

The webpage can be found here: http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/findata/index_choice.htm. As the
areas of the local fire services and school district do not match perfectly in all cases, I was unable to provide
information for all school districts. .
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charter school enrollment leads to a 0.00 percent increase or decrease in expenditures. The next
two columns show coefficients suggesting no effect of charter schools on spending. All
coefficients are not statistically significant and the magnitude of the effects is close to zero. The
results confirm that charter school enrollment is not coincidently related to other events at the
county or district level influencing per pupil expenditures.

4.9 Heterogeneity of the Estimates

Tables 24 and 25 provide several robustness checks using different samples of school districts,
charter school enrollment in different grades, and differentiates the charter school effect by time.
The first two columns in Table 24 show results for subsamples of districts located up or
downstate. The coefficients are not statistically significant and the charter school effect is much
smaller than in the main specification. Given the results, charter schools do not seem to have a
different effects in areas close to New York City and areas further away.

Column III to V present models using subsamples of districts with different need/resource
capacities. The model using a subsample with high need districts shows statistically significant
coefficients on both enrollment terms. The magnitude of the effect is larger than in the main
specification ranging from -1.8 to -7.3 percent for enrollments between 50 and 5000 charter
school students. The larger magnitude is not a surprise as most charter schools locate in districts
with high need/resource capacity and these districts are likely to drive the overall result.

The model using a subsample with average need districts shows statistically insignificant
coefficients. The magnitude of the effect is close to zero. The result is somewhat surprising as
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two districts having charter schools are located in districts with average need/resource capacity.
According to the theoretical framework, there are two potential explanations for the result. First,
charter school enrollment does neither create efficiency gains nor access cost. Second, both
mechanism cancel each other out.

In Column V, I present results using a sample of districts with low need resource capacity. Recall
from Table 18 that none of the charter schools is located in a low need district, and hence charter
school enrollments in this sample are solely based on students crossing school district borders.
The coefficients on the two enrollment terms are statistically significant. The magnitude ranges
between -0.7 and -7.2 percent for enrollments between 2 and 20 students. The magnitude is
similar compared to districts with high need/resources capacity. Therefore, the effect of charter
school enrollments on per pupil expenditures is driven by districts with high and low
need/resource capacity.

The following columns present the results for models using per pupil expenditures without
charter school payments as dependent variable. Models using the subsamples of districts located
up or downstate do not show statistically significant coefficients and the charter school effect is
close to zero (Columns VI and VII). The result indicates that the effect of charter school
enrollment does not differ between regions closer or further away from New York City. In
Columns VII to X I re- run the main specification using samples of school districts with high,
average, or low need/resource capacity. Similar to the earlier presented results in the same table,
the coefficients for subsamples using high and low need/resource capacity school districts are
statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect for district with high need capacity ranges
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between -1.5 and -6.7 percent for charter enrollments between 50 and 5000 students. The
magnitude of the effect for districts with low need capacity ranges between -0.8 and -7.3 percent
for enrollments between 2 and 20 students. Again, the effect of charter school enrollments on per
pupil expenditures is driven by districts with high and low need/resource capacity.

The first two columns of Table 24 present a robust check based on different grades offered by
charter schools. The first column presents the results using a subsample with charter school
enrollment in grades K to 6. The coefficients on the enrollment terms are statistically significant.
The effect ranges between -1.1 and -3.2 percent for enrollments between 50 and 4000 students.
The coefficients on the enrollment terms for the subsample of students in grades 7 to 12 are not
statistically significant. Therefore, the overall result is driven by charter enrollments in grades K
to 6. This is not a surprises as a greater shares of charter school students is enrolled I the grades
(see Table 18).

Column III presents the results for a model splitting the post period up in tree intervals of three
years each. The coefficients on the interactions between enrollment and a post period of 4th to 6th
year after the first charter school enrollment are statistically significant. The magnitude of the
effect ranges between -1.0 and -3.3 percent for enrollments of 50 and 5000 students respectively.
The result suggests that reductions in per pupil expenditures are mainly realized 4 to 6 years after
charter school entry.

The second section of Table 25 presents the results using per pupil expenditures without charter
school payments. The results are similar to the results presented in the first part of the table. The
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coefficients on the charter school enrollment terms are statistically significant for the subsample
of charter school students in grades K to 6. The effect ranges between -0.8 and -2.7 for
enrollments or 50 to 4000 students respectively. Again, the result suggest that the overall result
for models using expenditures without charter school enrollment are driven by enrollments in
grades K to 6.

Column VI investigates the timing of the charter school effect. Similar to the previous results,
the coefficients on the interactions between enrollment and a post period of 4th to 6th year after
the first charter school enrollment are statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect ranges
between -1.3 and -3.9 percent for enrollments of 50 and 5000 students respectively. Again, the
result suggests that reductions in per pupil expenditures for traditional public school students are
mainly realized 4 to 6 years after charter school entry.

4.10 Conclusions

In the theoretical section of the chapter, I work out how charter schools affect school district
performance and the costs and efficiency of providing education. The empirical strategy aims at
estimating the effects of charter school enrollments on efficiency while controlling for costs and
performance. Utilizing data for all New York State school districts (excluding New York City)
from 1998/99 to 2009/10, I find that charter school increase the efficiency of providing
education. The results are confirmed by several falsification and robustness checks.

The magnitude of the efficiency effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in
charter schools. The effect ranges between -1.1 and -3.4 for enrollments between 50 and 5000
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charter school students holding performance and cost factors constant. Given average per pupil
expenditures of $15,395 (including charter payments), charter school reduce district expenditure
on average between $169 and $523 per pupil.

The caveat in the interpretation of the coefficient attached on charter school enrollment as
efficiency variable is that I have to control for all potential cost factors associated with charter
schools that could influence per pupil expenditures. However, in this draft of the chapter, I
cannot control for the ability of the students crossing district borders. Later drafts will shine more
light into transferring students and will instrument for charter school enrollment.

Given multiple outputs and input sharing in the production of education, the reduction of
inefficiencies in the production of test scores may have two different sources. First, the reduction
could reflect decreases in spending for outputs other than test scores. Second, the reduction could
reflect the use of more efficient technologies to educate students.
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Figure 12: Effect of Charter Schools Enrollment on Per Pupil Expenditures Including Charter Payments
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Table 18: Summary of Charter School Openings and Enrollments
District

First Charter
Number of
Established Charter Schools
in 2008/09

Location:
Downstate

Location:
Upstate

High Need
District

Average Need
District

Charter
Enrollment
K to 6

Charter
Enrollment
7 to 12

Albany
1999/00
9
Yes
Yes
1536
313
Buffalo
2000/01
14
Yes
Yes
3845
2400
Rochester
2000/01
5
Yes
Yes
783
190
Roosevelt
2000/01
1
Yes
Yes
178
50
Riverhead
2001/02
1
Yes
Yes
117
0
Kenmore-Tonawanda 2001/02
1
Yes
Yes
85
37
Troy
2001/02
1
Yes
Yes
321
16
Lackawanna
2002/03
1
Yes
Yes
299
46
Syracuse
2002/03
2
Yes
Yes
505
364
Yonkers
2005/06
1
Yes
Yes
242
2
Niagara Falls
2006/07
1
Yes
Yes
319
0
Source: Number of charter schools and year of establishment are taken from the SUNY Charter School Institute web page (http://www.newyorkcharters.org).

Share of
District
Enrollment

Charter
Enrollment
Outside District

19.18%
15.91%
2.84%
7.64%
2.48%
1.44%
7.54%
15.09%
4.14%
1.04%
4.11%

381
1385
53
273
115
1441
152
178
44
114
17
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Table 19: Summary Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

16,314

4,470

9,750

49,920

16,319

4,474

9,750

49,920

15,395

4,266

9,160

48,449

15,399

4,269

9,160

48,449

Charter School enrollment (by residence)

0.03
15.06

0.45
199.76

0.00
0.00

14.00
6245.00

Performance Variable
Performance Index (incl. student proficiency,
diploma rates, non-dropout rates)

75.29

11.14

29.18

97.94

Cost Related Variables
Teacher salary (1 - 5 years experience)
Enrollment (by residence)
Percent of students with severe disabilities
Percent LEP students
Percent free lunch

22,505
3,317
1.31
2.04
19.84

9,324
3,721
0.82
3.52
15.82

1
208
0.00
0.00
0.00

61,744
45,459
7.46
33.21
90.84

Efficiency Variables
Local tax share
STAR tax share
State aid term
Income per pupil
Percent college graduates
Percent yout (age 5 - 7)

0.44
0.78
0.02
115,776
28.33
17.54

0.14
0.13
0.02
95,391
14.91
2.34

0.03
0.32
0.00
25,180
6.00
8.81

1.05
1.00
0.22
993,261
83.40
26.56

1.30

0.36

0.00

2.60

1.71

1.84

0.00

5.98

48,560

13,875

20,756

99,889

0.75

0.09

0.44

1.00

0.02

0.02

0.00

0.38

Dependent Variables
Current expenditures per pupil
(with charter school payments)
Current expenditures per pupil
(without charter school payments)
Operating expenditures per pupil
(with charter school payments)
Operating expenditures per pupil
(without charter school payments)
Charter School Variables
Number of charter schools

Instrumental Variables
Average percent of high cost students in the
county (excluding focal district)
Average percent of LEP students in the
county (excluding focal district)
Annual county average salary of
manufactering jobs
STAR tax share with inflated 1999 property
values
Adjusted state aid ratio with 1999 property
values

Notes: Summary measurements include fiscal years 1999 to 2009. All monetary variables are adjusted for inflation
and displayed in 2009 dollars.

166

Table 20: Charter School Effect on District Expenditures Using Charter Indicators
Expenditure without
Charter School Payments

Expenditure including
Charter School Payments

Charter School variables
Charter school indicator

Current
(I)

Operating
(II)

-0.00289
(0.0151)

-0.00249
(0.0155)

Current
(III)

-0.0150***
(0.00545)

Charter school count

Operating
(IV)

Indicator for 2 charter schools
Indicator for 3 charter schools
Indicator for 4 charter schools
Indicator for 5 or more charter schools

4,731
0.793

4,731
0.772

4,731
0.795

Operating
(VI)

Current
(VII)

Operating
(VIII)

-0.0176
(0.0159)

-0.0185
(0.0164)

-0.0157***
(0.00555)

Indicator for 1 charter school

Observations
R squarred

Current
(V)

4,731
0.774

0.00615
(0.0151)
0.00293
(0.0356)
-0.0428
(0.0275)
-0.0723**
(0.0360)
-0.0719**
(0.0358)

0.00651
(0.0156)
0.00742
(0.0362)
-0.0420
(0.0276)
-0.0725*
(0.0374)
-0.0730**
(0.0367)

4,731
0.791

4,731
0.770

4,731
0.792

4,731
0.771

Current
(IX)

Operating
(X)

-0.0215***
(0.00521)

-0.0229***
(0.00531)

4,731
0.796

4,731
0.775

Current
(XI)

Operating
(XII)

-0.00192
(0.0157)
-0.00889
(0.0411)
-0.0597**
(0.0275)
-0.103***
(0.0355)
-0.0954**
(0.0383)

-0.00239
(0.0163)
-0.00512
(0.0425)
-0.0605**
(0.0278)
-0.107***
(0.0370)
-0.0989**
(0.0398)

4,731
0.791

4,731
0.769

Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist
of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax
share, and state aid term.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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Table 21: Charter School Effect on District Expenditures Using Charter Enrollment
Expenditure including
Charter School Payments

Charter School variables
Charter enrollment < 100
Charter enrollment < 200 students and > 100
Charter enrollment < 300 students and > 200
Charter enrollment < 500 students and > 300
Charter enrollment > 500

Current
(I)

Operating
(II)

0.000845
(0.00364)
0.000734
(0.0118)
-0.0354*
(0.0200)
-0.0290**
(0.0128)
-0.0795***
(0.0209)

0.000738
(0.00382)
5.14e-05
(0.0121)
-0.0369*
(0.0212)
-0.0299**
(0.0131)
-0.0802***
(0.0217)

Log charter enrollment

Operating
(IV)

Current
(V)

Operating
(VI)

0.000227
(0.00372)
-0.00427
(0.0114)
-0.0441**
(0.0194)
-0.0442***
(0.0134)
-0.0960***
(0.0216)

0.000071
(0.00390)
-0.00548
(0.0118)
-0.0465**
(0.0205)
-0.0465***
(0.0136)
-0.0984***
(0.0225)

0.00776**
0.00812**
(0.00379)
(0.00400)
-0.00238*** -0.00246***
(0.000833) (0.000870)

Log charter enrollment squarred

Observations
R squarred

Current
(III)

Expenditure without
Charter School Payments

4,731
0.794

4,731
0.773

4,731
0.793

4,731
0.772

Current
(VII)

Operating
(VIII)

0.00871**
0.00919**
(0.00388)
(0.00409)
-0.00295*** -0.00311***
(0.000837) (0.000875)
4,731
0.794

4,731
0.773

4,731
0.793

4,731
0.771

Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and
year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated
using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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Table 22: First Stage Coefficients

Performance Index
Average percent of high cost students in the
county (excluding focal district)
Average percent of LEP students in the
county (excluding focal district)
Annual county average salary of
manufactering jobs
STAR tax share with inflated 1999 property
values
Adjusted state aid ratio with 1999 property
values

Dependent Variables
STAR Tax share
Teacher Salary

Adjusted aid ratio

0.0012
(0.0046)

0.0219***
(0.004)

-0.0002***
(0.0001)

0.0001
(0.0004)

0.0063**
(0.003)

0.0293**
(0.0144)

0.0138***
(0.0019)

0.0007**
(0.0003)

0.0507***
(0.0109)

0.4438***
(0.0638)

-0.0054
(0.0061)

-0.0005
(0.0011)

-0.0412
(0.0397)

0.354**
(0.1737)

1.3250***
(0.0189)

0.0799***
(0.0049)

0.0001*
(0.0000218)

-0.0001**
(0.000027)

-0.0001**
(0.000027)

-0.0001***
(0.000021)

Note: Other variables in the first stage results are not displayed.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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Table 23: Falsification Tests
Operating Expenditure including
Charter School Payments

Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment (1 year lead)

Leads

Area Change

(I)

(II)

Spending
Fire Dept.
(III)

Operating Expenditure without
Charter School Payments
Leads

Area Change

(IV)

(V)

Spending
Fire Dept.
(VI)

0.0272
(0.0218)
-0.00197
(0.00208)

-0.0138
(0.0374)
0.00114
(0.00652)

-0.00056
(0.00045)
-0.0004
(0.00044)
0.000275
(0.00105)
-0.000161
(0.000981)
0.00512**
(0.00044)
-0.00257**
(0.001)

0.0272
(0.0217)
-0.00198
(0.00208)

-0.0129
(0.0391)
0.000629
(0.00742)

-0.00086**
(0.00041)
-0.00069
(0.00044)
0.00019**
(0.00097)
0.00015
(0.00011)
0.0082*
(0.00442)
-0.00343***
(0.00092)

Control Variables
Performance Variable
Enrollment Variables
Cost Variables
Efficiency Variables

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Fixed Effects and Trends
District fixed effects
District trends
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

4,731
0.782

775
0.752

2,946
0.357

4,731
0.780

775
0.752

2,946
0.356

Log charter enrollment squarred (1 year lead)
Log charter enrollment (2 year lead)
Log charter enrollment squarred (2 year lead)
Log charter enrollment
Log charter enrollment squarred

Observations
R squarred

Note: All regressions are estimatd with district and year fixed effects. Sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan
statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for
teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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Table 24: Heterogeneity Checks Using Area and Need/Resource Capacity Subsamples
Operating Expenditure including
Charter School Payments

Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment
Log charter enrollment squarred

Observations
R squarred

Operating Expenditure without
Charter School Payments

downstate
urban
(I)

upstate
urban
(II)

high need

avg. need

low need

upstate
urban
(VII)

high need

avg. need

low need

(V)

downstate
urban
(VI)

(III)

(IV)

(VIII)

(IX)

(X)

-0.00654
(0.00967)
0.000772
(0.00206)

0.00101
(0.00488)
-0.00119
(0.00112)

0.0289***
(0.00758)
-0.00599***
(0.00117)

-0.00458
(0.00693)
-0.000173
(0.00183)

0.0318**
(0.0122)
-0.01743**
(0.0052)

-0.00710
(0.00972)
0.00159
(0.00206)

0.000215
(0.00492)
-0.000552
(0.00118)

0.0281***
(0.00786)
-0.00559***
(0.00123)

-0.00544
(0.00689)
0.000719
(0.00180)

0.033**
(0.0123)
-0.0178**
(0.0052)

1,441
0.779

2,847
0.795

385
0.805

2,692
0.677

1,045
0.804

1,441
0.783

2,847
0.793

385
0.803

2,692
0.680

1,045
0.804

Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are
included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard
errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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Table 25: Heterogeneity Checks Using Grade Enrollment Subsamples and Interactions with Time
Operating Expenditure including
Charter School Payments
(I)
Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment (K to 6)
Log charter enrollment squarred (K to 6)

(II)

0.00775**
(0.00392)
-0.00242***
(0.000859)

Log charter enrollment (7 to 12)

(IV)

(V)

Log charter enrollment X 1st to 3rd year post

-0.00783
(0.00673)
-0.000604
(0.00151)
0.00408
(0.00394)
-0.00155**
(0.000676)
0.00828*
(0.00450)
-0.00243***
(0.000644)
0.00369
(0.00608)
-0.000815
(0.000857)

Log charter enrollment squarred X 1st to 3rd year post
Log charter enrollment X 4th to 6th year post
Log charter enrollment squarred X 4th to 6th year post
Log charter enrollment X 7th to 9th year post
Log charter enrollment squarred X 7th to 9th year post

4,731
0.785

(VI)

0.00789*
(0.00405)
-0.00212**
(0.000916)
-0.00742
(0.00675)
-0.000808
(0.00153)

Log charter enrollment squarred (7 to 12)

Observations
R squarred

(III)

Operating Expenditure without
Charter School Payments

4,731
0.785

4,731
0.782

0.00475
(0.00393)
-0.00203***
(0.000679)
0.00875*
(0.00453)
-0.00278***
(0.000673)
0.00335
(0.00625)
-0.000904
(0.000900)
4,731
0.786

4,731
0.786

4,731
0.782

Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed
effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and
serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax
share, and state aid term.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
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